Essays on Agglomeration and Inter-Jurisdictional Competition by Koh, Hyun-Ju
Essays on Agglomeration and
Inter-Jurisdictional Competition
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
im Jahr 2009
vorgelegt von
Hyun-Ju Koh
Referent: Prof. Dr. Rainald Borck
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Michael Pflüger
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 10. Februar 2010
Acknowledgements
First I want to thank my supervisor Rainald Borck for his academic guidance and encour-
agement. He gave me the freedom to pursue my research interests and was always willing
to discuss new ideas and thoughts with me. His comments and suggestions improved every
paper of the dissertation.
I am also grateful to my second supervisor Michael Pflüger. His fascination for regional and
urban economics spilled over and became my favorite research interest. I am also thankful
for his efforts to arrange a research stay abroad.
I thank Andreas Haufler who completes my thesis committee for valuable comments on my
research. I am also indebted to Gilles Duranton who served as a local supervisor during
my stay at the University of Toronto. I much enjoyed doing research in such an inspiring
environment.
I gratefully acknowledge financial and academic support from the Bavarian Graduate Program
in Economics and the Elitenetzwerk Bayern.
Special thanks go to my co-authors for the rewarding experience that doing research together
is much more fun.
Part of the chapters were presented at conferences: the meeting of the Austrian Economic
Association (NoEG) in Vienna, 2008, the Annual Meeting of the European Economic Asso-
ciation (EEA) in Milan, 2008, the IIPF Meeting in Maastricht, 2008, the Public Economic
Theory (PET) Meeting in Seoul, 2008 and the Annual Meeting of the German Economic As-
sociation (VfS) in Magdeburg, 2009. I thank all participants for their comments. I also thank
all seminar participants of the BGPE Workshop, Public Economics Seminar and participants
of the Trade Seminar at the University of Toronto for their remarks.
Special thanks go to my colleagues at the department: Wolfgang Habla, Ferdinand Mitter-
maier, Ines Pelger and Nadine Riedel for enjoyable conversations especially those beyond
economics. Wolfgang Habla and Mohammed Mardan for research assistance and Anita Hof-
mann for handling all administrative affairs.
Most importantly, I am deeply indebted to my family. Their love and support helped me to
endure especially difficult times during my years of studies.
Hyun-Ju Koh
Munich, 25 September 2009
Contents
Introduction 1
1 Assessing the Localization Pattern of German Manufacturing & Ser-
vice Industries -
A Distance Based Approach 9
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Estimation Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.1 Step 1: Calculation of Kernel Density Estimate . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3.2 Step 2: Constructing Counterfactuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.3 Step 3: Global Confidence Bands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.4 Step 4: Identification of Localized Industries . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Results: Industrial Localization in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.1 Geographical and Sectoral Scope of Localization . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5 The Ellison and Glaeser (1997) Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.5.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5.2 Results with the EG index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Contents ii
2 Taxing Agglomeration Rents:
The importance of localization and urbanization for local business
taxation 41
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2 A Simple Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4 Empirical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5.1 Baseline Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5.2 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3 Inefficient Lock-in and Subsidy Competition 85
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2.1 Basic Set Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2.2 Preferences and Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2.3 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.2.4 Long run equilibrium and welfare: the symmetric case . . . . . . 96
3.2.5 Long run equilibrium and welfare: the asymmetric case . . . . . 101
3.3 Subsidy Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.3.1 Basic Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.3.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.5 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Contents iii
3.5.1 Break point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.5.2 Sustain point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.5.3 Locational Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.5.4 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4 The winner gives it all:
Unions, tax competition and offshoring 121
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.2 The basic model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.2.1 Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.2.2 Industrial production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.2.3 Mobile factor’s reward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.2.4 Union wage setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.3 Tax competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.3.1 Second Stage: Periphery’s government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.3.2 First Stage: Core’s government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.4 Winners and losers of the subsidy race . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
4.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.7.1 Proof of Proposition 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.7.2 Proof of Proposition 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
4.7.3 Proof of Proposition 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5 The merits and pitfalls of co-agglomeration:
Contents iv
Vertical linkages and regional competition 149
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.2.1 Basic Set Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5.2.2 Preferences and Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.2.3 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.3 Locational equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.4 Competition for a key industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
5.4.1 Stage 2 - Periphery’s decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
5.4.2 Stage 1 - Core’s decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5.6 Locational forces of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
5.6.1 Final goods sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
5.6.2 Intermediate goods sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
5.7 Proof of Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
5.8 Derivation of φB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
5.9 Cost-of-living indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
5.10 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
5.10.1 Proof of Proposition 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
5.10.2 Proof of Proposition 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
5.10.3 Proof of Proposition 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Bibliography 189
List of Figures
1.1 Kernel Density Functions and Global Confidence Bands . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2 Industry location pattern for four illustrative industries . . . . . . . . 21
1.3 Kernel Density Functions for Cutlery (WZ2861) and Motion picture,
video distribution activities (WZ9212) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4 Γm and Ψm by distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5 Distribution of γEG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.1 Raumordnungsregionen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.1 Locational equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.2 Bifurcation diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3 Social welfare: symmetric region size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.4 Bifurcation diagram for asymmetric region size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.5 Agglomeration rent for asymmetric region size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.6 Social welfare: asymmetric region size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.7 Govt 2’s Decision (zd2 > 0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.1 Stability of core-periphery equilibria under asymmetric unionization . . 132
4.2 Core’s welfare function for different union wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.3 Foreign workers’ welfare differential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Contents vi
4.4 Welfare of h’s union workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
4.5 Welfare of h’s non-union workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.6 Home’s welfare difference for different union wages . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.1 Upstream industry (X) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.2 Downstream industry (M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
5.3 Core’s subsidy necessary to defend industry core . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
List of Tables
1.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2 Plant Size Distribution (DO index) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Industry Size Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Most Localized Manufacturing Industries (DO index) . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5 Most Localized Service Oriented Industries (DO index) . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6 Most Dispersed Manufacturing Industries (DO index) . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.7 Location of Plants in the Weaving Industry (WZ1722) . . . . . . . . . 30
1.8 Intra-Industry Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.9 Geographical and Industrial Concentration for Different Administration
Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.10 EG index for different administration units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.11 Most Localized Industries with EG index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.12 Most Dispersed Industries: EG index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.2 Number of Employees - Localized Industries at 0km . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.3 Number of Employees - Localized Industries at 10km . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.4 Sum Localized Industry Shares - Localized Industries at 0km . . . . . . 73
Contents viii
2.5 Sum Localized Industry Shares - Localized Industries at 10km . . . . . 74
2.6 Number of Employees in Core Regions - Localized Industries at 0km . . 75
2.7 Number of Employees in Core Regions - Localized Industries at 10km . 76
2.8 First Stage Regressions Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.9 Similarity - Localized Industries - DO index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.10 First Stage Regressions - Similarity Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.11 Employees in Core Regions - Localized Industries EG index . . . . . . . 80
2.12 Similarity Index - Localized Industries - EG index . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.13 Robustness Check - Market Potential and Diversification . . . . . . . . 82
Introduction
The concentration of economic activity across space percolates through every spatial
scale. An often cited example at the cross-country level is certainly Roger Brunet’s
concept of Europe’s Blue Banana.1 It describes the densely populated industrial region
that stretches across several countries in Europe, notably from the North West of Eng-
land down to the North of Italy including major cities like Amsterdam, Cologne and
Frankfurt am Main. Core-periphery patterns of industrial activity are equally observed
at the sub-national level like the U.S. manufacturing belt, Route 128 in Massachusetts
or Île-de-France to name just a few examples. Moving further down the spatial scale,
the existence of cities is probably the most conceivable example to illustrate the irreg-
ular nature of economic activity in space. Measuring the degree to which economic
activity concentrates and unveiling the underlying (economic) factors is at the heart of
regional and urban economics. However, much as the clustering of economic activity is
a fascinating area of research of its own it is also closely linked to public policy ques-
tions as firm location choices inevitably affect households’ welfare through demand and
supply side effects. Moreover, recent years have witnessed a steadily growing literature
which relates agglomeration economies2 to questions in public finance. As will be laid
out in detail below, recognizing the propensity of economic agents to co-locate in space
has important implications for tax policy and qualifies results obtained in previous tax
competition models.
The doctoral dissertation presents the author’s contributions on the consequences of
agglomeration economies for local business taxation and policy competition.3 Chap-
ter 1 begins with the identification of localized manufacturing and service industries
in Germany. Using a rich data set on the population of German firms we apply two
1Brunet (1989).
2The terms ‘agglomeration’ and ‘localization’ will be used interchangeably. I also follow Hoover (1936),
who defines localization economies as the benefits generated by the geographical proximity of firms
producing similar goods. ‘Urbanization’ economies in contrast capture the benefits that arise from
the overall economic activity in a particular location.
3Chapters 1 and 2 originate from collaborating work with Nadine Riedel. Chapter 3 is joint work with
Rainald Borck and Michael Pflüger and Chapter 4 results from collaborating work with Ferdinand
Mittermaier.
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different identification approaches for localization, the distance based approach of Du-
ranton and Overman (2005) and the discrete measure proposed by Ellison and Glaeser
(1997) which are both well established in the literature and reflect the state of the art
in that research field.4 Traditional measures of agglomeration such as the spatial GINI
coefficient used in Krugman (1991b) or Audretsch and Feldman (1996) compare the
employment pattern of one industry to that in the aggregate but fail to distinguish
between concentration stemming from industry characteristics5 and concentration in
response to agglomeration economies. We therefore employ more sophisticated mea-
sures which control for both the general tendency for firms to concentrate and the plant
size distribution. We find the location pattern of most industries to depart substan-
tially from randomness in the sense that firms are exposed to significant agglomeration
forces. In line with previous studies on manufacturing firms in the UK and France, our
analysis suggests that especially traditional manufacturing industries exhibit strong ag-
glomeration patterns. Moreover, we find that geographical localization is not restricted
to the manufacturing sector but that it plays an equally, or even more important role
in service industries.
Unquestionably related to the measurement of localization is the identification of the
underlying causes of agglomeration, a research field which dates back to early contri-
butions by von Thünen (1826) and Marshall (1890) and which still constitutes a lively
research area both theoretically and empirically.6
In his Principles of Economics, Alfred Marshall envisages three main causes for indus-
try agglomeration which result from ‘thickly peopled’ industrial districts that can be
subsumed under the categories - knowledge creation and knowledge processing, sharing
of intermediate goods suppliers and sharing a common labor market. The first channel
refers to the spillover of ideas, (tacit) knowledge and skills which are immaterial and
4Combes and Overman (2004) provide an excellent overview on different agglomeration measures.
5In extreme a one-plant monopolist will be considered as being agglomerated simply because all
employment is concentrated in one plant. Concentration however is not the result of agglomeration
economies but simply due to the plant size distribution.
6Duranton and Puga (2004) provide a detailed survey on the micro-foundations of agglomeration
economies. The interested reader is referred to Rosenthal and Strange (2004) who for a comprehensive
overview of the empirical literature on the sources of agglomeration.
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therefore hard to observe. The second describes a typical risk sharing effect: The spatial
concentration of industry allows a division of the overall production process to many
subsidiary industries which produce specialized intermediate inputs. The constant de-
mand from different final goods producers in a densely populated area then facilitates
the bearing of high fix costs for specialized machinery that is needed to produce inter-
mediate inputs. Finally, similar to the preceding channel, Marshall (1890) mentions
the benefits of producing in a densely populated area with a variety of employment as
it offers a ‘constant market for skill’. This involves improved matching between workers
and employers as well as risk sharing among firms against idiosyncratic shocks. Firms
are able to easily release workers in response to firm specific output contractions and to
easily hire workers in times where output is expanded. Additionally, Marshall (1890)
also stresses the importance of factors like the proximity to the sea, favorable climate
conditions or fertile soil for a number of traditional industries.
In accordance with Krugman (1991a) primary factors exogenously assigned by na-
ture are defined as first-nature geographies whereas agglomeration that emerges from
the interaction of individual economic agents are labeled second-nature geographies.
Opposed to first nature geographies, second nature geographies are to a large extent
endogenous and could therefore be influenced by policy actions.
Industry clusters that rely on second nature geographies have caught recent attention
with Paul Krugman who has been awarded the Nobel prize in 2008 for his analysis of
trade patterns and the location of economic activity. His path breaking 1991 Journal
of Political Economy paper introduced a novel research area also referred to as the
‘New Economic Geography’ (NEG).7 The prominent Krugman (1991e) core-periphery
model combines increasing returns to scale, love for variety household preferences and
Samuelson (1954) iceberg transport costs in a general equilibrium framework and is
perceived as the prototype of agglomeration models. For certain parameter ranges,
pecuniary externalities that arise from the interaction of producers and workers de-
7The label ‘New’ in NEG is however debatable - it is rather the combination of existing ideas bor-
rowed from trade theory and modelling approaches like the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic
competition framework than the invention of a completely new research field (see also Neary (2001)
and Ottaviano and Thisse (2004)).
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manding manufactured varieties trigger a circular causality process that concludes in
a core-periphery constellation of industrial activity of ex ante identical regions.
By now, a sizeable number of contributions have enriched this field of research ac-
counting for partial agglomeration (Pflüger (2004)) or highlighting alternative sources
of circular causation such as input-output linkages between final goods producers and
intermediate input suppliers (Krugman and Venables (1995) and Venables (1996)), in-
stitutional labor market effects (Picard and Toulemonde (2006)), the availability of
local public goods (Roos (2004)) or endogenously qualified labor force (Picard and
Toulemonde (2004)) and agglomeration resulting from local technological spillovers
(Ulltveit-Moe (2007) and Borck et al. (2009)).8
One eminent feature that characterizes agglomeration models is the possibility that
economic activity can get locked-in in either location. In particular, accounting for
locational hysteresis challenges those predictions obtained from traditional tax com-
petition models9 where fiscal externalities between competing governments lead to a
race to the bottom of tax rates and sub-optimal levels of public goods provision. In
contrast, local governments in a world with agglomeration tendencies are able to tax
agglomeration rents up to a certain threshold without triggering an immediate outflow
of the mobile factor.10 But whereas the predictions of economic geography for govern-
ments’ tax setting behaviour are widely acknowledged in the theoretical literature by
now, empirical validation of taxable agglomeration rents still lags behind.11
The paper presented in the second chapter fills this gap and provides empirical evidence
for taxable location rents. It further identifies factors which favor the extractability of
agglomeration rents. Precisely, we empirically investigate the impact of firm agglom-
eration on jurisdictional tax setting behavior. Our testing ground is the German local
8For a recent survey of the new economic geography literature see Redding (2009). Other surveys
of the economic geography literature include Ottaviano and Puga (1998) and monographs by Fujita
and Thisse (2002) and Fujita et al. (1999).
9See Wilson (1999) for a detailed survey of the literature.
10This key insight of economic geography models for public finance has been pushed forward notably
by Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind et al. (2000), Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Borck and
Pflüger (2006).
11Notable exceptions include Charlot and Paty (2007) and Buettner (2001).
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business tax which is set at the municipality level. Exploiting a rich data source on the
population of German firms, we find evidence for effects of urbanization and localiza-
tion economies on the jurisdictional tax rate choice. In addition the paper shows that
a jurisdiction’s potential to tax agglomeration rents depends on the difference of its
agglomeration characteristics to neighboring communities. German municipalities tend
to set high local business taxes if they face large firm and industry agglomerations rel-
ative to neighboring communities. To account for potential reverse causality problems,
the analysis exploits long-lagged population and infrastructure data to instrument for
the agglomeration measures.
Likewise, multiple spatial equilibria and path dependency, both typical features of eco-
nomic geography models are particularly appealing for public policy analysis. Broadly
speaking, the Krugman type of model predicts that ex ante identical locations may
end up as a core or periphery region with residents in the core enjoying higher real
income than residents in the periphery. Which location evolves as the industrial core
region is however purely random. Rich anecdotal and empirical evidence support the
idea that an industry’s initial location is only to a limited extent predictable and often
simply caused by ‘historic accidents’.12 For instance, German expellees from Jablonec
nad Nisou (Czech Republic) who have been employed in the jewelery industry prior to
World War II settled to Neugablonz, a suburb of the city Kaufbeuren. Today Kauf-
beuren still shows considerable specialization in the manufacture of jewelery and is
considered as a major cluster of this industry.13
Additionally, the fact that economic activity is not evenly distributed across space but
separates into economically prosperous and peripheral regions is, of course, interrelated
12See for instance Redding et al. (2007) for a recent contribution on the location of German Airports.
Davis and Weinstein (2002) note that multiple equilibria are empirically irrelevant which is however
contradicted by Brakman et al. (2004) who confirm the existence of multiple equilibria for German
city growth.
13Other examples are documented in Marshall (1890). He points out that the expansion of a family
group into a village in Russia caused the localization of industry resulting in a number of villages all
specialized in one industry branch e.g. manufacturing the spokes for a wheel of a vehicle. Krugman
(1991b) himself begins his chapter on localization with the story of a girl named Catherine Evans
who presumably played a decisive role in the localization of the U.S. manufacturing carpet industry
in Dalton, Georgia.
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to disparities in regional welfare. (Immobile) workers in the rural area suffer from high
consumer prices and less attractive job opportunities contrary to households in the
industrial core. This unequal allocation of firms is clearly hard to accept especially for
policy makers. As a matter of fact, numerous corrective industrial policy programs on
every government level evidently indicate politicians’ effort to influence the location
choice of firms which eventually results in a competition for mobile capital between local
governments. This policy competition however occurs within an environment where
firms’ responses to policy interventions proceed non-linearly. Subsidy payments to the
mobile factor are harmless up to a certain level but fully reverse an existing location
pattern once this threshold is exceeded.14 Chapter 3 and 4 deal with the possibility that
economic activity is inefficiently locked-in in a region with smaller region size (Chapter
3) or distorted labor markets (Chapter 4). In both cases ‘history’ has chosen a less
suitable location, i.e. welfare of the whole economy could be enhanced if economic
activity relocated to the other location. Both chapters assess under which conditions
this inefficient allocation can be corrected by means of state subsidies.
In detail, the third chapter presents a subsidy game among two asymmetric regions
where geographically localized intra-industry spillovers serve as a source of agglom-
eration. This allows for stable locational equilibria where all industrial activity is
inefficiently locked-in into the smaller region. When regions weigh workers’ and capi-
talists’ welfare equally, the core region will set its subsidy low enough that the industry
relocates to the larger region, restoring an efficient allocation. Jurisdictional competi-
tion in this case corrects inefficiencies that result from external scale economies. When
workers’ welfare is weighted more heavily, the core may pay subsidies that are high
enough to prevent a relocation of industry. In this case industry remains inefficiently
locked-in in the smaller region.
Chapter 4 analyzes competition for capital between welfare-maximizing governments in
a framework with agglomeration tendencies and asymmetric unionization. We find that
a unionized country’s government finds it optimal to use tax policy to induce industry
14For a detailed illustration see Baldwin et al. (2003).
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to relocate towards a location with a competitive labor market instead of realizing the
benefits from higher wage income while exporting part of the wage burden to foreign
consumers. Via the tax regime effect, which favors the factor capital, and the efficiency
effect, consumers and producers alike benefit from off-shoring industry towards a low-
cost country. Our result qualifies first intuition that defending high wage industries is
beneficial to a country as part of the associated cost is shifted to foreign consumers.
Contrary to the preceding chapters 3 and 4, the last chapter of the dissertation presents
a true vertical linkage model in the spirit of Venables (1996) that considers produc-
tion linkages as a source of agglomeration. The paper recognizes the recent shift in
several national industrial policy strategies as outlined in the latest OECD report on
regional policies (OECD (2007)). It assesses a cluster strategy where public funds are
distributed to firms of an industry of which local authorities believe that it fosters
an ongoing co-agglomeration process. The attraction of one industry induces further
establishments of related industries to co-locate as this lowers the cost of purchasing
intermediate inputs. In contrast to the preceding theoretical models, overall welfare
could not be enhanced by shifting the core to the other location. The equilibrium out-
come of the subsidy race then reveals that a welfare maximizing periphery will abstain
from snatching the industrial core as the financing costs exceed the benefits of attract-
ing a core industry. The allocation of economic activity remains unchanged. Except
for capital owners of the subsidized industry core residents suffer from financing sector
specific subsidies that are necessary to prevent a relocation of industry.
All in all, the doctoral dissertation comprises theoretical and empirical contributions
to topics in industry agglomeration and public finance. It provides a detailed picture
of the industry structure in Germany and unveils that first and second nature geogra-
phies considerably shape the location pattern of economic activity in Germany. In
addition it also documents the persistence of industry agglomeration over time. The
subsequent chapter confronts theoretical predictions of the economic geography liter-
ature with German firm level data. The empirical findings confirm the existence of
agglomeration rents and unveils factors that may hamper the extraction of location
Introduction 8
rents. The dissertation continues with three theoretical contributions which emphasize
different sources of agglomeration. In the broader sense, the theoretical models elab-
orate on inefficiencies that arise from increasing returns to scale and/or labor market
distortions. The results qualify traditional views that inter-jurisdictional competition
is always inefficient. They also highlight distributional tensions that arise between
different factor owners notably workers and capitalists.
Chapter 1
Assessing the Localization Pattern of
German Manufacturing & Service
Industries -
A Distance Based Approach
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1.1 Introduction
More than a hundred years ago Marshall (1890) pointed out the stylized fact that
some industries tend to geographically cluster whereas others do not. However, for the
century to come rigorous empirical tests of industry agglomeration in space turned out
to be impossible due to a lack of appropriate data. The few studies that addressed
the problem were refined to a comparison of the industry structure of large geographic
units like countries or regions and could thus provide a rough insight into agglomeration
patterns at most.1 It has just been in recent years that access to micro-geographic data
sets has become available in several countries which allow researchers to assign firm
activity to smaller geographical units like municipalities or postcode areas and thus to
determine (more) precise agglomeration patterns in space.
The first influential approach to test for industrial localization in space using micro-
geographic data was developed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) (in the following abbre-
viated with EG). They construct an index for industrial agglomeration which is based
on the idea to compare the concentration of industries in a jurisdictional unit to the
jurisdiction’s overall firm activity while at the same time controlling for the industry’s
plant size distribution. If an industry tends to cluster over and above general agglom-
eration tendencies in a geographical area, it is defined to be localized. Although the
EG approach has several advantages,2 it has nevertheless been criticized in the lit-
erature on the grounds that it relies on the unrealistic assumption that geographical
agglomeration ends at the jurisdictional border which makes the results sensitive to
the spatial aggregation of the geographical units used for the calculation. This prob-
lem has been addressed in a recent contribution by Duranton and Overman (2005) (in
the following abbreviated with DO) who calculate industrial agglomeration patterns
based on bilateral firm distances in an industry and determine whether the industry’s
location pattern significantly deviates from randomness. Consequently, they avoid the
1For an overview for the European Union see Combes and Overman (2004).
2Advantages of the Ellison and Glaeser (1997) that have been noted in the literature are: a) it is
comparable across sectors, b)it controls for the overall concentration of economic activity and c) it
accounts for the industry’s plant size distribution (see e.g. DO).
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jurisdictional border issue faced by the EG methodology.
In this paper, we employ the DO approach to identify localized four-digit industries in
the manufacturing and service sector in Germany based on a unique data set on the
population of German plants. Our findings suggest that 78 % of the industries show
a geographical concentration in space that deviates from randomness. This fraction is
somewhat larger than the one reported in previous studies for the UK and France (DO
and Maurel and Sedillot (1999)). In line with these previous papers, we find especially
traditional manufacturing industries like e.g. textile production to be strongly local-
ized which is consistent with Marshall’s predictions on the sources of agglomeration
that should be invariant to country characteristics.3 Note, however, that the study
also suggests some important differences between industry agglomeration in Germany
and other countries. For example the metal industry seems to exhibit especially strong
localization patters within German borders. As many of the traditional localized in-
dustries in our study belonged to the drivers of the industrialization process during
the 19th century and the production pattern of the German economy has changed
enormously since then, our study equally suggests that agglomeration patterns are
quite persistent over time. Moreover, the analysis indicates that localization occurs
at shorter distances and that localized industries hold an overproportional share in
employment.
A second contribution of our paper is that we do not follow DO in restricting the analy-
sis to manufacturing industries. At the contrary, our aim is to present a comprehensive
picture of the location pattern of four-digit industries in Germany and thus, we equally
include service industries in the analysis. Interestingly, we find that the majority of
service industries included in our analysis show spatial agglomeration whereas espe-
cially financial administration and the entertainment industry show strong localization
patterns. Thus, our analysis indicates that agglomeration tendencies are not unique to
3Marshall (1890) identifies three potential sources for geographical agglomeration: saving on transport
costs through input sharing, labor market pooling effects and technological spillovers of which all
three are expected to be largely independent from country-specific characteristics. Moreover, large
local labor markets offer further productivity advantages additional to labor pooling effects e.g.
improved matching between workers and firms (see e.g. Helsley and Strange (1990) and Duranton
and Puga (2004).
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manufacturing firms but are equally, or even more pronounced in the service sector.
Last, we complement our paper by rerunning the analysis based on the EG method-
ology and find a slightly larger percentage of industries to be localized, namely 86 %.
This reflects the fact that the EG methodology is in general less rigorous in declaring
an industry to be agglomerated than the DO approach as it is not based on statis-
tical departure from randomness. Moreover, we also show that the EG index is not
invariant to the geographical unit of observation which is used for its calculation but
that it strongly increases in the aggregation level of the observation units employed.
For example, some of our industries exhibit a negative EG index indicating a dispersed
location pattern if the index is calculated at a disaggregated level and at the same time
show a strong positive EG index indicating agglomeration if the index is calculated at
more aggregated levels. This sensitivity makes results obtained with the EG method-
ology difficult to interpret and thus, we consider the distance-based DO-approach to
be the superior measure which derives more reliable results.
Our paper adds to a small set of existing studies which determine industry agglomera-
tion on the basis of micro-data. In recent years a small number of studies has applied
the EG approach to determine agglomeration patterns of manufacturing industries in
the US, UK and France (Ellison and Glaeser (1997), Maurel and Sedillot (1999), Du-
mais et al. (2002), Devereux et al. (2004)). The paper most closely related to ours is
Alecke et al. (2006) who employ the EG methodology on three-digit industry data for
German counties to identify agglomeration patterns for the manufacturing industry
in Germany. As pointed out above, the EG approach is, however, very sensitive to
spatial aggregation which makes the results difficult to interpret across different scales
of aggregation.
The number of studies which resolve these problems and apply the more sophisti-
cated DO approach to determine the agglomeration in manufacturing industries is tiny
however and restricted to the countries of UK and France (see DO and Barlet et al.
(2008)). Our paper complements the literature here as we find that many traditional
manufacturing industries which show localization patterns in the UK and France are
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also localized in Germany. Moreover, contrary to DO, we do not restrict our analysis
to manufacturing industries, but equally include the service sector into the analysis
which we find to be strongly characterized by geographical localization.4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set and presents basic
summary statistics. In Sections 3 and 4, we summarize the DO methodology and
present our results. Section 5 reruns the analysis applying the EG methodology and
Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Data
Our analysis draws on a data set for the population of German firms provided by the
German Employment Agency (“Bundesagentur für Arbeit”) for the year 1999. The
data includes information on every plant in Germany that employs at least one worker
who is subject to compulsory social security contributions5 and provides information
on the number of employees, the four-digit industry code and the host municipality. In
total, the data set comprises 2,139,383 plants whereas we drop 6,902 observations due
to a missing industry code.
In contrast to previous studies on geographical localization that are restricted to the
manufacturing sector we include both, service and manufacturing industries in our
analysis. However, as the DO methodology is demanding in terms of computation
time and server capacity, we limit the calculation of the DO index to the year 1999 and
drop industries which are highly unlikely to show agglomeration patterns like public
libraries or activities of membership organizations. Furthermore, we disregard retail
and most wholesale industries as these commonly comprise a large number of plants
4Despite the continuously rising importance of industries in the tertiary sector, only a small number
has looked into the agglomeration of service industries so far. Except for a few contributions by
Barlet et al. (2008), Kolko (2009) and Alecke and Untiedt (2006), where the latter two analyses
are based on the discrete EG index, the location pattern of service industries has remained rather
unexplored.
5Not subject to social security contributions are civil servants, self-employed workers and workers with
minor jobs below an earnings threshold of about 400 Euros.
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which convexly increases the computation time for the DO methodology. The sample
for our baseline analysis then comprises 981,997 plants and 337 four-digit industries (of
which 254 belong to manufacturing and 83 belong to service industries6) with a total
of 15,280,213 employees located in 11,677 municipalities (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics
Number of plants 981,997
Number of four-digit industries 337
Number of employees 15,280,213
Average number of employment per plant 16
Number of municipalities 11,677
Moreover, Table 1.2 indicates that the size distribution of plants in our data is skewed
toward small establishments as 28 % of firms employ 1 employee only, 50 % employ
between 2 and 10 workers, 17 % between 11 and 50 workers and only 5 % of the
plants employ more than 50 employees. Moreover, the distribution of firms across
industries shows that the number of firms which operate within one four-digit industry
varies strongly between 10 and 56,535 firms whereas the median industry consist of
485 plants (see Table 1.3).
Table 1.2: Plant Size Distribution (DO index)
No. of employees per plant No. of plants in % of total firm number
1 278,223 28
2-10 492,732 50
11-50 164,498 17
>50 46,544 5∑
981,997 100
Last, to apply the DO methodology, we have to determine the bilateral distances be-
tween the plants in our sample. For this purpose we add Gauss-Krueger coordinates
for each municipality in our sample and assign the respective coordinates to all firms
located within the municipality’s borders. Consequently, firms located within the same
6The term service industry refers to industries that create an intangible object.
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Table 1.3: Industry Size Distribution
No. of plants per industry No. of industries in % of total industry number
10-199 111 33
200-499 61 18
500-999 49 15
1000-4999 74 22
>5000 42 12∑
337 100
municipality observe a bilateral distance of zero. As the majority of German munic-
ipalities comprise a rather small geographic territory, we presume that this approach
delivers sufficiently precise distance measures for the firms in our data set. The me-
dian of the bilateral distance between all plants in our data is determined with 312
kilometers whereas it varies between a minimum of 0 kilometers and a maximum of
888 kilometers.
1.3 Estimation Methodology
As indicated above, we follow the methodology proposed by DO to identify localized
industries in Germany. In the following, we will shortly sketch the underlying rationale
of the DO approach. The general idea of the approach is to determine the distribution
of bilateral distances between the firms in an industry and to compare this distribution
to a randomly drawn set of bilateral distances. An industry is defined to be significantly
localized or dispersed respectively if its distribution of bilateral distances significantly
deviates from the simulated random draws.
1.3.1 Step 1: Calculation of Kernel Density Estimate
In a first step, we calculate the bilateral distance between all establishments in an
industry m = 1, ..,M . We define di,j as the distance between plant i and j of industry
m and estimate the density of the bilateral distances Kˆm(d) at any point (distance) d
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with7
Kˆm(d) =
1
n(n− 1)h
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
f
(
d− di,j
h
)
(1)
where n is the number of plants in the industry, f is the Gaussian kernel function with
bandwidth (smoothing parameter) h.
1.3.2 Step 2: Constructing Counterfactuals
The goal of the analysis is to identify whether the location pattern of a considered
industry departs significantly from randomness. To do so, we calculate counterfactual
kernel density estimates for each industry m which are then compared to the actual
kernel density determined in (1). The counterfactual industry m˜ is created as follows:
(i) From the overall sample which comprises all plants located within Germany, we
randomly draw as many plants as the industry under scrutiny has.8 Two comments
are in order. First, we sample from the overall population of existing plants to control
for the overall tendency of economic activity to agglomerate. Put differently, we do
not assume economic activity to be uniformly distributed but account for the overall
pattern of firm activity in Germany. Second, each hypothetical industry needs to con-
sist of the same number of plants as the industry under scrutiny in order to control
for industrial concentration. (ii) We then calculate the bilateral distances of this hypo-
thetical industry m˜ and estimate the kernel density of the bilateral distances according
to (1).
We repeat (i) and (ii) a thousand times such that the simulation provides us with 1000
7See Silverman (1986) for details concerning the choice of the kernel function.
8Hence, the underlying assumption being that each location occupied by a plant of some industry is
also a potential location for plants of other industries. Our approach slightly deviates from DO as
the construction of our counterfactuals is based on locations of manufacturing and service industries
in Germany (as both, the manufacturing and the service sector are included in our analysis) whereas
DO account for the location of manufacturing firms only when constructing their counterfactuals (as
their whole analysis accounts for the manufacturing sector only). Thus, we compare the location
pattern of an industry to the the location pattern of all other industries, i.e. to the location pattern
of economic activity in general, and not only to the location pattern of the manufacturing sector.
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counterfactual estimates for kernel densities K˜sm˜(d), s = {1, ..., 1000} for each industry
m.
1.3.3 Step 3: Global Confidence Bands
In the next step, we compare the actual kernel density estimates to the simulated coun-
terfactuals. In order to make a statement about the statistical departure of the local-
ization pattern from randomness, we construct confidence bands using the simulated
counterfactual distributions. Following Duranton and Overman (2005), we consider
only the range of distances between zero kilometers and the median of all bilateral dis-
tances within the data, in our case distances between 0-312 km.9 By interpolation we
construct an upper and a lower global confidence band to which the actual distribution
of bilateral distances will be compared to. Any deviation from randomness can then
be concluded to indicate localization or dispersion. These global bands are created
as follows: For each distance d we pick a K˜sm˜(d) such that only 95 % of all randomly
generated distance density functions lie above or below this band. Put differently, only
5 % of our simulated estimators hit the upper global confidence band when considered
over all distances (0-312 km), the same holding for the lower band. Hence, for each d
in the interval [0,312] there is a K˜m(d) which creates an upper bound if viewed over
all d. And there is a K˜m(d) for each d ∈ [0, 312] which creates a lower bound if viewed
over all d ∈ [0, 312].
1.3.4 Step 4: Identification of Localized Industries
The last step is to compare the actual estimated distribution of bilateral distance with
the global confidence bands. An industry m is said to be localized if Kˆm(d) > K˜m(d)
for at least one d ∈ [0, 312], i.e. the estimated density departs from randomness for at
9As Duranton and Overman (2005) note a distance greater than the median distance could in principle
be interpreted as dispersion. However, we capture any dispersed industry within the range 0-312km
as we define an upper and a lower confidence band.
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least one distance. In contrast, an industry is said to be dispersed if Kˆm(d) < K˜m(d)
for at least one d ∈ [0, 312] and the industry is not localized. The localization and
dispersion indices are then defined as
Γm(d) ≡ max(Kˆm(d)− K˜m(d), 0) (2)
for localization and
Ψm(d) =
 max(K˜m(d)− Kˆm(d)) if
∑312
d=0 Γm(d) = 0,
0 otherwise.
for global dispersion. Graphically this means that the estimated distribution of dis-
tances of a localized industry lies above the global confidence band for at least one
distance d. An industry is identified as being dispersed if its estimated kernel density
function lies below the lower confidence band for at least one distance d and never
lies above the upper bound. Summing up the localization (dispersion) index over all
distances yields a measure Γm ≡
∑312
d=0 Γm(d) (Ψm ≡
∑312
d=0Ψm(d)) for the degree of
localization (dispersion). The larger the indexes, the larger is the localization and dis-
persion pattern respectively. Figure 1.1 shows three industries which are either globally
localized or dispersed. Solid lines indicate the actual density as estimated according to
(1) whereas the upper (lower) dashed line indicates the upper (lower) global confidence
band.
Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics (WZ1760) is globally localized as the
estimated kernel density function lies above the upper global confidence band for short
distances. This industry has a large cluster in the Ruhr area, in the state of Baden-
Württemberg and in Saxony as can be seen in Figure 1.2. Firms within these clusters
are located close to each other which explains the high density at short distances.
Manufacture of soap and detergents (WZ2451) is globally dispersed as the estimated
distribution lies below the lower global confidence band (lower dashed line) for some
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(a) Manufacture of Knitted and Crocheted Fabrics (WZ1760)
.
00
1
.
00
2
.
00
3
.
00
4
.
00
5
0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300
distance (km)
(b) Manufacture of Soap and Detergents, Cleaning and Pol-
ishing Preparations (WZ2451)
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(c) Manufacture of Jewelery (WZ3622)
Figure 1.1: Kernel Density Functions and Global Confidence Bands
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distances and does simultaneously not exhibit localization patterns, i.e. the estimated
distribution does not lie above the upper global confidence interval for any distance.
As Figure 2 illustrates, the location pattern of this industry is consequently much more
evenly distributed.
One major merit of the distance based DO approach is that it detects the localization
of economic activity across different spatial scales. As in DO we encounter industries
with kernel density functions that exhibit multiple peaks. Manufacture of jewelery
(WZ3622) exhibits a high density for distances below 30 km and a high density for
distances at intermediate distances 120-150 km (Figure 1.1c). Figure 1.2 illustrates the
location pattern of this industry. The clustering of firms within this industry begins in
the Ruhrgebiet area and moves downwards to a cluster in the state of Rheinland-Pfalz
and down to the state of Baden-Württemberg.
The last map in Figure 1.2 illustrates the location pattern of publishing and sound
recordings (WZ2214). DO reported this industry together with publishing of books
(WZ2211) to be strongly localized according to the DO index and only weakly ag-
glomerated according to the EG index. For our data we find that this industry is only
weakly localized according to the DO index (and, as will be shown later, among the
most dispersed industries according to the EG index).
1.4 Results: Industrial Localization in Germany
We find that 262 out of 337 (78 %) industries deviate from randomness (at a 5 %
confidence level) in the sense that they are globally localized. Decomposing our results
to manufacturing and service industries suggests that 181 of 254 (71 %) manufacturing
industries and 81 of 83 (98 %) of the considered service industries are globally localized
in Germany.
The fraction of localized manufacturing industries is slightly larger than the one re-
ported for the UK (52 %) and France (60 %) in earlier studies by DO and Barlet et al.
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Figure 1.2: Industry location pattern for four illustrative industries
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(2008). While this result may reflect a larger importance of industrial agglomeration
patterns in Germany compared to other countries, we think that the difference might
also be driven by sample variations which affect the identification strategy. First, both
DO and Barlet et al. (2008) choose a different counterfactual and constrain their sam-
ple of potential locations to those currently occupied only by manufacturing plants
whereas we treat each plant location as a potential location irrespective of the industry
sector. Moreover, the general distribution of economic activity in the UK and France
differs substantially from the general firm location pattern in Germany as economic
activity in both countries is far more concentrated in a small number of regions than for
Germany. It may therefore not be surprising that less industries in the UK or France
exhibit economic concentration over and above the general tendency to agglomerate
than in Germany, which comparatively exhibits a more regular location pattern. In
other words, a stronger urbanization pattern in the UK and France may make it more
difficult to identify industrial agglomeration patterns which go beyond urbanization.
Table 1.4 presents the twenty manufacturing industries which are identified to be most
localized according to the DO-index (Γm ≡
∑312
d=0 Γm(d)). Interestingly, we find that
especially traditional manufacturing industries tend to show strong spatial agglomera-
tion patterns. Among the twenty most localized industries three belong to textile and
nine industries are related to metal products. Some of these industries, in particular
the manufacturing of textile, jewelery and watches, were also identified as agglomerated
industries in the UK and/or France. As many of these agglomeration patterns evolved
with the industrial revolution in the 19th century, our analysis provides strong evidence
for the persistence of agglomeration patterns. One German peculiarity seems to be a
strong spatial clustering of metal and metal related industries. Whereas DO report
cutlery (WZ2861) as the only metal related industry among the ten most localized
industries in the UK, nine metal related industries are among the twenty most local-
ized industries in Germany. Moreover, industries like the building of ships and floating
structures (WZ3511) and the processing and preserving of fish (WZ1520) which depend
on the proximity to the sea were found to be among the most dispersed in the UK but
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Table 1.4: Most Localized Manufacturing Industries (DO index)
Four-digit industries No. of firms Γm
2861 Manufacture of cutlery 291 .648
3661 Manufacture of imitation jewelery and related articles 110 .640
1722 Weaving of carded yarn 17 .370
3350 Manufacture of watches and clocks 218 .328
1724 Weaving of silk yarn 29 .302
1760 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics 672 .242
1593 Manufacture of wine from grape 344 .237
1594 Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines 46 .203
2874 Manufacture of chain and springs, fasteners and screw machine products 479 .193
2710 Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys 546 .180
2734 Cold drawing of wire 82 .180
2731 Cold drawing of bars 84 .177
2840 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy 492 .171
3511 Building of ships and floating structures 200 .153
1520 Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and mollusca 269 .123
2745 Other non-ferrous metal production 285 .122
3622 Jewelery and related articles 2183 .121
1721 Weaving of cotton 292 .107
2752 Casting of steel 104 .102
2753 Casting of light metals 354 .097
list among the twenty most localized industries in Germany which may (partly) reflect
first-order geographic differences between the two countries.
However, we do not restrict our study to the manufacturing sector but equally in-
vestigate location patterns in the service industry. Service related industries such as
financial intermediation and entertainment are in general less dependent on natural
resources, exhibit lower transport costs and rely more on face-to-face interactions with
their customers. We find that 81 of the 83 (pre-selected) service related industries ex-
hibit global localization. Barlet et al. (2008) detect a similar pattern for French service
and manufacturing industries, whereas the picture is less clear in the US (see Kolko
(2009), which is however based on the EG methodology). Careful inspection of the
type of localized service industry is informative. We therefore rank the twenty most
localized service industries in Table 1.5.
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Table 1.5: Most Localized Service Oriented Industries (DO index)
Four-digit industries No. of firms Γm
6110 Sea and coastal water transport 1,152 .276
9211 Motion picture, video and television programme production activities 1,864 .257
6311 Cargo handling 179 .234
6210 Service activities incidental to air transportation 438 .222
6711 Administration of financial markets 76 .214
6712 Security and commodity contracts brokerage 189 .208
9212 Motion picture, video and television programme distribution activities 299 .153
6322 Service activities incidental to water transportation 193 .142
9240 News agency activities 1,168 .096
7020 Renting and operating of own or leased real estate 17,613 .092
6602 Pension funding 119 .090
7413 Market research and public opinion polling 585 .090
6523 Other financial intermediation 891 .086
9232 Operation of arts facilities 1,285 .077
7032 Management of real estate on a fee or contract basis 20,748 .071
7414 Management consultancy activities 19,137 .061
7320 Research and experimental development on social sciences and humanities 537 .057
7440 Advertising 16,379 .051
6323 Service activities incidental to air transportation 552 .043
6120 Inland water transport 1323 .043
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Apart from transportation industries which do rely on first nature geographies such as
the proximity to the sea, the most strongly localized service industries are related to the
administration of financial markets and the entertainment sector. As these industries
heavily rely on skilled and specialized labor, this suggests that thick labor market
effects including knowledge spillovers or labor market pooling may be major drivers
of the agglomeration pattern. Note, moreover, that the financial and entertainment
industries have also been found to be strongly agglomerated in the US (see Kolko
(2009)) or France (Barlet et al. (2008)). Additionally, several research industries in
which knowledge spillovers may be expected to be the major driver of the agglomeration
process occur to be globally localized in Germany e.g. Market research and public
opinion polling (WZ7413).
Furthermore, in line with results reported for the US, service industries seem to be
more urbanized than manufacturing industries. Whereas the median population of
municipalities which host agglomerated manufacturing industries is 20,576, the median
population of communities hosting service industries is two times larger with 41,957.
As service industries such as financial intermediation and consultancy typically serve
customers across different industries, interaction costs are minimized when locating
in rather dense and urbanized areas. Note however that although a larger fraction
of service than manufacturing industries is found to be localized, the DO indexes
of the twenty most localized service industries falls short of the indexes calculated
for the manufacturing sector. This indicates that the intensity of the localization
pattern is stronger in the manufacturing industries than in the service sector. Figure
1.3 illustrates this point and depicts the estimated distribution of bilateral distances
for the localized manufacturing industry cutlery (WZ2861) and the localized service
industry motion picture, video and television distribution (WZ9212) which are both of
similar industry size and listed among the most localized industries in Table 1.4 and
Table 1.5, respectively. Whereas the distribution of bilateral distances between firms
of the cutlery industry is highly skewed indicating that almost all firms are located
at very short distances (as this minimizes high transport costs), the service industry
exhibits a more uniform location pattern across distances.
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Figure 1.3: Kernel Density Functions for Cutlery (WZ2861) and Motion picture, video
distribution activities (WZ9212)
To complete our analysis, we list the most dispersed industries in Table 1.6. The re-
sults indicate that especially industries related to food production exhibit a dispersed
location pattern. Note moreover that contrary to previous studies based on the EG
methodology which report the counter-intuitive result that high and medium tech
industries related e.g. to communication and electrical equipment show dispersed lo-
cation patterns (see Devereux et al. (2004), Alecke et al. (2006)), our findings based on
the DO index to the contrary show that high-tech industries tend to be geographically
localized (although with a relatively weak intensity).
In a last step, we investigate whether the industries which are found to be agglomerated
according to the DO index employ an over- or underproportional share of the overall
workforce. Our findings indicate that the former is true and localized industries in Ger-
many occupy an overproportional fraction of employees, precisely 95 % of the workers
in Germany are employed in localized industries. This is in line with DO, who equally
report manufacturing employment in localized industries to exceed the percentage of
localized industries. Moreover, our analysis confirms the findings in earlier studies (DO
and Barlet et al. (2008) for the UK or France) which showed that localization occurs
at shorter distances of 0 to 30 kilometers whereas dispersion shows no clear pattern.
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Table 1.6: Most Dispersed Manufacturing Industries (DO index)
Four-digit industries Ψm
3621 Striking of coins .098
3543 Manufacture of bicycles and invalid carriages .083
1588 Manufacture of homogenized food preparations and dietetic food .075
2744 Copper production .069
2411 Manufacture of industrial gases .068
1717 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres .068
2122 Manufacture of household and sanitary goods and of toilet requisites .065
1543 Manufacture of margarine and similar edible fats .064
1572 Manufacture of prepared pet foods .061
1583 Manufacture of sugar .060
2733 Cold forming or folding .060
2743 Lead, zinc and tin production .059
1542 Manufacture of oils and fats .058
2111 Manufacture of pulp .055
1552 Manufacture of ice cream .054
2624 Manufacture of other technical ceramic products .054
2417 Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms .054
1541 Manufacture of raw oils and fats .053
1600 Manufacture of tobacco products .052
This is illustrated in Figure 1.4 which depicts the distribution for global localization
and global dispersion of the industries in our sample across distances.
1.4.1 Geographical and Sectoral Scope of Localization
Beyond identifying the location pattern of four-digit industries, it is interesting to
learn about the geographical and sectoral scope of localization, i.e. to investigate
in which German regions certain industries are agglomerated (geographical scope of
localization) and whether four-digit industries in the same industry branch exhibit
comparable location patterns (sectoral scope of localization).
In a first step, we illustrate the geographical scope of localization for some manufac-
turing and service industries which are strongly localized and listed in Tables 4 and
5. One of the most agglomerated manufacturing industries identified in our study
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Figure 1.4: Γm and Ψm by distance
is the weaving industry (WZ1722). A closer look exhibits that a major fraction of
this industry is located in the county of Düsseldorf which holds 47 % of all firms and
more impressively 80 % of total industry employment (see Table 1.7).10 Within this
county, the industry cluster spreads across several municipalities (whereas the cities
of Mönchengladbach and Korschenbroich occupy the largest number of employees) il-
lustrating the shortcoming of the EG index that does not take into account economic
clustering across jurisdictional borders (see Section 5 below).
Why does the weaving industry cluster in the county of Düsseldorf? Several reasons
may be decisive. Apart from history, the availability of unskilled labor in densely
populated areas like Düsseldorf may contribute to the agglomeration tendency. More-
over, transport costs may foster the agglomeration of (manufacturing) industries as
extensively discussed in models of the new economic geography. This agglomeration
force indeed seems to be important as we find several manufacturing industries which
are characterized by high transport costs to be localized, for examples industries re-
lated to basic metals (WZ27) and fabricated metal products (WZ28) that exhibit large
geographic clusters in the two contiguous counties Arnsberg and Düsseldorf.
Several other examples can be named. For instance, the city of Solingen holds by far
the largest share in the cutlery industry, with 68 % of the total industry firms and 65
10To avoid pitfalls that may result from transforming ‘dots on a map into unit of boxes’, Table 1.7
reports the location of establishments at different administrative levels: at the finest level of aggre-
gation (municipality) and a higher administrative unit (‘Regierungsbezirk’) which is comparable to
French department levels.
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% of total industry employment. Likewise to the British cutlery industry in Sheffield
which Marshall (1890) mentions in his discussion of localization, Solingen is known
for its long tradition in the manufacture of blades and forging. Analogously, historic
traditions may (partly) explain the agglomeration of the manufacturing of watches and
clocks (WZ3350) in Pforzheim, a city with a long tradition in the manufacture of gold
(and therefore is also known as the ‘city of gold’). Similarly, history likely shaped
the agglomeration pattern of imitation jewelery (WZ3661) where the majority of the
industry’s workforce is tied to the city of Kaufbeuren.11 Apart from that, industrial
location patterns in Germany also suggest the importance of first-order geographical
characteristics in shaping industry patterns. As an illustrative example, the Hanseatic
city of Hamburg holds 52 % of total industry employment in cargo handling (WZ6311).
The tendency to agglomerate in the same geographical area equally applies to service
industries which may on the one hand be less exposed to transport costs but are on
the other hand likely to be more reliant on the availability of specialized labor. The
city of Frankfurt am Main for instance is heavily localized in the financial service
industry and holds 85 % of employment in the administration of financial markets
(WZ6311). Moreover, fairly young service industries such as entertainment related
industries (WZ9211 and WZ9212) do exhibit multiple clusters in large German cities
like Berlin, Hamburg, Munich and Cologne.
Besides the geographical scope of localization, we investigate to what extent four-digit
industries which belong to the same two-digit industry branch follow the same local-
ization pattern (sectoral scope of localization). The results of this exercise are listed
in Table 1.8. In general, we find that four-digit industries within the same industry
branch tend to follow the same localization pattern whereas the picture is somewhat
more pronounced for service industries compared to the manufacturing sector. For
example, in the food products industry (WZ 15) a comparably large fraction of 50% of
the firms exhibit a dispersed location pattern while the fraction of dispersed industries
in the branch printing and reproduction of recorded media (WZ 22) is 0%. Our re-
11Note that many ethnic German immigrants were engaged in the jewelery sector. After being expelled
to Germany after World War II, they restarted their businesses in Kaufbeuren.
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Table 1.7: Location of Plants in the Weaving Industry (WZ1722)
Regierungsbezirk Municipality Firm number Employment
Düsseldorf Mönchengladbach 4 456
Jüchen 1 9
Korschenbroich 1 112
Grefrath 1 7
Willich 1 1
Cologne Wegberg 1 17
Burscheid 1 28
Braunschweig Osterode am Harz 2 2
Oberbayern Dietramszell 1 2
Leipzig Hartha 1 8
Lübeck 1 1
Halle (Saale) 1 25
Berlin 1 62∑
17 730
sults somewhat deviate from the findings for UK reported by Duranton and Overman
(2005) whereas the differences seem to be mainly driven by a higher overall fraction of
localized industries identified in our study. For example, while 16 out of 32 four-digit
industries (i.e. 50%) of the food products branch are localized in our study, only 1 out
of 30 four-digit industries of this branch is globally localized in the UK. Similarly, all
industries belonging to the branch wood and products of wood (WZ20) exhibit global
localization in Germany whereas the same branch is dispersed in the UK.12 In general,
however, there is also a large overlap between localized industry branches in Germany,
France and UK, see for example the textile (WZ17), leather (WZ19) or publishing
(WZ22) industry.
1.5 The Ellison and Glaeser (1997) Approach
Despite the merits of the DO approach, it has the obvious shortcoming that its com-
putation is demanding with respect to time and server capacity. Consequently, the
12Germany seems to be more comparable to France as Barlet et al. (2008) report 52 % of industry
branch (WZ15) and 83 % of industry branch (WZ20) to be globally localized.
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Table 1.8: Intra-Industry Localization
Two-digit branch No. of
four-digit
industries
% of ind.
globally
localized
15 Food products 32 50
16 Tobacco products 1 0
17 Textiles 20 85
18 Wearing apparel 6 67
19 Leather and related products 3 100
20 Wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture 6 100
21 Paper and paper products 7 57
22 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 13 100
23 Coke and refined petroleum products 1 100
24 Chemicals and chemical products 19 53
25 Rubber and plastic products 7 86
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 25 52
27 Basic metals 17 82
28 Fabricated metal products,except machinery and equipment 16 88
29 Machinery and equipment 20 90
30 Computer and electronic products 2 100
31 Electrical equipment 7 71
32 Electronic components, communication equipment 3 100
33 Instruments and appliances for measuring 5 100
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 3 100
35 Building of ships and boats 8 88
36 Furniture, jewelery, bijouterie, musical instruments 13 69
40 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 3 33
41 Water collection, treatment and supply 1 100
45 Construction of buildings 16 81
50 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 4 100
51 Wholesale on a fee or contract basis 1 100
55 Accommodation and food service activities 1 100
60 Land transport and transport via pipelines 6 100
61 Water transport 2 100
62 Air transport 2 100
63 Support activities for transportation 6 100
64 Postal and courier activities 3 100
65 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 5 100
66 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding 3 100
67 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities 4 100
70 Real estate activities 5 100
71 Rental and leasing activities 9 78
72 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 6 100
73 Scientific research and development 3 67
74 Service activities for businesses 12 100
90 Sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 1 100
92 Motion picture, video and television programme production 10 100
93 Other service activities 1 100∑
262
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majority of previous papers which try to assess industry localization based on micro-
geographic data, relies on an approach proposed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) which is
easier to compute but also faces some methodological shortcomings (as was discussed
in the Introduction). To complement our analysis, we rerun the investigation based on
the EG methodology. In the following, we will shortly sketch the EG approach, present
our results and illustrate the methodological shortcomings in depth.
1.5.1 Methodology
Based on a location choice model where individual plants make a location decision
that maximizes their profits, the index proposed by EG accounts for both, the overall
tendency to concentrate as well as the plant size distribution. It is assumed that profits
of a plant are driven by three components. First, a random variable which captures the
effect of observed and unobserved location characteristics (natural advantages) on the
profitability of the plant. The second component reflects the existence of spillovers (lo-
calization economies) which raises a plant’s profitability resulting from the interaction
with other plants located in geographical proximity.13 The last component is a purely
random variable which captures factors that are idiosyncratic to the plant. In the
absence of any agglomerative forces (spillovers and/or natural advantages) the result-
ing location pattern can be explained by firm-specific characteristics such as the plant
size distribution and the overall tendency for economic activity to concentrate due to
history or general first nature geographies (e.g. one generally expects less economic
activity on rugged terrain or at high altitude).
The presence of non-idiosyncratic factors such as localization economies or natural
advantages, however, lead to a concentration of economic activity which goes beyond
what would be expected given the overall concentration of plants and industry specific
13EG note that the expected location pattern resulting from natural advantages or spillovers are
observationally equivalent. The proposed index therefore does not give evidence on the sources of
agglomeration.
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characteristics. The EG index is defined as
γEG =
G−
(
1−∑i x2i)H(
1−∑i x2i)(1−H) (3)
where G measures the raw geographic concentration of an industry and is defined as
G ≡
∑
i
(si − xi)2, (4)
with xi being location i’s share in the overall employment and si being location i’s
employment share within a particular industry. Note that the EG index is appealing
as it does not take a uniform distribution of employment as the benchmark but the
overall employment of the geographical unit. Hence, as long as the respective industry
reflects the employment pattern observed in the geographical unit, this industry will not
be considered as being agglomerated. The Herfindahl index H =
∑
j z
2
j of a particular
industry captures the plant size distribution, with zj representing employment share
of the j-th plant. A small H indicates a competitive industry with many small plants
whereas higher weight is given to plants with a high employment share. Ignoring the
size distribution of plants would lead to false conclusions about the concentration of
an industry. Including the Herfindahl index therefore washes out any concentration
which can be attributed to the industrial structure. In general, it holds that the larger
the EG index calculated in equation (3), the larger is the agglomeration tendency of
the considered industry. The authors report industries with a γEG less than 0.02 to be
weakly concentrated, whereas 0.02 ≤ γEG ≤ 0.05 reflects intermediate and γEG > 0.05
strong localization of an industry. These threshold values have been commonly applied
in various applications of the EG index (see e.g. Rosenthal and Strange (2001)).
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of γEG
1.5.2 Results with the EG index
Figure 1.5 depicts the distribution of the EG index for the 337 German four-digit
manufacturing and service industries in our data. As observed in studies applying
the EG methodology to the US and UK before, the distribution of the index is very
skewed indicating that only few industries are highly agglomerated. For our 337 four-
digit industries in Germany the mean of γEG is 0.015, the median is 0.003.14 Hence,
the values obtained for our German industries are somewhat lower compared to the
UK with a mean value of 0.033 and a median of 0.007 (Devereux et al. (2004)) or the
US with a mean value of 0.051 and a median of 0.026 (Ellison and Glaeser (1997)).
As indicated above, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) report industries with a γEG less than
0.02 to be weakly concentrated, whereas 0.02 ≤ γEG ≤ 0.05 reflects intermediate and
γEG > 0.05 strong localization of an industry.
Out of the 254 German manufacturing industries, 213 industries (84 %) exhibit a
positive value for γEG. According to the threshold levels reported above, 41 of our
manufacturing industries (16 %) are dispersed and 188 industries (74 %) are weakly
agglomerated. Only 14 industries (6 %) exhibit intermediate localization and only
14The median remains if restricting the sample to 254 manufacturing industries (the mean with 0.011
being somewhat lower).
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11 industries (4 %) are considered as strongly agglomerated. Compared to studies
based on the EG methodology for other countries, the fractions of industries with
intermediate or strong localization patterns in our analysis are small. Ellison and
Glaeser (1997), for example, report a fraction of 25 % of the industries to be subject
to strong agglomeration economies, Maurel and Sedillot (1999) report 27 % of French
manufacturing industries to be strongly localized and Devereux et al. (2004) find a still
considerable fraction of 16 % of manufacturing industries with a strong localization
pattern in the UK. All of these percentage values are substantially larger than the tiny
fraction of 4 % of the industries which are reported to be strongly localized in our
paper. Naive interpretation may lead to the conclusion that Germany seems to exhibit
far less industrial agglomeration than other countries like the US, France or the UK.
However, a comparison between the different studies may not be reasonable since the
EG index might be sensitive to the size and shape of the underlying zoning system as
pointed out in a recent working paper by Briant et al. (2008). Precisely, the authors
illustrate that the EG index tends to increase in the aggregation level of the unit
of observation15 which implies that differences between our EG results and the ones
reported by previous studies may be driven by differences in the underlying spatial
observations units. While we calculate the EG index on the level of almost 12,000
German municipalities, previous studies tend to use fairly aggregated spatial units like
50 US states (Ellison and Glaeser (1997)), 95 French departments (Maurel and Sedillot
(1999)) and 113 British postcode areas (Devereux et al. (2004)).
To confirm that indices obtained with the EG methodology are sensitive to spatial ag-
gregation in our analysis, we recalculate the EG index for more aggregated spatial units,
precisely on the level of 441 counties (‘Kreise’) and 97 commuting areas (‘Raumord-
nungsregionen’).16 Table 9 lists the Herfindahl index (H), the mean raw concentration
15This becomes clear after inspecting the raw index of concentration G ≡ (si − xi)2. Recall that G
will be low as long as an industry mimics the general tendency of the economy to agglomerated,
i.e. as long as si and xi are of similar size. Increasing the scale of spatial aggregation then causes
a widening of the gap between an industry’s share in a region’s employment si and a region’s share
in overall employment xi.
16While German counties represent administrative jurisdictions, commuting areas are functional eco-
nomic regions.
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Table 1.9: Geographical and Industrial Concentration for Different Administration
Units
Administrative unit H G γEG
Municipality 0.047 0.060 0.015
County 0.047 0.065 0.020
Commuting Area 0.047 0.073 0.030
Table 1.10: EG index for different administration units
Administrative unit γEG > 0 0 < γEG < 0.02 0.02 ≤ γEG ≤ 0.05 γEG > 0.05
Municipality 213 (84 %) 188 (74 %) 14 (6 %) 11 (4 %)
County 217 (85 %) 165 (65 %) 30 (11 %) 21 (8 %)
Commuting Area 227 (89 %) 134 (53 %) 57 (22 %) 36 (14 %)
index (G) and the mean EG index for our 337 industries. Whereas the Herfindahl
index is stable across different spatial units, both the raw index of geographic con-
centration as well as the EG index increase with a rising level of spatial aggregation
and are therefore not invariant to the underlying geographical unit. Consequently, as
reported in Table 1.10, our calculated EG indexes converge toward those reported for
other countries when moving up the scale of spatial aggregation. Calculated on the
level of 97 German commuting areas, weak agglomeration is now detected for 53 % of
German industries (as opposed to 74 % if calculated on the municipality level), 22 % of
German manufacturing industries exhibit intermediate agglomeration (as opposed to 6
% if calculated on the municipality level) and 14 % of German industries are strongly
agglomerated (as opposed to 4 % if calculated on the municipality level).17
Thus, the EG methodology is found to be sensitive to the underlying zoning system
which is used to calculate the EG index, in particular on the aggregation level of the
units of observations. As the size of jurisdictional units (on which data is available)
differs between countries, it is to some extent problematic to make cross-country com-
parisons of agglomeration patterns based on the EG methodology. As the DO approach
17The same increasing nature of the EG index has been observed in Devereux et al. (2004) who report
the index for 447 local authorities, 113 postcode areas and 65 counties.
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Table 1.11: Most Localized Industries with EG index
Four-digit industries G H γEG
6711 Administration of financial markets .70 .18 .64
2861 Manufacture of cutlery .44 .04 .41
1722 Weaving of carded yarn .42 .19 .29
3661 Imitation jewelery and related articles .28 .03 .26
6311 Cargo handling .27 .06 .23
6323 Service activities incidental to air transportation .27 .12 .17
1586 Processing of tea and coffee .18 .05 .14
1717 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres .24 .12 .14
6523 Other financial intermediation .14 .02 .12
1723 Weaving of worsted yarn .25 .16 .11
6110 Sea and coastal water transport .11 .01 .10
2741 Precious metals production .28 .20 .10
1520 Processing and preserving of fish, crustaceans and mollusca .11 .03 .09
6712 Security and commodity contracts brokerage .13 .05 .08
6713 Other activities auxiliary to financial services .09 .02 .07
3622 Jewelery and related articles .08 .01 .07
2955 Machinery for paper and paperboard production .11 .05 .07
1542 Manufacture of oils and fats .26 .22 .06
9212 Motion picture, video and television programme distribution activities .10 .04 .05
9211 Motion picture, video and television programme production activities .06 .005 .05
does not face similar problems, it is superior in this respect.
Moreover, note that the fraction of industries which are identified to be localized is
substantially larger for the EG methodology than for the DO approach. This reflects
the fact that the latter approach is much stricter in declaring an industry to be agglom-
erated as it statistically tests for departures of the location pattern from randomness.
Tables 1.11 and 1.12 list the most localized and the most dispersed industries according
to the EG methodology. The tables suggest that both indices are correlated but also
point to important differences in the results. The EG methodology for example derives
similar results as the DO approach, in the sense that it also identifies many of the
traditional manufacturing industries to be strongly localized, most notably industries
related to textile and metal production. Moreover, the EG index equally points to an
important role of localization in service related industries like financial markets and
the entertainment industry. However, on the other side, in Table 1.12 the EG analysis
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Table 1.12: Most Dispersed Industries: EG index
Four-digit industries G H γEG
2744 Copper production .317 .349 -.0476
2420 Manufacture of pesticides and other agrochemical products .171 .188 -.0207
4524 Construction of water projects .250 .265 -.0195
2214 Publishing of sound recordings .312 .322 -.0120
4030 Steam supply .065 .076 -.0115
2463 Manufacture of essential oils .163 .173 -.0107
2665 Manufacture of fibre cement .065 .074 -.0097
6030 Transport via pipeline .071 .079 -.0089
6230 Space transport .429 .436 -.0084
2441 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products .209 .216 -.0082
1713 Preparation and spinning of worsted-type fibres .125 .132 -.0077
6021 Urban and suburban passenger land transport .009 .016 -.0065
7123 Renting of air transport equipment .043 .049 -.0065
1595 Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages .456 .461 -.0057
3001 Office machinery .047 .053 -.0054
9253 Botanical and zoological gardens and nature reserves activities .020 .025 -.0047
4020 Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains .035 .039 -.0046
3541 Manufacture of motorcycles .329 .334 -.0045
7240 Data base activities .069 .073 -.0040
7260 Other computer related activities .053 .056 -.0038
suggests that some medium and high tech industries such as publishing of sound record-
ings (WZ2214), office machinery (WZ3001) or computer programming (WZ72) show
strong dispersion patterns whereas the DO approach proposes them to be localized.
The differences between the results for the two approaches is also reflected in a rather
low rank correlation of the indexes which is calculated with 0.40 (the correlation of the
indexes themselves is 0.60).18
18Note that the EG and DO methodology differ in the respect that the calculation of the former is
based on the number of employees in an industry while the latter is based on the number of plants
in an industry. DO report that fewer industries are localized when weighting for employment but
these industries deviate more strongly randomness.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper assesses the location pattern of four-digit industries in Germany using the
distance based approach developed by Duranton and Overman (2005). We find that
71% of the manufacturing industries in Germany exhibit significant geographical lo-
calization, a fraction which is somewhat larger than previous results based on the DO
approach for the UK and France. Moreover, we find that localization occurs at shorter
distances and that localized industries hold a larger share in employment. In general,
our results suggest that especially traditional manufacturing industries, e.g. the man-
ufacturing of textile, show strong agglomeration patters. As many of these industries
were identified to be localized in studies for the UK and France before, this suggests
that agglomeration (in these industries) does not seem to be responsive to country spe-
cific political or geographical conditions. However, there are also some German specific
features in the agglomeration pattern. For example, several industries related to metal
production seem to exhibit stronger agglomeration patterns in Germany.
Moreover, in contrast to Duranton and Overman (2005) who restrict their analysis to
the manufacturing sector, we equally investigate localization patterns in the service
industry. Our analysis suggests that agglomeration forces play an equally or even more
important role in the service sector as the vast majority of service industries included
into our analysis turn out to be significantly localized. The strongest agglomeration
patterns are found in the financial markets sector and the entertainment industry.
In a last step, we rerun our analysis based on the discrete approach proposed by
Ellison and Glaeser (1997). In line with the presumption that the EG approach is less
rigorous in identifying agglomeration patterns (as it is not based on a statistical test for
deviations from randomness), we find a larger fraction of industries to be agglomerated
according to the EG index. Moreover, we show that the calculation of the EG-index
is sensitive to the aggregation level of its observation units which makes it difficult to
interpret and hardly comparable across countries. As the DO approach is not prone
to these problems, we consider it to be superior in this respect.
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Thus, we might conclude that our analysis indicates that agglomeration forces play an
important role in both, German manufacturing and service industries. This may have
important economic implications for the productivity and wages of workers in these
industries (as suggested by Henderson (1986),Glaeser and Maré (2001) and Gould
(2007)). Moreover, rents which accrue through industrial localization patterns may be
taxable for German municipalities which set the local business tax rate as pointed out
in a recent paper by Koh and Riedel (2009b).
Due to constraints in data availability we are unfortunately not able to assess the dif-
ferent sources of agglomeration in a rigorous framework. Nevertheless, the results of
our analysis may allow for some speculations. As many traditional manufacturing in-
dustries (like e.g. metal production) face high transport costs and are simultaneously
found to be localized in space, our findings might suggest that transport costs play
a significant role in shaping agglomeration patterns. Moreover, the fact that finan-
cial services and entertainment industries (with plausibly low transport costs for their
products) are geographically agglomerated in large urban areas might support the idea
that labor market pooling effects and knowledge spillovers exert positive externalities
on firms belonging to these sectors and give rise to localization patterns. These are
interesting avenues for future research to explore.
Chapter 2
Taxing Agglomeration Rents:
The importance of localization and
urbanization for local business
taxation
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2.1 Introduction
One of the most fascinating stylized fact that still allures researchers from various fields
is the uneven distribution of economic activity in space. In his principles Alfred Mar-
shall (1890) acknowledges that economic activity tends to cluster in space and that
this agglomeration cannot always be explained by exogenous differences in first nature
geographies (the physical configuration of the landscape with mountains, coast or nat-
ural resources). He formulated three sources of agglomeration economies which are all
based on the idea that firms profit from locating geographically close to each other:
knowledge spillovers, labor market pooling effects and input-output linkages. Since the
advantage of locating in geographical proximity may affect firms within the same in-
dustry differently than firms operating in different sectors, the literature distinguishes
between so-called localization economies which describe the concentration of economic
activity on the industry level and urbanization economies which describe the overall
size of the corporate sector and market respectively.1
Several fields in economics have acknowledged the existence of agglomeration exter-
nalities such as the new growth theory or new trade theory which led to an extensive
body of research initiated by Krugman (1991) known as the New Economic Geography
(NEG) literature. The impact of urbanization and localization economies on productiv-
ity (Henderson (1986), Henderson (2003) and Combes et al. (2007)), wages (Wheaton
and Lewis (2002)) and growth (Glaeser et al. (1992), Henderson et al. (1995)) has been
extensively studied. Recent years have moreover seen the development of a flourishing
theoretical literature that applies NEG models to questions related to public economics,
most notably papers by Andersson and Forslid (2003), Ludema and Wooton (2000),
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Borck and Pflüger (2006). The key finding of this
literature is that the presence of agglomeration economies reduces the mobility of cap-
ital and creates taxable location rents. This allows local governments to set higher tax
rates without triggering an immediate capital outflow.
1See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a detailed survey on urbanization and localization economies.
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Despite this theoretical interest in the interaction between agglomeration economies
and local governments’ tax setting behaviour, the theoretical predictions have to the
best of our knowledge, not yet been tested in a rigorous empirical framework which,
additionally to overall agglomeration effects, distinguishes between different scopes of
agglomeration. Our paper aims to provide some answers in this area and to determine
if and to what extent jurisdictional tax setting behaviour is affected by the presence of
agglomeration rents.
Our testing ground is the German local business tax (Gewerbesteuer) which is set
autonomously by the approximately 12,000 German municipalities. Precisely, we de-
termine how urbanization and localization economies affect the municipalities’ local
business tax rate choice. To construct agglomeration measures for urbanization and
localization economies, we employ a rich data-set comprising all firms located in Ger-
many. Urbanization economies arise because firms profit from locating near to other
firms and thus, they are captured in our estimation strategy by the number of workers
employed in a jurisdiction. To construct measures for localization economies, we in a
first step identify industries whose localization pattern shows (strong) spatial clustering
of activity following the distance-based approach proposed by Duranton and Overman
(2005). From this, we in a second step construct several localization measures which
account for a community’s number of workers in localized industries, the intensity of
the industry’s localization pattern and the fraction of the overall number of employees
in a localized industry which is located in the considered municipality. To the best of
our knowledge, our paper is the first to analyze the importance of agglomeration on
the industry level separately from overall size effects. Our estimation results suggest
a positive effect of urbanization economies and localization economies on tax setting
behaviour which is determined to be quantitatively larger for the localization mea-
sure. Precisely, we find for our preferred specification that a ten percent increase in
the number of localized employees (capturing localization economies) enhances the lo-
cal business tax by 3 percentage points while an increase in the number of employees
(capturing urbanization economies) by ten percentage points induces a rise in the local
business tax by 0.6 percentage points.
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To avoid a bias in our estimation results driven by unobserved heterogeneity between
the municipalities in our sample, we add a large set of control variables to our regression
framework. Thus, we account for first-order differences in nature characteristics by in-
cluding control variables for the jurisdiction’s quality of soil and for proximity to rivers,
mountains, lakes and the sea. Moreover, we add a full set of fixed effects for commut-
ing areas within Germany to absorb heterogeneity between regions and additionally
account for differences in income levels, public good provision, the municipality’s fis-
cal situation and neighboring community’s tax setting behaviour. Clustering of the
standard errors at the level of the commuting regions moreover takes into account
that the communities may be hit by correlated shocks. Additionally, our empirical
specifications accounts for potential problems caused by reverse causality as the local
business tax rate choice may simultaneously affect the firm agglomeration in a munic-
ipality. To overcome this identification problem, we employ an instrumental variable
approach which relies on long-lagged historical population data and on historical data
on the introduction of railways as exclusion restrictions for the observed agglomeration
economies. Both measures include information for years prior to 1936 when the first
local business tax act was passed in Germany. We find our instruments to be relevant
and valid.
In a final step, we show that a municipality’s potential to tax agglomeration rents is
determined by its agglomeration characteristics relative to neighboring communities.
Since the majority of German municipalities comprise rather small geographical areas,
spatial concentration of firms is unlikely to end at the administrative border but in
many cases spreads across several municipalities. If municipalities which are close sub-
stitutes with respect to their localization and urbanization pattern are located nearby,
this might alleviate a jurisdiction’s potential to tax agglomeration economies. This
pattern is also suggested by anecdotal evidence. For example, Munich which is the
only major city in Southern Germany has a local business tax rate of 490 business tax
points (or 24.5 percentage points) in our sample period while several large cities in
North-Rhine Westphalia are located geographically close and have local business tax
rates below 420 business tax points (or 21 percentage points) (see e.g. Cologne, Dues-
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seldorf,...). To test for this effect in an empirical framework, we construct measures
which capture size differences between a jurisdiction and its neighboring municipalities
(in the urbanization dimension) and employment differences for the set of localized
industries located in a jurisdiction compared to its neighbors. Our results confirm this
presumption and indicate that jurisdictions set larger tax rates if they host large firm
agglomerations relative to neighboring communities and if they locate agglomerated
industries which are weakly represented in neighboring municipalities.
Summing up, this paper determines the effect of agglomeration economies on the choice
of the corporate tax rate in an empirical framework. The main novelty is to assess the
role of different agglomeration channels on the choice of the local business tax rate,
precisely of localization and urbanization economies in the considered community and
neighboring municipalities. The paper extends work by Buettner (2001) and Charlot
and Paty (2007) who determine the effect of urbanization economies in the consumer
dimension on the jurisdictional tax rate choice. Buettner (2001) analyzes the deter-
minants of the choice of the German local business tax using a panel of jurisdictions
within the German state of Baden-Württemberg and finds that jurisdictions with a
larger population tend to set higher local business tax rates. Charlot and Paty (2007)
equally assess the effects of access to consumer markets on the corporate tax rate choice
for French municipalities, where market access is defined as the distance-weighted in-
come of all other municipalities. They find a positive relationship between the local tax
rate and the municipality’s market access suggesting the existence of taxable agglomer-
ation rents.2 Both papers, however, neglect urbanization effects in the firm dimension
and do not account for localization economies. Moreover, both papers equally do not
address potential estimation problems caused by reverse causality, a problem that we
circumvent in our analysis by using an instrumental variable approach.
Moreover, our analysis relates to papers which determine corporate tax and agglom-
eration effects on the location decision of firms. Prominent examples are Devereux et
al. (2007), Brülhart et al. (2007) and Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé (2008). All of the
2Note that our main results are unaffected by the inclusion of a control variable for the consumer
market access as shown in robustness checks.
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cited papers find that the location decision of firms becomes less sensitive to corporate
tax rate changes in the presence of agglomeration economies. However, although these
findings are in line with our results, the papers conceptually differ from our analysis
since they do not test whether agglomeration economies exert a causal impact on the
choice of the jurisdictional local business tax rate.
Our paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we discuss the main theoretical hy-
potheses underlying our empirical work. Section 3 describes the data set, in section
4 the estimation strategy is presented. Section 5 gives an overview over our main
findings. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 A Simple Theoretical Model
In the following, we construct a simple theoretical model based on Haufler and Wooton
(2009) to receive guidance for the specification of our empirical framework. We con-
sider a metropolitan area formed by two jurisdictions i ∈ {a, b} each inhabited by ni
immobile residents and competing for a fixed number of mobile firms. Each jurisdiction
hosts two industries, a “localized” industry and a numéraire sector. Firms of the lo-
calized industry produce a homogeneous good x under imperfect competition whereas
firms in the latter sector produce the numéraire good z under perfect competition.
Both goods are produced using labor as the only input. The x commodity is subject
to real transport costs whereas the numéraire good is traded freely which also ensures
the wage rate w to be equalized across jurisdictions. Residents in both locations have
identical preferences
ui = αxi − β
2
x2i + zi, i ∈ {a, b} (1)
Each resident receives wage income from inelastically supplying one unit of labor to
either sector x or z. Moreover, we assume that total revenues Ti stemming from local
business taxation are redistributed to consumers residing in jurisdiction i. Hence,
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each resident’s budget constraint can be expressed as w + Ti
ni
= zi + pixi. Solving
the representative consumer’s utility maximization problem and aggregating over all
consumer yields the aggregate market demand for good x, Xi = ni(α−pi)β .
A number of k mobile firms of the localized x sector from outside of the metropolitan
area are willing to invest in either jurisdiction a or b. Each entrant thereby incurs fixed
costs Fi ≡ f − γhi − µni, where f is assumed to be identical across jurisdictions and
incorporates costs e.g. for setting up a production facility or administration costs not
further specified in the model. Moreover, we presume that an entrant’s set up costs
are lowered if it locates in particular close to firms of the same industry due to the
existence of agglomeration economies and if it locates where economic activity is most
intense (large region size measured through ni). The term γhi therefore captures a
new firm’s benefit from locating close to existing firms hi of the same industry (“local-
ization economies”) whereas the latter term µni incorporates the cost lowering effect
resulting from the overall scale of economic activity within a jurisdiction (“urbanization
economies”).3
In the spirit of Brander and Krugman (1983)’s reciprocal dumping model firms non-
cooperatively choose quantities for each market separately. Hence, pre-tax operating
profit of a firm located in i is given by
pii = (pi − w)xii + (pj − w − τ)xji, i 6= j (2)
where pi is the producer price for sales on the home market, pj denotes the producer
price on the foreign market and xji is the quantity sold in j by a firm producing in i.
Maximizing (2) using market demand Xi yields optimal quantities for both markets of
a firm located in i
xii =
ni(α− w + (kj + hj)τ)
β(1 + k + h)
, xji =
nj(α− w − τ + (1 + kj + hj)τ)
β(1 + k + h)
(3)
3The theoretical model in Konrad and Kovenock (2009) argues in a similar direction. The authors
assume within a dynamic framework that the fixed costs for FDI will be lower if a region succeeded
to attract FDI in the preceding time period. Consequently, the existence of old FDI results in an
“agglomeration advantage” for the competing jurisdiction.
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Eq. (3) reveals that optimal output levels for the home market depend positively on
the number of firms in the other jurisdiction, (kj + hj), as this reduces competition on
the domestic market. Substituting optimal output levels using in (3) and equilibrium
consumer prices into firm’s profit function (2) yields the pre-tax operating profit of a
firm located in jurisdiction i
pii =
ni[α− ω + (kj + hj)τ ]2
β(k + h+ 1)2
+
nj[α− ω − (1 + kj + hj)τ ]2
β(k + h+ 1)2
, (4)
with k = ki + kj and h = hi + hj, i 6= j, i, j ∈ {a, b}. In the absence of transport
costs location no longer matters as both jurisdictions form a common market. A higher
number of new and initial firms increases the degree of competition and depresses a
firm’s operating profit. A higher overall number of both initial and new firms increases
competition on the product market and reduces a firm’s operating profit.
All firms are subject to a local business tax ti imposed by the host region. The potential
k new firms decide on where to set up their production facility based on the comparison
of after-tax profits in a and b where the after-tax profit for a firm locating in i, reads
Πi ≡ pii − ti − Fi (5)
Solving the condition for a locational equilibrium Πa−Πb = 0 with ∆ ≡ ta−tb denoting
the tax rate differential between region a and b allows us to solve for the equilibrium
number of new entrants to the market in jurisdiction a
k∗a =
k − ψloc
2
+
φ(2na − n)
2nτ
− β(1 + k + h)(∆− µψ
urb − γψloc)
2nτ 2
, (6)
where φ ≡ 2(α − ω) − τ > 0. The term ψurb ≡ na − nb captures jurisdiction a’s
relative agglomeration advantage with respect to the overall scale of economic activity
whereas ψloc ≡ ha−hb reflects the degree of a’s uniqueness with respect to its localized
industry. A large number of existing firms ha relative to jurisdiction b intensifies com-
petition in a and deters mobile firms from entering this market. The second term in
(6) captures a jurisdiction’s pure size effect which vanishes if jurisdictions are equally
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sized. Differences in tax rates denoted by ∆ will affect firms’ location decision but
less so if a jurisdiction exhibits agglomeration advantages both on the industry and
overall level of economic activity. The effect of taxation becomes less decisive in firm’s
location choice if the respective jurisdiction is larger in absolute terms but also rela-
tive to its neighboring jurisdiction and hosts a larger number of firms in the localized
sector. Consequently, the model accounts for the empirically well established fact that
the existence of agglomeration economies attenuates firms’ sensitivity to tax differen-
tials (See e.g. Devereux et al. (2007), Brülhart et al. (2007) and Jofre-Monseny and
Solé-Ollé (2008)).
In the first stage of the tax game local governments maximize their residents’ wage
income and revenues from taxing profits of firms producing within their administrative
boundaries, Wi = ti(ki+ hi) + wni , choosing their tax rates non-cooperatively. Differen-
tiating each government’s objective function Wi with respect to its own tax rate taking
into account the equilibrium firm number in (6) and solving for the equilibrium Nash
tax rate yields
t∗i =
γψloci + µψ
urb
i
3
+
τ [3nτ(k + h) + φ(ni − nj)]
3β(1 + k + h)
, i 6= j, i, j ∈ {a, b} (7)
In the following we are primary interested in the comparative static results
∂t∗i
∂hi
> 0,
∂t∗i
∂ni
> 0. (8)
Our comparative static results suggest that both urbanization and localization advan-
tages exert a positive impact on the choice of the local business tax. The equilibrium
tax rate chosen by each government will be higher the larger the absolute size of eco-
nomic activity in general and the economic scale on the sectoral level.
The model also reveals that the capacity of a government to tax away location rents
depends on whether the respective jurisdiction hosts a larger economic base and a
larger amount of firms in the agglomeration sector than the competing jurisdiction.
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This is formally captured by the following comparative static results
∂t∗i
∂ψloci
> 0,
∂t∗i
∂ψurbi
> 0. (9)
Thus, our analysis predicts a positive effect of urbanization and localization economies
on the tax rate choice and stresses that it is not only the jurisdiction’s own agglomer-
ation measures which are decisive for the corporate tax decision but also the relative
position compared to other jurisdictions. In the following, we will bring this hypothesis
to the data.
2.3 Data
The purpose of our paper is to determine how agglomeration economies and industry
patterns affect the corporate tax rate choice of jurisdictions. Our testing ground is
the German local business tax which is set autonomously by the approximately 12,000
German municipalities. Micro data on the industry classification and employment level
of the whole population of German firms enables us to construct agglomeration and
industry patterns and to link these variables to the municipalities’ tax rate choice.
Our paper draws on various data sources in order to set up a data set which is suitable
to test the hypotheses outlined above. Our final data includes information for the years
1999 to 2007. The observational unit is the municipality per year. The dependent vari-
able in our empirical analysis is the local business tax rate which is set at the German
municipality level. We restrict our analysis to communities located in Western Ger-
many as communities in the East German states (which joined the Federal Republic of
Germany in 1990) were subject to structural reforms which changed their geographical
borders within our sample period.4 This leaves us with a total of 8,464 West German
municipalities between 1999 and 2007. The information on the local business tax rate
is taken from the German Federal Statistical Office. Table 2.1 shows that the average
4Nevertheless, we find largely comparable results to the ones presented in this paper if we account for
all municipalities in Germany.
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business tax rate set by communities in Germany is determined with 334 business tax
points or 16.7%(= 5% ·334) and shows a considerable cross-sectional variation between
a tax rate of 0% to 45%.
To construct measures for the presence of agglomeration economies and for the indus-
try structure at the municipality level, we exploit a comprehensive and detailed data
set on the population of German firms between 1999 and 2007 which is provided by
the German Employment Agency (’Bundesagentur für Arbeit’). The data includes a
detailed industry classification for each firm at the 4-digit level, the firm’s number of
employees (which are subject to social security payments5) and the firm’s host com-
munity. This firm and employment information is used to construct measures for the
municipalities’ urbanization and localization economies in absolute and relative terms,
i.e. we determine measures capturing the jurisdiction’s own agglomeration patterns
and its agglomeration pattern relative to neighboring communities. A detailed de-
scription of the variable construction can be found in Section 4. As depicted in Table
2.1, the average number of employees in German municipalities is 2, 571 with a strong
cross-section variation though between one and 774, 869 employees.
Moreover, we augment our data by information on various municipality characteristics
which are used as control variables in our analysis. Thus, we add information on first-
order nature differences between the jurisdictions, comprising data for the soil quality
(published in the European Soil Database6), as well as first nature geographies like the
location at a river, lake, the sea or the mountains (obtained from the Bundesamt für
Kartographie and Geodäsie). Moreover, we account for information on the inhabitants’
average income, the community’s financial situation as measured by the lagged deficit
per capita in the grants per capita received through the German income redistribution
scheme.7 Furthermore, we control for the level of public good provision by including
variables on infrastructure quality as the presence of a railway station, airport, seaport
5In Germany, only workers employed in minor contracts (earning less than 400 Euros per month) are
not subject to social security contributions.
6We thank Gilles Duranton for providing us with this data.
7The information on income and the communities’ budget variables is retrieved from the German
Federal Statistical office and its publications Statistik Lokal.
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and high-way connection (obtained from the Bundesamt fuer Karthographie and Geo-
daesie). Last, a distance-weighted average tax rate for the neighboring communities is
added. The associated descriptive statistics are found in Table 2.1.
2.4 Empirical Methodology
In our empirical analysis, we estimate a model of the following form
tit = α0 + α1Uit + α2Lit + α3Xit + ²it (10)
whereas tit depicts the local business tax rate of community i at time t. Uit and Lit
describe urbanization and localization economies. The urbanization economies Uit are
reflected by the general economic activity in a community and are captured in our
analysis by the municipality’s number of employees. Formally, we define a first ur-
banization measure U1it = EMPi,t with EMPi,t being municipality i’s employment at
time t. Firms are presumed to profit from locating close to each other in the same
community. If the associated rent is taxable by the municipality, larger firm agglom-
erations are presumed to exert a positive effect on the tax rate choice. Consequenlty,
we presume α1 > 0.
However, as laid out in the theory section, the ability of a community to tax an ur-
banization rent may not only depend on its own firm agglomeration but also on its
relative agglomeration compared to neighboring jurisdictions. Precisely, if other com-
munities with a similar or even larger size than the considered community are located
geographically close, mobile firms have an attractive alternative location choice. This
competition dimension between communities may restrict their ability to tax urbaniza-
tion rents. To capture a municipality’s relative economic activity, we define a second
urbanization measures capturing differences in the number of employees between the
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considered jurisdiction i and other German communities j
U2i,t =
N∑
j=1
(
EMPi,t − EMPj,t
DISTi,j
)
, i 6= j, ` ∈ {i, j} (11)
whereas EMPi,t and EMPj,t depict the number of employees in the considered juris-
diction i and the neighboring jurisdiction j in year t respectively and DISTi,j stands
for the geographic distance between the two jurisdictions. A high positive value for the
similarity measure U2i,t indicates that the respective municipality hosts a large number
of workers compared to other (neighboring) jurisdictions. According to our theoretical
model, the municipality is then positive differentiated from its neighboring commu-
nities with respect to urbanization economies which should allow it to tax arising
agglomeration rents, predicting α1 > 0.
Moreover, to determine localization economies Li,t, we in a first step exploit our micro
data on the population of German firms to identify 4-digit industries in Germany
which exhibit strong geographical clustering at small distances. To do so, we follow a
methodology developed by Duranton and Overman (2005) (in the following DO). The
approach is sketched in Appendix A of this paper whereas a more detailed description of
the methodology as well as of the results to this exercise can be found in a companion
paper (Koh and Riedel (2009a)). Abstracting from any industries which are clearly
not expected to show geographical localization patterns (as e.g. public libraries, retail
companies etc.), the DO approach reports that the location pattern of 78% of the
remaining German manufacturing and service industries deviates from randomness at
any distance. For our purpose, it however seems to be more decisive whether industries
are significantly agglomerated at small distances as it is only then that they may be
presumed to profit from being geographically very close to other firms within the same
jurisdiction and that taxable agglomeration rents arise.8 We thus identify a first set of
industries which are agglomerated at a distance of 0 kilometers (i.e. are agglomerated
8If an industry is for example signifcantly agglomerated at a distance of 50 kilometers, then firms
appear to profit from being sufficiently close to each other but not necessarily located within the
same community. This then does not allow any of our geographically small communities to tax the
associated agglomeration rent as the firms are indifferent at which precise community within a certain
distance radius to locate.
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within the boundaries of German jurisdictions)9 and a second set of industries which
are significantly localized at a distance smaller 10 kilometers according to the Duranton
and Overman (2005) approach (73% and 77% of the industries respectively).
As the majority of industries thus observes a significant localization pattern, we face
the difficulty that localization measures may be highly correlated with the urbanization
measures described above which makes identification of both difficult (the correlation
between the number of employees in localized industries at 0 kilometers (10 kilometers)
and the overall number of employees is for example determined with 0.898 (0.997)).
Moreover, many of the industries exhibit only a weak agglomeration pattern according
to the DO index which indicates the intensity of localization (denoted by Γm(d) in Ap-
pendix A). Thus, for an industry to be defined as localized for our analysis, we require
it to be signficantly agglomerated at a distance of 0 kilometers (below 10 kilometers)
and to exhibit a high localization intensity in the sense that the DO index is above the
mean of the sample distribution. As this cut-off value is adhoc, we experimented with
other cutoff values at the median and different percentiles of the sample distribution
which are reported in the result section. Based on this discussion, we define our first
localization measure to be the community’s number of employees which are employed
in localized industries L1i,t =
∑M
m=1EMPi,m,t with EMPi,m,t indicating the number of
employees in community i, at time t, in the localized industry m.
On top of that, the capability of a community to tax the localization rent, how-
ever, also depends on the fraction of employees in a certain localized sector hosted
by the considered municipality. The larger the fraction of the localized industry’s
activity within a community’s borders, the less attractive it is for firms in this in-
dustry to leave the community. Thus, we additionally construct a measure for lo-
calization rents as the sum of localized industries shares in a considered community
L2i,t =
∑M
m=1(EMPi,m,t/
∑M
m=1EMPm,t). Last, to combine L
1
i,t and L2i,t, we define a
measure to capture industry cores (i.e. large agglomerations of a localized industry)
since we presume that it is mainly those cores which give rise to pronounced local-
9Note that we cannot identify the exact geographic location of firms within one community and thus,
the geographical distance of firms located in the same community is zero kilometers.
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ization economies. Thus, we define a localization measure L3i,t which captures the
number of employees in localized industries if the share of the industry in the con-
sidered community is above a defined threshold and hence, L3i,t =
∑M
m=1EMPi,m,t if
EMPi,m,t/
∑M
m=1EMPm,t > α with α being some positive constant.
Last, following our theoretical predictions, we presume that the capability of the com-
munity to tax localization rents does not only depend on its own localization measures
but also on its industry agglomeration compared to neighboring jurisdictions which
are alternative location choices for mobile firms. Thus, the relative position compared
to neighboring communities may be important, i.e. the difference in the number of
employees in a certain localized industry compared to neighboring jurisdictions. We
calculate the following variable to capture this effect
L4i,t =
N∑
j=1
M∑
m=1
(
EMPi,m,t − EMPj,m,t
DISTi,j
)
, i 6= j (12)
whereas EMPi,m,t again depicts the number of jurisdiction i’s employees in the localized
industry m and EMPj,m,t depicts the neighboring jurisdiction j’s number of employees
in industry m at year t.
Besides these agglomeration measures, Xit depicts a vector of control variables to
absorb heterogeneity between the jurisdictions. Thus, we account for first order differ-
ences in nature characteristics by including information on the soil quality and prox-
imity to rivers, lakes, mountains and the sea which may affect a jurisdiction’s attrac-
tiveness as a firm location. This for example takes care of the fact that a fertile soil
may have historically attracted the settlement of people and firms (which ultimately
might have given rise to agglomerations) and simultaneously induces governments to
impose a high corporate tax on firms which exploit the fertile soil in the jurisdiction.
Moreover, we include a set of control variables for public good provision (the provi-
sion of a railway station, airport and seaport and the connection to highways) and the
community’s lagged financial situation (e.g. the lagged deficit per inhabitant and the
grants per inhabitant received via the German fiscal equalization scheme), the income
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per employee and the average neighboring communities’ tax rate. Following previous
papers (see e.g. Overesch and Rincke (2008)), the latter is calculated as a distance
weighted average of all other communities in Germany. Moreover, we add a full set
of fixed effects for 74 employment regions in Germany (“Raumordnungsregionen”) to
account for heterogeneity between German regions whereas the employment (commut-
ing) areas are defined according to German commuting patterns (see the definition of
the Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordung and Appendix C for a visualization).10
Last, we control for a full set of year fixed effects to capture common shocks over time.
²it stands for the random error term.
Finally, our analysis may be prone to potential reverse causality issues. Precisely, the
tax rate choice may affect the agglomeration pattern observed in the community as low
tax rates are well established to positively affect firm location. To account for reverse
causality, we employ an instrumental variable approach and investigate how exogenous
variations in the agglomeration economies affect the municipality’s tax rate choice. In
the following, we will briefly present the instrumental variables used for this purpose.
Our first set of instruments is constructed from historical population data for German
municipalities. Precisely, we employ data from a census in 1910. Although the pop-
ulation information is available for all communities in 1910, we have to address the
problem that several jurisdictions have experienced adjustments in their jurisdictional
borders since then. Precisely, in 1910 the area which is Germany today has hosted
around 70,000 autonomous communities. Today the same area is divided into around
12,000 communities only. Using historical maps, we have linked the population data
in 1910 to today’s jurisdiction borders and thus constructed information on the long
lagged population of today’s municipalities.
A central advantage of this long-lagged population data is that it reflects a munic-
ipality’s inhabitants before the introduction of the local business Tax Act (’Reichs-
gewerbesteuergesetz vom 1. Dezember 1936’) in Germany in 1936. Long-lagged pop-
10Note that our framework does not allow to include community fixed effects as the urbanization
and localization measures constructed above hardly vary over time and thus do not enable us to
determine agglomeration effects on the tax rate choice in a panel framework.
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ulation data has been employed by several authors to instrument for the presence of
agglomeration economies, see for example Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Combes et al.
(2007). In several respects, however, we consider our data to be superior since we
obtain long-lagged information for the whole territory of the German state in 1910
and do not have to restrict our analysis to jurisdictions (commonly cities) above a
size threshold like earlier work. Based on this long-lagged population information, we
construct several instruments for our agglomeration economies measures, precisely the
long-lagged number of inhabitants in a community, a long-lagged market potential of
the community (defined as the sum of inhabitants of neighboring communities over
the geographic distance from the considered municipality) and a long-lagged relative
population size measure which is defined analogously to U2i,t.
Moreover, as a second set of instruments we include long-lagged information on the
number of train connections which run through a considered municipality. The data is
obtained from Handbuch der deutschen Eisenbahnstrecken (1984) includes information
on all train connections in Germany between the 1840ies and the early 1930ies (and
thus before the introduction of the German local business tax in 1936). We match
the long-lagged information on the railway system to the communities in our data
set based on historic maps. The idea to use long-lagged information on infrastruc-
ture investment in the railway system to explain the agglomeration of (localized) firms
follows the perception that infrastructure investment may attract firm agglomeration
and affect agglomeration dynamics. Although these past infrastructure investments
are themselves driven by determinants at the time of construction (like e.g. population
density and the presence of natural resources for example in the mining industry), these
infrastructure investments might also have had an impact on location decisions and ag-
glomeration dynamics after their construction. This is, for example, also accounted for
in a related framework by Redding et al. (2007) who show that the division of Ger-
many into two states after World War II triggered a relocation of the airport hub from
Berlin to Frankfurt (Main) which did not relocate back to Berlin after the reunification
of Germany in 1990. This suggests that past infra-structure investments may prevail
and may equally determine today’s location patterns. The long-lagged information on
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the German railway system may thereby serve as a particularly good instrument for
the localization of industries since in Germany particularly manufacturing firms with
high trade costs tend to be localized for which the connection to the railway system
may be of particular interest. From this long-lagged railway information, we define
two instruments: first, the number of train connections of a municipality before 1935
and a market potential for the train network in neighboring communities (define as the
sum of train connectons in neighboring communities normalized on the distance to the
considered municipality).
For our instruments to be valid and to deliver unbiased estimates, they have to satisfy
two conditions: relevance and exogeneity. Correlation tests indicate a relevant corre-
lation between our instruments and the agglomeration variables. Since we are in the
position to construct more instrumental variables from the long-lagged population and
railway information than are needed to identify the estimation system, we can apply
a Sargan/Hansen test to determine the exogeneity in the instrumental variables. The
results for this test will be presented in section 5.
2.5 Results
Our results are depicted in Tables 2.2-2.10. All regressions control for a full set of year
fixed effects and a full set of fixed effects for the German employment regions. Moreover,
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors allowing for clustering at the commuting area
level are presented in parentheses and thus, account for the fact that communities
within the same commuting area may experience correlated shocks.
2.5.1 Baseline Results
Table 2.2 depicts our first set of baseline estimations using the number of employees to
capture urbanization economies (U1i,t) and the number of employees in industries with
significant and above average localization patterns according to DO to capture localiza-
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tion economies (L1i,t). As the distribution of the variables is strongly skewed, we follow
previous papers and employ their logarithm as explanatory variable. Specification (1)
regresses the tax rate on the agglomeration measures, simultaneously controlling for
a full set of commuting area fixed effects and year fixed effects. The coefficient esti-
mates for both variables are positive while, however, only the coefficient estimate for
the localization variable gains statistical significance. Controlling for first-order na-
ture characteristics in Specification (2) renders both coefficient estimates to become
statistically significant suggesting a positive impact of localization and urbanization
economies on the tax rate choice. This result is robust against controlling for the in-
come per capita and the average tax rate in neighboring communities in Specification
(3) and various public infrastructure and public budget variables in Specification (4).
Quantitatively, a ten-percent increase in the number of employees induces the local
business tax rate to rise by 9.3 business tax points (or 0.47 percentage points) while
a ten-percent increase in the number of localized employees induces the local business
tax rate to rise by 11.5 business tax points (or 0.58 percentage points).
The described specifications base the construction of the localization measure on indus-
tries which observe an above average localization intensity according to the DO index.
As this cutoff value is adhoc, we reestimated our specification using alternative cutoff
values for the localization intensity. In general, we find that - in line with intuition -
the coefficient estimate for the localization measure rises the larger the cutoff value for
the distribution of the localization intensity. Specifications (5) to (8) depict reestima-
tions of Columns (1) to (4) whereas only industries with a localization intensity in the
90th percentile of the intensity distribution are considered for the construction of our
localization measure (note that the 90th percentile is commonly larger than the mean
of the intensity distribution). The results are comparable to the previous estimations
whereas the coefficient estimate for the localization measure tends to be quantitatively
higher though.11 In Table 2.3, we moreover reestimate the specifications in Table 2.2
including all industries in the construction of the localization measure which exhibit
11Note, however, that the difference between the coefficient estimates in Columns (4) and (8) are not
statistically different from each other.
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significant localization patterns at any distance below 10 kilometers according to DO
and find comparable (quantitatively slightly smaller) results.
Following our argumentation in the previous section, we experiment with alternative
localization measures. In Table 2.4, we define the localization measure to be the sum
of the employment shares of localized industries (at 0 kilometers according to DO) in
the considered jurisdiction (L2i,t). Specifications (1) to (4) thereby take all industries
with a DO index (and hence localization intensity) above the mean into account when
constructing the localization measure whereas Specifications (5) to (8) account for in-
dustries with a DO index above the 90th percentile only. The results again indicate a
positive effect of both urbanization and localization economies on the municipalities’
business tax rate choice. This is confirmed in Table 2.5 which reestimates the Speci-
fications in Table 4 but accounts for all industries which show significant localization
patterns according to DO at any distance below 10 kilometers.
Finally, we merge the two definitions of the localization measures discussed so far into
our preferred measure which considers the number of employees in a localized industry
within the community’s border accounting for major firm agglomerations only, i.e.
agglomerations which comprise a sufficient share of the industry’s employment. The
idea behind this approach is that it likely does not pay for communities to host a
single firm or a small number of firms in a localized industry (i.e. firms which are
located apart from the major industry cores and thus may be spread across several
communities). We follow two approaches to define this measure. First, we determine an
employee distribution of each localized industry across the communities in our sample
and identify the communities above the 99th percentile which host the largest number
of employees in that industry. These communities are defined to host industry cores.
The localization measure then sums up the number of employees in these industry
cores for the communities in our sample. The results of this exercise are found in
Table 2.6. In Specification (1), we again regress the local business tax rate on the
measures for localization and urbanization economies (the number of employees in the
latter case). Note that the coefficient estimate for the urbanization variable and the
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localization variable are quantitatively larger which may partly be driven by a lower
correlation and a more exact identification of the effects but likely also reflect a larger
impact of employees in localized industry cores on the tax rate measure. The effects
are robust against the inclusion of control variables in Specifications (2) to (4) although
the coefficient estimates diminish in size.
In Specification (5), we moreover account for potential reverse causality problems by
instrumenting for our agglomeration measures using the information on long-lagged
population and long-lagged railway connections. While the coefficient estimate for the
employee variable remains largely stable, the coefficient estimate for the localization
variable strongly increases in size. This is in line with intuition as reverse causality
issues are likely to bias our coefficient estimate downwards if we do not account for
potential negative effects of taxes on agglomeration size. Quantitatively, the specifi-
cation suggests that a ten-percent increase in the number of employees enhances the
jurisdiction’s local business tax rate by 12 local business tax points or 0.6 percentage
points while a ten-percent increase in the number of localized employees increases the
local business tax rate by 61 local business tax points or 3 percentage points.
Note moreover that the test statistics indicate our instrumental variable approach to
be valid. The Stock Yogo tests suggests that we do not face weak identification while
the Sargan/Hansen statistic confirms the instruments to be exogenous and valid. The
first-stage regressions are presented in Table 2.8, Specifications (1) and (2). In line
with intuition, we find that the long-lagged population exerts a much stronger im-
pact on today’s urbanization economies as captured in Specification (1) than on the
localization economies as captured in Specification (2). Interestingly, the long-lagged
population similarity index capturing the relative size of the community compared
enters negatively for the urbanization economy equation and positively for the local-
ization economies. This former effect may be driven by historic satellite jurisdictions
to larger cities which grew overproportionally in size. Thus, if the community was
located close to a big agglomeration center it is also likely to be large in size today.
This is however less true for localization economies which are strongly driven by his-
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toric and traditional industries often located in larger population centers. Moreover, as
expected the number of train connections exerts a quantitatively larger impact on the
localization economies than on urbanization economies and the market potential for
the number of train connections (calculated as the sum of number of train connections
in neighboring communities normalized on the distance to the considered community)
only exerts a significantly positive impact on the localization measure suggesting the
importance of a good railway system for the location of industry clusters.
Moreover, in Specifications (6) to (9), we reestimate Specifications (1) to (4) defining
the localization measure to be the sum of employees in localized industry clusters with
an above average DO index whereas industry cluster is defined to be characterized
by the fact that at least two percent of the industry’s employees have to be located
within the jurisdiction’s borders. The results derived are comparable to the previous
estimates. As this cutoff value for the industry core definition is adhoc, we moreover
reestimated the specifications using one and three percent of the industry share as a
cutoff value and found comparable results. Additionally, in Table 2.7 we reestimate the
regressions presented in Table 6 but basing the definition of the localization measures on
all industries which are localized according to DO at any distance below 10 kilometers.
The results derived are comparable to previous estimates.
Last, as suggested by our theoretical model, the municipality’s tax setting behavior
may not only be affected by its own agglomeration measures but by the relative ag-
glomeration compared to neighboring jurisdictions. In Table 2.9 we regress the local
business tax on the jurisdiction’s relative urbanization compared to neighboring juris-
dictions (U2i,t) and its relative localization compared to neighboring jurisdictions (L4i,t).
As both measures are strongly skewed to the right, we shift their distribution upwards
so that the smallest index value is just above zero and employ their logarithm as ex-
planatory variable. The results are presented in Table 2.9 and indicate that both, a
larger urbanization compared to its neighbors as well as a high localization compared
to its neighbors tends to raise the local business tax rate. This result is robust against
the inclusion of additional control variables in Specifications (2) to (4) whereas again
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the coefficient estimates diminish in size. Again, the analysis may be prone to reverse
causality problems, as the jurisdiction’s tax rate choice may equally affect the agglom-
eration measures. Thus, we employ an instrumental variables approach in Specification
(5) and find large effects of urbanization and localization economies on the tax rate
choice. These results are confirmed in Specifications (6) to (10) which reestimates the
specifications accounting not only for industries which are localized at 0 kilometers but
also for all industries which are localized at any distance below 10 kilometers. Note that
the test statistics again indicate the instrumental variable approach to be valid as they
report the instruments to be relevant and valid. Moreover, the first stage regressions
reported in Table 2.10 are largely in line with intuition, especially note that the mar-
ket potential variable for the train connections again exhibits a significantly positive
effect on the localization measure while the effect is insignificant for the urbanization
variable.
2.5.2 Robustness Checks
All specifications reported so far construct the measure for the localization economies
on the basis of the DO approach. As a robustness check, we additionally rerun the
identification of localized industries based on the Ellison and Glaeser (1997) approach
and reconstruct our localization measures on the basis of these results. For a detailed
description of the EG results, see the companion paper Koh and Riedel (2009a). In
general, we find that the EG index identifies slightly other industries and slightly
more industries to be localized. From a methodological point of view, we consider the
DO approach to be superior as laid out in Appendix A and Koh and Riedel (2009a).
The results are reported in Tables 2.11 to 2.12 and confirm the previous regression
results in the sense that urbanization and localization economies are found to exert
a positive effect on the municipality’s tax rate choice, irrespective of the definition of
the agglomeration measures. In particular, the relative agglomeration measures are
again found to have a positive tax impact. Moreover, the results are quantitatively
comparable. Analogous to our definition of strongly localized employees based on the
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DO index, we select those employees which are employed in agglomerated industries
according to the Ellison and Glaeser (1997) methodology with an EG index above
the mean of the index distribution.12 Table 2.11 depicts our estimation results. In
line with our results reported in Table 2.6, localization economies exert a slightly
stronger positive impact on the local business tax rate than urbanization economies.
In Specification (4), a ten-percent increase in the number of employees yields to a 12.95
business tax points (0.65 percentage points) increase of the local business tax whereas
a ten-percent increase in the number of localized employees brings about an increase
of 14.9 business tax points (0.74 percentage points). These numbers are comparable to
those reported for localized employees according to the DO methodology. Additionally,
reestimating the effects of a municipality’s relative position compared to its neighbors
with a similarity measure that is based on the Ellison and Glaeser (1997) methodology
yields similar results. Again, a municipality which is less substitutable in a firm’s
location choice in terms of the localization and urbanization pattern is more able to
extract location rents. These results are depicted in Table 2.12.
Last, we run robustness checks on our specifications additionally including the market
potential (defined as the sum of the income in neighboring jurisdictions over the dis-
tance to the considered community) as explanatory variable in our estimation frame-
work. The results are presented in Specifications (1) and (2) of Table 2.13. Most
importantly, the inclusion of the market potential as explanatory variable also does
not affect our estimation results.
Finally, we redo the same exercise including a measure for the community’s diversi-
fication in terms of its industry structure. A common measure used in the literature
is the inverse Hirschman-Herfindahl index (see also Duranton and Puga (2000)). It
is defined as the inverse of a municipality’s sum over all industries of squared in-
dustry employment shares. A higher index indicates a diversified municipality which
holds employment shares across many different industries. The results are reported in
Specifications (3) and (4) of Table 2.13 and show that diversification in the industry
12We additionally applied the official agglomeration thresholds as reported in Ellison and Glaeser
(1997) which yielded similar results.
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structure exerts a positive impact on a jurisdictions tax rate choice. Not surprisingly,
the coefficient for the effect of diversification on the local business tax rate reverses
as we address potential reverse causality problems by instrumenting for agglomeration
and diversification as the diversity index is highly correlated with our agglomeration
measures.13 Most importantly, our results are again unaffected by the inclusion of the
additional control variable.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence for the positive effect of firm agglomeration
on the tax setting behaviour of German municipalities. Exploiting a rich data source
which comprises all firms located in Germany including the plant’s four-digit industry
classification we are able to address different scopes of agglomeration. Precisely, we
identify agglomeration at the sectoral level (‘localization’) applying the Duranton and
Overman (2005) index and agglomeration based on the overall economic activity within
a municipality (‘urbanization’). We find that both, the existence of urbanization and
localization economies within a municipality’s boundary exert a positive impact on the
choice of the local business tax rate. The effect of agglomeration on the sectoral level
is thereby found to be quantitatively larger.
Moreover, we find that a jurisdiction’s capacity to extract location rents depends on
the geographical composition of an agglomeration. Precisely, we investigate which
factors determine a jurisdiction’s capacity to tax away agglomeration rents and apply
different measures which all capture a jurisdiction’s substitutability with respect to
its industry structure and general scale of economic activity. A municipality is found
to set higher tax rates if it hosts a larger economic base relative to its neighboring
jurisdictions. Moreover, localization that disseminates across jurisdictional boundaries
lowers a municipality’s capability to extract location rents. Our findings suggest to
13Intuitively, a municipality which comprises urbanization and/or localization advantages will also
host a large variety of different industries as described in Jacobs (1969).
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rethink the desirability to raise local business taxes at the municipality level as the
composition of an agglomeration may prevent the taxability of an agglomeration rent
at the local level.
Finally, we explicitly address potential reverse causality problems by using an instru-
mental variable approach. Using long-lagged historical population data and data on the
number of train connections prior to 1936 we are able to approach estimation problems
which beset previous studies in this research area.
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Appendix A: Identifying Agglomerated Industries
The literature has proposed various approaches to identify the geographical location
pattern of an industry. The most widely used methodologies have been developed
by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) (henceforth EG) and Duranton and Overman (2005)
(henceforth DO). Both approaches measure industry agglomeration over and above
the overall concentration of economic activity and control for industrial concentration
driven by firm-specific characteristics such as the plant size distribution.
The EG index is a discrete measure which compares aggregate industry employment
shares within geographical units to the overall share of activity. A shortcoming of
the approach is that it does not control for geographical proximity of plants but treat
firms equally irrespective of whether they are located close to each other or at the
opposite of the geographical unit. Moreover, the EG approach is sensitive to the
aggregation level which is employed to determine industry agglomeration which may
make its interpretation difficult (for a thorough discussion identifying agglomerated
industries in Germany based on the same dataset, see Koh and Riedel (2009a)).
The DO approach in contrast is not prone to these problems. Thus, for the construction
of industry agglomeration in our baseline estimates, we follow the DO methodology to
identify localized industries in Germany. In sensitivity checks, we however also apply
the EG index.
In the following, we briefly outline the methodology and refer to Duranton and Over-
man (2005) and Koh and Riedel (2009a) for a detailed description of the approach. The
basic intuition for the DO index is to estimate the density of bilateral distances be-
tween firms of the same industry and to compare the distribution of bilateral distances
to the distribution of a hypothetical industry’s randomly generated location pattern
which has the same number of firms as the actual industry. An industry is considered
as being localized at distance d if its distribution of bilateral distances departs signifi-
cantly from randomness. In the first step, we calculate the bilateral distances of firms
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within each industry m using Gauss-Krüger coordinates available for each municipal-
ity. Defining di,j as the distance between firm i and j of industry m we estimate the
density of distances Kˆm(d) at any distance d with
Kˆm(d) =
1
n(n− 1)h
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
f
(
d− di,j
h
)
(A.1)
where n is the number of firms in industry m, f is the Gaussian kernel function with
bandwidth (smoothing parameter) h. Next, we calculate counterfactual kernel den-
sity estimates for this industry by randomly drawing locations from the population
of German firms. Repeating this simulation exercise 1000 times, we then compare
the industry’s actual location pattern to the simulated patterns and thus determine
whether it significantly departs from randomness. To test the significance of the result
we construct local confidence bands which allow us to make statements about whether
the location pattern of an industry deviates significantly from randomness. For each
distance d in the interval [0,312], where 312 is the median distance in our sample, we
rank the simulated kernel density estimates K˜m(d) in ascending order and select the
5th and 95th percentile. This yields a K˜m(d) which represents an upper 5% and a
K˜m(d) which represents the lower 5% bound. An industry m is said to be localized at
distance d if Kˆm(d) > K˜m(d) and the index of localization is defined as
Γm(d) ≡ max(Kˆm(d)− K˜m(d), 0). (A.2)
We will concentrate on localized industries at short distances at 0 kilometers14 or
distances below 10 kilometers. The size of the index indicates how much localization
occurs at a certain distance. It will serve as a proxy for the intensity of an industry’s
agglomeration in the following section.
14Note that our data does not comprise exact information on the location of a firm within a munici-
pality thus the distance of firms within the same community is zero.
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Appendix B: Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Local Business Tax Rate 333.99 31.313 0 900
(in Local Business Tax Points)
Local Business Tax Rate 16.700 1.566 0 45
(in %)
Number of Employees 2571.629 17,042.28 1 774,869
Loc Employee Measures
Loc Employee, 0 km, DO>Mean 239.549 2622.2 0 149,228
Loc Employee, 0 km, DO>90% Perc 55.159 795.865 0 45,299
Loc Employee, 10 km, DO>Mean 273.136 2933.556 0 166,926
Loc Employee, 10 km, DO>90% Perc 61.227 677.517 0 46,012
Loc Sum Ind. Share, 0 km, DO>Mean .0064 .0551 0 3.2299
Loc Sum Ind. Share, 0 km, DO>90% Perc .0022 .0286 0 1.6083
Loc Sum Ind. Share, 10 km, DO>Mean .0095 .0707 0 3.9211
Loc Sum Ind. Share, 10 km, DO>90% Perc .0033 .0324 0 1.6462
Core Municipality Variables
Loc Employee, 0 km, DO>Mean, Core > 99% Perc 106.303 1905.319 0 107,881
Loc Employee, 0 km, DO>Mean, Core > 2% 73.406 1826.169 0 104,924
Loc Employee, 10 km, DO>Mean, Core > 99% Perc 196.166 2992.382 0 165,546
Loc Employee, 10 km, DO>Mean, Core > 2% 132.244 2760.927 0 167,350
Similarity Measures
Similarity Number of Employees 17,726.97 1001,432 -186,809.7 4.70e+07
Similarity Loc. Employees, 0km 9104.921 12,0481.1 -6232.548 6434,129
Similarity Loc. Employees, 10km 13,869.97 155,189.2 -7649.638 7,523,753
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Table 2.1, continued: Descriptive Statistics
Variables: Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Control Variables
Income per Capita 16,816.24 1,719.761 12,838 27,952
Avg. Neighbor Tax Rate 271.101 19.520 239.537 311.299
Administration Grants pC 95.864 564.0004 -67.357 1,490,16.9
Investment Grants pC 37.990 392.074 -201.363 1,017,00.1
Deficit pC 17.520 2,336.273 -574,608 195,236.1
Number of Railway Stations .5097 .9139 0 16
Number of Airports .0451 .2172 0 2
Number of Seaports .0196 .1688 0 7
Instrumental Variables
Population 1910 3924.109 25,253.54 0 1,345,142
Market Potential 1910 193,901.4 44,940.59 0 440,815.4
Similarity Population 1910 -.000098 .0311 -.0070 1.6142
# Train Connections 1935 .3498 1.712 0 77
Market Potential Train Station 1935 17.9333 6.7554 0 48.5295
Notes: ‘Loc Employee, 0 km, DO>Mean’ (‘Loc Employee, 0 km, DO>90% Perc’) depicts the number of employees
located in a community which are occupied in industries that are localized at a distance of zero kilometers according
to the DO methodology and are strongly localized in the sense that the DO index which indicates the degree of
geographical clustering is above the mean (in the 90th percentile of the distribution). Analogous measures were
calculated for all industries which are localized at a distance smaller or equal 10 kilometers. Accordingly, ‘Loc Sum
Ind. Share, 0 km, DO>Mean’ (‘Loc Sum Ind. Share, 0 km, DO>90% Perc’) denotes the sum of industry shares
for all those industries in a considered community that are localized at a distance of zero kilometers according to
the DO methodology and are strongly localized in the sense that the DO index is above the mean (in the 90th
percentile of the distribution). Analogous measures were calculated for all industries which are localized at a distance
smaller or equal 10 kilometers. ‘Loc Employee, 0 km, DO>Mean, Core > 99th Perc’ depicts the number of strongly
localized employees (at zero kilometers) in a ‘core municipality’. Core municipalities hold a major share in a strongly
localized industry and are defined according to two definitions: ‘Core > 99th Perc’ depicts those municipalities which
hold an employment share in the 99th percentile of the localized industry’s employment share distribution across
municipalities. ‘Core > 2%’ denotes municipalities which hold a share in a strongly localized industry of at least
2%. ‘Similarity Number of Employees’ indicates the similarity in the number of employees between a considered
community and all other communities in Germany, adjusted for the distance. ‘Similarity Loc. Employees, 0km’
stands for the sum of the differences of localized employees (at zero kilometer, following DO) between a community
and all other communities in Germany, adjusted for the distance. All employee and similarity measures enter in
logarithmic form.
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Table 2.2: Number of Employees - Localized Industries at 0 kilometers
Region Fixed–Effects
Model DO index > mean DO index > 90th Percentile
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sum Loc Employees 2.376∗∗∗ 1.890∗∗∗ 1.465∗∗∗ 1.151∗∗∗ 3.481∗∗∗ 2.947∗∗∗ 2.360∗∗∗ 1.542∗∗∗
(.366) (.290) (.288) (.292) (.407) (.326) (.342) (.302)
Sum Employees .762 1.835∗∗∗ 1.122∗∗∗ .931∗∗ .801 1.669∗∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗ 1.072∗∗∗
(.607) (.375) (.378) (.374) (.493) (.325) (.344) (.352)
Income per Capita -27.136∗∗∗ -8.191 -27.801∗∗∗ -8.394
(9.952) (11.696) (10.235) (12.107)
Avg. Tax Neighbor .362∗∗∗ .341 .359∗∗∗ .343
(.089) (.225) (.088) (.222)
Deficit/105 8.550∗∗∗ 8.650∗∗∗
(1.90) (1.920)
Administration Grants .025∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗
(.002) (.004)
Investment Grants -.002 -.002
(.002) (.002)
Road Net Work 2.567∗∗ 2.396∗∗
(1.103) (1.077)
Railway .534 .470
(.365) (.366)
Airport 4.405∗∗∗ 3.998∗∗∗
(1.321) (1.275)
Seaport 9.112∗∗∗ 8.628∗∗∗
(2.797) (2.743)
Capital City 71.710∗∗∗ 44.530∗∗∗ 66.888∗∗∗ 43.118∗∗∗
(14.780) (14.501) (14.707) (14.440)
Rural Community -8.040∗∗∗ -6.064∗∗∗ -7.206∗∗∗ -5.828∗∗∗
(1.199) (1.112) (1.203) (1.109)
Border Community -.125 -.656 -.403 -.881
(1.838) (1.509) (1.781) (1.489)
First Nature Geographies
√ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989
# Commuting Areas 74 74 73 72 74 74 73 72
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for commuting area clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are municipalities per year. All regressions
include a full set of region fixed effects. ‘Sum Loc Employees ’ is the sum of employees of localized industries within
a municipality. Specifications (1)-(4) define localized industries in the sense that the DO index has to be above the
index distribution. Specifications (4)-(8) considers only those industries with a DO index above the 90th percentile
of the index distribution.
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Table 2.3: Number of Employees - Localized Industries at 10 kilometers
Region Fixed–Effects
Model DO index > mean DO index > 90th Percentile
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sum Loc Employees 2.175∗∗∗ 1.667∗∗∗ 1.213∗∗∗ .860∗∗∗ 2.715∗∗∗ 2.230∗∗∗ 1.675∗∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗
(.343) (.245) (.236) (.221) (.372) (.292) (.291) (.263)
Sum Employees .922 2.013∗∗∗ 1.331∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗ 2.074∗∗∗ 1.416∗∗∗ 1.288∗∗∗
(.618) (.379) (.387) (.383) (.535) (.350) (.366) (.368)
Income per Capita -26.298∗∗ -7.174 -26.236∗∗ -7.271
(10.025) (11.714) (10.114) (11.845)
Avg. Tax Neighbor .362∗∗∗ .333 .363∗∗∗ .333
(.089) (.224) (.089) (.224)
Deficit/105 8.570∗∗∗ 8.60∗∗∗
(1.910) (1.910)
Administration Grants .025∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗
(.004) (.004)
Investment Grants -.003 -.002
(.002) (.002)
Road Net Work 2.607∗∗ 2.522∗∗
(1.108) ( 1.101)
Railway .543 .516
(.362) (.362)
Airport 4.396∗∗∗ 4.291∗∗∗
(1.319) (1.302)
Seaport 9.166∗∗∗ 8.981∗∗∗
(2.809) (2.759)
Capital City 71.856∗∗∗ 44.711∗∗∗ 69.366∗∗∗ 43.925∗∗∗
(14.731) (14.504) (14.586) (14.422)
Rural Community -8.022∗∗∗ -6.103∗∗∗ -7.471∗∗∗ -5.932∗∗∗
(1.191) (1.112) (1.210) (1.122)
Border Community -.266 -.771 -.325 -.795
(1.857) (1.523) (1.842) (1.504)
First Nature Geographies
√ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989
# Commuting Areas 74 74 73 72 74 74 73 72
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Table 2.4: Sum Localized Industry Shares - Localized Industries at 0 kilometers
Region Fixed–Effects
Model DO index > mean DO index > 90th Percentile
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sum Loc. Ind. Shares 98.109∗∗∗ 88.212∗∗∗ 73.901∗∗∗ 55.362∗∗∗ 138.271∗∗∗ 130.220∗∗∗ 104.043∗∗∗ 75.939∗∗∗
(14.406) (12.729) (11.792) (10.916) (20.701) (17.577) (14.873) (18.037)
Sum Employees 2.156∗∗∗ 2.968∗∗∗ 1.983∗∗∗ 1.729∗∗∗ 2.416∗∗∗ 3.226∗∗∗ 2.135∗∗∗ 1.779∗∗∗
(.524) (.382) (.408) (.412) (.540) (.380) (.412) (.416)
Income per Capita -22.194∗∗ -3.936 -22.568∗∗ -4.432
(10.133) (11.430) (9.941) (11.367)
Avg. Tax Neighbor .368∗∗∗ .337 .368∗∗∗ .340
(.090) (.227) (.090) (.226)
Deficit/105 8.580∗∗∗ 8.590∗∗∗
(1.940) (1.950)
Administration Grants .023∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗
(.004) (.004)
Investment Grants -.002 -.002
(.002) (.002)
Road Net Work 1.262 1.780
(1.186) (1.156)
Railway .245 .391
(.394) (.389)
Airport 4.746∗∗∗ 4.706∗∗∗
(1.334) (1.346)
Seaport 8.045∗∗∗ 8.790∗∗∗
(2.562) (2.613)
Capital City 30.893∗ 22.506∗ 46.936∗∗∗ 31.491∗∗∗
(16.496) (11.862) (14.464) (11.032)
Rural Community -8.516∗∗∗ -6.738∗∗∗ -8.812∗∗∗ -6.7996∗∗∗
(1.184) (1.091) (1.199) (1.097)
Border Community .077 -.454 .252 -.402
(1.805) (1.516) (1.829) (1.508)
First Nature Geographies
√ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989
# Commuting Areas 74 74 73 72 74 74 73 72
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for commuting area clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are municipalities per year. All regressions include a
full set of region fixed effects. ‘Sum Loc. Ind. Shares’ is the sum of industry shares of localized industries within a
municipality. Specifications (1)-(4) define localized industries in the sense that the DO index has to be above the index
distribution. Specifications (4)-(8) considers only those industries with a DO index above the 90th percentile of the
index distribution.
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Table 2.5: Sum Localized Industry Shares - Localized Industries at 10 kilometers
Region Fixed–Effects
Model DO index > mean DO index > 90th Percentile
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sum Loc. Ind. Shares 79.994∗∗∗ 71.020∗∗∗ 59.870∗∗∗ 43.656∗∗∗ 131.364∗∗∗ 122.901∗∗∗ 98.508∗∗∗ 72.898∗∗∗
(11.767) (10.438) (9.622) (8.245) (19.132) (16.250) (13.665) (14.285)
Sum Employees 2.068∗∗∗ 2.885∗∗∗ 1.937∗∗∗ 1.710∗∗∗ 2.342∗∗∗ 3.149∗∗∗ 2.085∗∗∗ 1.762∗∗∗
(.519) (.380) (.406) (.409) (.537) (.382) (.411) (.415)
Income per Capita -22.147∗∗ -3.994 -22.035∗∗ -3.938
(10.177) (11.4997) (10.036) (11.403)
Avg. Tax Neighbor .368∗∗∗ .334 .369∗∗∗ .338
(.090) (.226) (.090) (.226)
Deficit/105 8.580∗∗∗ 8.590∗∗∗
(1.930) (1.950)
Administration Grants .023∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗
(.004) (.004)
Investment Grants -.002 -.002
(.002) (.002)
Road Net Work 1.186 1.587
(1.184) (1.165)
Railway .211 .319
(.391) (.393)
Airport 4.683∗∗∗ 4.704∗∗∗
(1.347) (1.338)
Seaport 8.073∗∗∗ 8.591∗∗∗
(2.549) (2.608)
Capital City 28.060∗ 21.420∗ 45.032∗∗∗ 30.572∗∗∗
(16.796) (12.045) (14.683) (10.959)
Rural Community -8.344∗∗∗ -6.645∗∗∗ -8.732∗∗∗ -6.798∗∗∗
(1.189) ( 1.093) (1.196) (1.095)
Border Community .-.013 -.522 .183 -.420
(1.804) (1.520) (1.846) (1.516)
First Nature Geographies
√ √ √ √ √ √
# Observations 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989
# Commuting Areas 74 74 73 72 74 74 73 72
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Table 2.6: Number of Employees in Core Regions - Localized Industries at 0 kilometers
Region Fixed–Effects
Model Core > 99th Percentile Core > 2%
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sum Loc Employees 3.561∗∗∗ 3.251∗∗∗ 2.734∗∗∗ 1.760∗∗∗ 6.114∗∗∗ 3.145∗∗∗ 2.849∗∗∗ 2.173∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗ 7.972∗∗∗
(.340) (.327) (.324) (.261) (1.256) (.517) (.497) (.452) (.348) (2.025)
Sum Employees 1.615∗∗∗ 2.344∗∗∗ 1.594∗∗∗ 1.432∗∗∗ 1.206∗∗ 2.244∗∗∗ 3.042∗∗∗ 2.033∗∗∗ 1.695∗∗∗ 1.708∗∗∗
(.477) (.348) (.375) (.384) (.576) (.530) (.369) (.404) (.412) (.623)
Income per Capita -26.776∗∗ -7.731 -14.397 -24.169∗∗ -5.617 -7.676
(10.511) (12.240) (15.294) (10.082) (11.610) (13.277)
Avg. Tax Neighbor .366∗∗∗ .331 .360 .364∗∗∗ .330 .329
(.089) (.223) (.236) (.090) (.228) (.252)
Deficit/105 8.490∗∗∗ 8.170∗∗∗ 8.550∗∗∗ 8.310∗∗∗
(1.850) (1.470) (1.930) (1.610)
Administration Grants .023∗∗∗ .022∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Investment Grants -.002 -.002 -.003 -.002
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Road Net Work 1.824 -1.113 2.427∗∗ -.297
(.984) (.870) (1.116) (1.223)
Railway .446 -.366 .547 -.192
(.352) (.441) (.363) (.466)
Airport 3.578∗∗∗ .807 4.445∗∗∗ 3.368∗∗
(1.229) (1.570) (1.344) (1.637)
Seaport 7.751∗∗∗ 2.226 8.765∗∗∗ 4.204∗
(2.658) (2.550) (2.731) (2.559)
Capital City 56.021∗∗∗ 38.999∗∗∗ 23.756 57.007∗∗∗ 38.181∗∗ -3.527
(14.511) (14.318) (18.216) (14.397) (14.507) (20.571)
Rural Community -7.059∗∗∗ -5.960∗∗∗ -2.749∗∗ -8.483∗∗∗ -6.564∗∗∗ -4.564∗∗∗
(1.126) (1.044) (1.367) (1.165) (1.075) ( 1.227)
Border Community -.547 -.792 -1.276 -.292 -.663 -1.013
(1.859) (1.545) ( 1.759) (1.832) (1.542) (1.789)
First Nature Geographies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Stock Yogo 30.693 14.503
Sargan-Hansen (dof) 2.844 (3) 2.720 (3)
Sargan-Hansen (p-value) 0.416 0.437
# Observations 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989 26,384 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989 26,384
# Commuting Areas 74 74 73 72 72 74 74 73 72 72
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for commuting area clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are municipalities per year. All regressions
include a full set of region fixed effects. ‘Sum Employees’ is the number of employees in the respective core municipality.
‘Sum Loc Employees’ is the number of localized employees in a core municipality localized at less than 0 km according
to the DO index. These employees are defined as strongly localized in the sense that the DO index has to be above
the mean of its distribution. ‘Core municipalities’ are classified according to two definitions: in specification (1)-(5) a
core municipality has to hold a share in a localized industry in the 99th percentile of the industry share distribution.
In specification (6)-(10) a core municipality has to hold a more than 2 % of a localized industry’s share.
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Table 2.7: Number of Employees in Core Regions - Localized Industries at 10 kilometers
Region Fixed–Effects
Model Core > 99th Percentile Core > 2%
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Sum Loc Employees 3.005∗∗∗ 2.728∗∗∗ 2.266∗∗∗ 1.502∗∗∗ 5.418∗∗∗ 2.211∗∗∗ 1.912∗∗∗ 1.348∗∗∗ .553∗∗ 6.643∗∗∗
(.283) (.275) (.265) (.222) (1.055) (.368) (.354) (.303) (.241) (1.540)
Sum Employees 1.535∗∗∗ 2.277∗∗∗ 1.574∗∗∗ 1.405∗∗∗ 1.035∗ 2.133∗∗∗ 2.957∗∗∗ 2.018∗∗∗ 1.715∗∗∗ 1.539∗∗
(.481) (.353) (.379) (.387) (.589) (.541) (.372) (.408) (.422) (.641)
Income per Capita -26.581∗∗ -7.229 -13.125 -24.065∗∗ -5.706 -7.133
(10.366) (11.994) (14.222) (9.941) (11.507) (13.060)
Avg. Tax Neighbor .361∗∗∗ .331 .349 .364∗∗∗ .330 .318
(.090) (.225) (.246) (.091) (.228) (.271)
Deficit/105 8.520∗∗∗ 8.210∗∗∗ 8.560∗∗∗ 8.270∗∗∗
(1.890) (1.520) (1.940) (1.60)
Administration Grants .023∗∗∗ .023∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Investment Grants -.002 -.002 -.003 -.003
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Road Net Work 1.944∗ -.827 2.585∗∗ -.133
(.993) (.793) (1.106) (.964)
Railway .451 -.398 .552 -.698
(.356) (.445) (.360) (.528)
Airport 3.187∗∗ -.590 4.439∗∗∗ 1.909
(1.221) (1.696) (1.334) (1.618)
Seaport 7.896∗∗∗ 2.274 8.859∗∗∗ 2.040
(2.719) (2.566) (2.806) (3.015)
Capital City 59.731∗∗∗ 40.777∗∗∗ 29.417∗ 63.941∗∗∗ 42.385∗∗∗ 11.509
(14.407) (14.295) (17.742) (14.407) (14.391) (17.125)
Rural Community -6.790∗∗∗ -5.731∗∗∗ -1.894 -8.243∗∗∗ -6.482∗∗∗ -2.899∗
(1.113) (1.030) (1.472) (1.143) (1.060) (1.518)
Border Community -.817 -1.022 -2.190 -.423 -.757 -2.515
(1.849) ( 1.548) (1.796) (1.876) (1.553) (1.934)
First Nature Geographies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Stock Yogo 30.943 26.109
Sargan-Hansen (dof) 2.340 (3) 1.697 (3)
Sargan-Hansen (p-value) 0.505 0.638
# Observations 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989 26,384 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989 26,384
# Commuting Areas 74 74 73 72 72 74 74 73 72 72
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Table 2.8: First Stage Regressions Employees - Localized Industries in Core Regions
Region Fixed–Effects - Core > 99th Percentile
Model 0 km 10 km
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Population 1910 1.105∗∗∗ .144∗∗∗ 1.105∗∗∗ .186∗∗∗
(.051) (.041) (.051) (.049)
Market Potential Pop 1910 1.559∗∗∗ 2.197 ∗∗∗ 1.559 ∗∗∗ 2.446∗∗∗
(.505) (.651) (.505) (.680)
Population Similarity 1910 -7.279∗∗∗ 19.072∗∗∗ -7.279∗∗∗ 19.511∗∗∗
(1.644) (3.962) (1.644) (4.284)
Market Potential Train 1935 .004 .022∗ .004 .026∗
(.009) (.012) (.009) (.013)
Number of Train Connections 1935 .090∗∗∗ .288∗∗∗ .090∗∗∗ .457∗∗∗
(.027) (.070) (.027) (.086)
Dep. Variable # Emp. All # Loc. Emp. # Emp. All # Loc. Emp.
# Observations 26,384 26,384 26,384 26,384
Partial R-Squared of Excl. IVs 0.429 0.077 0.429 0.080
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for commuting area clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are municipalities per year. All regressions
include a full set of region fixed effects. ‘# Emp. All’ is the number of employees in the core municipality, where
core municipalities are defined to hold a share in a localized industry in the 99th percentile of the industry share
distribution. ‘# Loc. Emp. ’ is the number of localized employees in a core municipality. These employees belong
to an industry that is geographically agglomerated according to the DO methodology and where its DO index lies
above the mean of its distribution.
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Table 2.9: Similarity - Localized Industries - DO index
Region Fixed–Effects
Model DO index at 0 km DO index at 10 km
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Similarity # Emp 7.203∗∗∗ 7.570∗∗∗ 6.475∗∗∗ 5.961∗∗∗ 7.379∗∗∗ 7.309∗∗∗ 7.836∗∗∗ 6.731∗∗∗ 6.003∗∗∗ 6.796∗∗
(.920) (.939) (1.164) (1.285) (2.750) (.951) (.973) (1.198) (1.290) (2.978)
Similarity # Loc Emp 5.799∗∗∗ 5.630∗∗∗ 5.234∗∗∗ 3.697∗∗∗ 7.6997∗∗ 5.062∗∗∗ 4.665∗∗∗ 4.326∗∗∗ 2.912∗∗∗ 8.312∗∗
(.831) (.858) (.906) (.762) (3.544) (.800) (.841) (.859) (.662) (3.786)
Income per Capita -23.609∗ -2.617 -5.736 -22.351∗ -.931 -5.320
(12.644) (13.751) (14.722) (12.963) (13.844) (15.297)
Avg. Tax Neighbor .363∗∗∗ .274 .287 .353∗∗∗ .239 .282
(.099) (.235) (.228) (.101) (.240) (.245)
Deficit/105 8.220∗∗∗ 7.920∗∗∗ 8.240∗∗∗ 7.850∗∗∗
(1.610) (1.340) (1.680) (1.350)
Administration Grants .028∗∗∗ .028∗∗∗ .029∗∗∗ .029∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.004)
Investment Grants -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Road Net Work .585 -1.301 .704 -1.393
(.955) (.893) (.924) (.890)
Railway -.092 -.745 .008 -.705
(.425) (.484) (.416) (.483)
Airport 2.081 .761 2.195∗ .594
(1.297) (1.534) (1.317) (1.566)
Seaport 5.561∗∗ 2.116 5.421∗∗ .712
(2.440) (2.287) (2.465) (2.5996)
Capital City 37.812∗∗∗ 30.131∗∗ 17.644 40.940∗∗∗ 32.123∗∗ 17.460
(14.046) (13.479) (16.499) (13.760) (13.492) (16.401)
Rural Community -2.728∗∗ -2.973∗∗ .165 -2.722∗∗ -3.040∗∗ .220
(1.245) (1.245) ( 1.639) (1.258) (1.235) (1.609)
Border Community -.708 -1.270 -1.611 -.698∗∗ -1.139 -1.594
(1.855) (1.633) (1.546) (1.838) (1.602) (1.551)
First Nature Geographies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Stock Yogo 21.474 23.009
Sargan-Hansen (dof) 0.323 (3) 0.052 (3)
Sargan-Hansen (p-value) 0.9556 0.997
# Observations 42,705 37,551 33,036 20,797 18,960 49,338 43,324 38,672 21,623 19,741
# Commuting Areas 74 74 73 72 72 74 74 73 72 72
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Table 2.10: First Stage Regressions - Similarity Index
Region Fixed–Effects
Model 0 km 10 km
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Population 1910 .366∗∗∗ .106∗∗∗ .363∗∗∗ .112∗∗∗
(.036) (.019) (.034) (.020)
Market Potential Pop 1910 .205 .634∗∗ .165 .686∗∗
(.248) (.268) (.253) (.260)
Population Similarity 1910 3.817∗∗∗ 10.082∗∗∗ 3.814∗∗∗ 9.442∗∗∗
(1.183) (1.431) (1.192) (1.542)
Market Potential Train 1935 .008 .013∗∗∗ .009 .011∗
(.006) (.005) (.007) (.006)
Number of Train Connections 1935 .143∗∗∗ .110∗∗∗ .147∗∗∗ .140∗∗∗
(.022) (.029) (.023) (.032)
Dep. Variable Simi All Simi Loc Simi All Simi Loc
# Observations 18,960 18,960 19,741 19,741
Partial R-Squared of Excl. IVs 0.296 0.145 0.285 0.126
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Table 2.11: Employees in Core Regions - Localized Industries - EG index
Region Fixed–Effects
Model Core > 99th Percentile Core > 2%
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (4) (10)
Sum Loc Employees 2.721∗∗∗ 2.452∗∗∗ 2.031∗∗∗ 1.485∗∗∗ 7.622∗∗∗ 2.835∗∗∗ 2.637∗∗∗ 2.131∗∗∗ 1.228∗∗∗ 6.60∗∗∗
(.271) (.260) (.236) (.230) (1.238) (.390) (.377) (.338) (.303) (1.609)
Sum Employees 1.773∗∗∗ 2.543∗∗∗ 1.695∗∗∗ 1.295∗∗∗ .160 2.134∗∗∗ 2.901∗∗∗ 1.904∗∗∗ 1.632∗∗∗ 1.715∗∗∗
(.4997) (.354) (.382) (.379) (.696) (.518) (.363) (.395) (.408) (.609)
Income per Capita -25.638∗∗ -9.311 -27.161 -24.409∗∗ -6.550 -13.669
(10.085) (12.182) (17.216) ( 10.054) (11.777) (13.698)
Avg. Tax Neighbor .397∗∗∗ .345 .407 .370∗∗∗ .338 .384
(.090) (.227) (.263) (.090) (.226) (.251)
Deficit/105 8.550∗∗∗ 8.320∗∗∗ 8.580∗∗∗ 8.40∗∗∗
(1.930) (1.660) (1.950) (1.710)
Administration Grants .023∗∗∗ .021∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗ .024∗∗∗
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Investment Grants -.002 -.002 -.003 -.002
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Road Net Work 1.925∗ -2.311∗∗ 2.316∗∗ -.492
(.9997) (1.041) (1.080) (1.021)
Railway .366 -1.007∗∗ .507 -.404
(.346) (.447) (.357) (.458)
Airport 3.420∗∗∗ -2.558 4.135∗∗∗ 1.373
(1.294) (1.867) (1.325) (1.761)
Seaport 8.347∗∗∗ 2.495 8.253∗∗∗ 1.830
(2.716) (2.587) (2.730) (2.722)
Capital City 61.304∗∗∗ 42.449∗∗∗ 30.787∗ 58.303∗∗∗ 39.136∗∗∗ 11.577
(14.593) (14.376) (17.890) (14.271) (14.129) (16.532)
Rural Community -7.157∗∗∗ -5.212∗∗∗ 2.595 -8.364∗∗∗ -6.523∗∗∗ -4.374∗∗∗
(1.142) (1.029) (2.020) (1.140) (1.057) (1.226)
Border Community -.719 -1.155 -3.381∗∗ -.108 -.566 -.314
(1.136) (1.438) (1.724) (1.794) (1.511) (1.513)
First Nature Geographies
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Stock Yogo 17.172 25.090
Sargan-Hansen (dof) 1.615 (3) 3.466 (3)
Sargan-Hansen (p-value) 0.656 0.325
# Observations 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989 26,384 75,180 60,646 53,972 28,989 26,384
# Commuting Areas 74 74 73 72 72 74 74 73 72 72
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for commuting area clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are municipalities per year. All regressions include a full
set of region fixed effects. ‘Sum Employees’ is the number of employees in the respective core municipality. ‘Sum Loc
Employees’ is the number of employees in a core municipality localized according to the EG index. These employees
are defined as strongly localized in the sense that the EG index has to be above the mean of its distribution. ‘Core
municipalities’ are classified according to two definitions: in specification (1)-(5) a core municipality has to hold a
share in a localized industry in the 99th percentile of the industry share distribution. In specification (6)-(10) a core
municipality has to hold more than 2% in a localized industry’s employment.
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Table 2.12: Similarity - Localized Industries - EG index
Region Fixed–Effects
Model EG index > mean
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Similarity # Emp 8.063∗∗∗ 8.620∗∗∗ 7.648∗∗∗ 6.773∗∗∗ 6.857∗∗
(.875) (.872) (1.201) (1.408) (2.730)
Similarity # Loc Emp 4.892∗∗∗ 4.573∗∗∗ 4.399∗∗∗ 3.199∗∗∗ 8.840∗∗
(1.067) (1.068) (1.072) (.975) (3.909)
Income per Capita -31.063∗∗ -9.763 -12.187
(13.916) (14.343) (15.072)
Avg. Tax Neighbor .384∗∗∗ .327 .328
(.098) (.227) (.220)
Deficit/105 257.470∗∗∗ 213.320∗∗
(.001) (84.240)
Administration Grants .028∗∗∗ .028∗∗∗
(.006) (.006)
Investment Grants -.001 -.002
(.002) (.002)
Road Net Work .707 -1.143
(.997) (.914)
Railway -.233 -.860∗
(.428) (.504)
Airport 2.058 .736
(1.362) (1.547)
Seaport 5.003∗∗ .341
(2.350) (2.452)
Capital City 39.356∗∗ 31.262∗∗ 17.600
(15.104) (15.943) (16.333)
Rural Community -2.039 -2.813∗∗ -.701
(1.408) (1.402) (1.536)
Border Community -1.129 -1.375 -2.084
(2.156) (1.948) (2.099)
First Nature Geographies
√ √ √ √
Stock Yogo 35.576
Sargan-Hansen (dof) 0.199 (3)
Sargan-Hansen (p-value) 0.9779
# Observations 37,533 33,638 29,944 16,946 15,467
# Commuting Areas 74 74 73 72 72
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Table 2.13: Robustness Check - Market Potential and Diversification
Region Fixed–Effects
Model Core > 99th Percentile - 0km
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sum Loc Employees 1.739∗∗∗ 7.254∗∗∗ 1.771∗∗∗ 4.925∗∗
(.262) (1.208) (.263) (1.983)
Sum Employees 1.546∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗ 1.274∗∗∗ 17.013
(.410) (.583) (.399) (11.534)
Market Potential -5.402 -15.059∗
(7.542) (8.063)
Diversity Index .974∗∗ -35.172
(.547) (25.274)
Income per Capita -5.206 -9.714 -9.697 -22.596
(12.586) (14.927) (12.039) (23.695)
Avg. Tax Neighbor .200 .145 .269 -.032
(.242) (.243) (.218) (.3999)
Deficit/105 13.550∗∗∗ 13.290∗∗∗ 8.440∗∗∗ 8.460∗∗∗
(1.50) (1.189) (1.790) (2.570)
Administration Grants .022∗∗∗ .020∗∗∗ .022∗∗∗ .067∗∗
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.031)
Investment Grants -.004∗ -.003∗∗ -.002 -.013
(.002) (.003) (.002) (.008)
Road Net Work 1.989∗ -1.488∗ 1.785∗ -1.377
(1.013) (.879) (.999) (1.188)
Railway .344 -.525 .270 -1.413
(.347) (.463) (.350) (.979)
Airport 3.553∗∗∗ -.033 3.734∗∗∗ -2.976
(1.225) (1.664) (1.212) (3.914)
Seaport 8.361∗∗∗ 1.370 8.534∗∗∗ -7.714
(2.631) (2.741) (2.605) (8.352)
Capital City 43.528∗∗∗ 18.925 40.633∗∗ 17.731
(14.570) (17.641) (16.519) (15.881)
Rural Community -5.635∗∗∗ -1.943 -5.682∗∗∗ 4.138
(1.037) (1.303) (1.065) (4.789)
Border Community -1.184 -2.129 -.804 -4.470
(1.524) (1.947) (1.608) (2.876)
First Nature Geographies
√ √ √ √
Stock Yogo 16.532 1.174
Sargan-Hansen (dof) 0.402 (2) 0.326 (2)
Sargan-Hansen (p-value) 0.818 0.850
# Observations 22,987 20,971 28,795 26,240
# Commuting Areas 72 72 72 72
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for commuting area clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are municipalities per year. All regressions
include a full set of region fixed effects. ‘Market Potential’ is the distance weighted sum of per capita income of all
neighboring communities and measures a location’s market access (see also Head and Mayer (2004)). ‘Diversity Index’
denotes the inverse Hirschman-Herfindahl and measures the degree of diversification within a municipality (see also
Duranton and Puga (2000)). It is defined as the inverse of a municipality’s sum over all industries of squared industry
employment shares, where a higher index therefore indicates a diversified municipality.
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Appendix C
Karte Raumordnungsregionen 1.1.2004
Raumordnungsregionen
75
Rosenheim
Rosenheim
1 Schleswig-Holstein Nord 15 Bremen-Umland 29 Havelland-Fläming 43 Bochum/Hagen 57 Westsachsen 71 Nordschwarzwald 85 OberpfalzNord
2 Schleswig-Holstein Süd-West 16 Oldenburg 30 Berlin 44 Köln 58 Oberes Elbtal/Osterzgebirge 72 Stuttgart 86 Industrieregion Mittelfranken
3 Schleswig-Holstein Mitte 17 Emsland 31 Altmark 45 Aachen 59 Oberlausitz-Niederschlesien 73 Ostwürttemberg 87 Westmittelfranken
4 Schleswig-Holstein Ost 18 Osnabrück 32 Magdeburg 46 Bonn 60 Chemnitz-Erzgebirge 74 Donau-Iller (BW) 88 Augsburg
5 Schleswig-Holstein Süd 19 Hannover 33 Dessau 47 Siegen 61 Südwestsachsen 75 Neckar-Alb 89 Ingolstadt
6 Hamburg 20 Südheide 34 Halle/S. 48 Nordhessen 62 Mittelrhein-Westerwald 76 Schwarzwald-Baar-Heuberg 90 Regensburg
7 Westmecklenburg 21 Lüneburg 35 Münster 49 Mittelhessen 63 Trier 77 Südlicher Oberrhein 91 Donau-Wald
8 Mittleres Mecklenburg/Rostock 22 Braunschweig 36 Bielefeld 50 Osthessen 64 Rheinhessen-Nahe 78 Hochrhein-Bodensee 92 Landshut
9 Vorpommern 23 Hildesheim 37 Paderborn 51 Rhein-Main 65 Westpfalz 79 Bodensee-Oberschwaben 93 München
10 Mecklenburgische Seenplatte 24 Göttingen 38 Arnsberg 52 Starkenburg 66 Rheinpfalz 80 Bayerischer Untermain 94 Donau-Iller (BY)
11 Bremen 25 Prignitz-Oberhavel 39 Dortmund 53 Nordthüringen 67 Saar 81 Würzburg 95 Allgäu
12 Ost-Friesland 26 Uckermark-Barnim 40 Emscher-Lippe 54 Mittelthüringen 68 Unterer Neckar 82 Main-Rhön 96 Oberland
13 Bremerhaven 27 Oderland-Spree 41 Duisburg/Essen 55 Südthüringen 69 Franken 83 Oberfranken-West 97 Südostoberbayern
14 Hamburg-Umland-Süd 28 Lausitz-Spreewald 42 Düsseldorf 56 Ostthüringen 70 Mittlerer Oberrhein 84 Oberfranken-Ost
Raumordnungsregionen sind mit Ausnahme
der Stadtstaaten großräumige, funktional
abgegrenzte Raumeinheiten für die
Raumordnungsberichterstattung des Bundes.
Sie entsprechen in der Regel den Planungs-
regionen der Länder, in Niedersachsen und
Nordrhein-Westfalen vergleichbaren
regionalen Gliederungen.
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Figure 2.1: Raumordnungsregionen
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Appendix D: Constructing historical data sets
The long lagged population data was derived from the population census in 1910 which
was conducted by the Kaiserliches Statistisches Amt (1915). The basic historical data
contained around 80.000 observations which had to be matched to around 8.000 West
German municipalities that exist today. Two major challenges had to be overcome
during the construction of the data set. Firstly, in 1910 the German Kaiserreich com-
prised a much larger territory than today, notably Prussia which stretched north earth
(todays Poland) and north comprising many nowadays Danish cities. Secondly, todays
municipality borders do not coincide with those back in 1910 which were much more
disaggregated at that time. A majority of jurisdictions which formed an autonomous
municipality back in 1910 were consolidated during several municipal reforms to one
municipality with several suburbs and villages. The single historical municipalities
were matched manually according to their name and the region. Fortunately, names of
historic municipalities did merely change over time and they could be precisely located
as the data set was partitioned into single provinces which simplified the matching sub-
stantially. This two stage procedure avoided pitfalls, e.g. from multiple municipality
names that would have otherwise bothered the matching process. Our final matching
rate amounts to 97%.
The construction of the historical railway data proceeded similarly except for ‘filling’
up todays municipalities with historic jurisdictions. We assigned the number of train
stations to the respective municipality which we identified according to the name and
region.
Chapter 3
Inefficient Lock-in and Subsidy
Competition
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3.1 Introduction
The many merits and drawbacks of capital tax competition and other forms of loca-
tional or jurisdictional competition have been established in a by now sizable literature.1
This paper advances a novel argument in favor of tax competition: inefficient lock-ins
of industry can potentially be overcome, and a shift to a more efficient equilibrium be
induced, through competition in capital subsidies.
Inefficient lock-in situations are well-known from the field of technology adoption
(David, 1985; Arthur, 1989). Arguably the most famous example is the computer
keyboard, which despite technologically superior systems today still has the same lay-
out – a succession of letters beginning with QWERTY in the topmost row – as the old
typewriter.
Decreasing unit costs and multiple equilibria are also a hallmark of the new trade the-
ory and of economic geography. This research has unveiled that ‘history matters’ for
national or regional specialization, and that it cannot be assured that the best equi-
librium is chosen. Krugman and Obstfeld (2009) provide a simple textbook example
that countries can get locked into undesirable specialization patterns when industries
are competitive and there are external economies of scale at the country level: two
countries, Switzerland and Thailand, are both (potentially) able to supply the world
demand for watches at decreasing average costs. Although Thailand could (by assump-
tion) do so more cheaply at any scale, the Swiss industry, has (historically) established
its industry first. This head start and the associated scale of production implies that
the Swiss industry has lower unit costs compared to a Thai watch firm which considers
to enter the market, but realizes that it could not competitively produce the first unit
in isolation (i.e. given that a watch industry is yet non-existing in Thailand). Path
dependencies and hysteresis effects in location have similarly been shown to arise in
the more recent economic geography models (see e.g. Fujita et al., 1999; Baldwin et al.,
2003). Anecdotal evidence documenting that agglomeration patterns may persist even
1Recent surveys of this literature are provided in Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and in Wilson (1999).
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though the initial factors have vanished over time have been presented early on by
Krugman (1991b,c). More recent econometric evidence documented in Redding et al.
(2007) reinforces the hypothesis that history may matter: they find that the tempo-
rary shock of the division of Germany after World War II had a permanent effect on
industry location in the sense that there are no signs that the associated shift of the
German air hub from Berlin to Frankfurt is only temporary.
These lock-in effects – in the fields of technology adoption, international trade and eco-
nomic geography or other fields – have in common that a shift from (say) an inefficient
equilibrium to a potentially more efficient equilibrium is prevented by a coordination
failure among the agents. The starting point of our analysis is a situation of an in-
efficient lock-in of industry, where no single firm finds it profitable to shift location
even though a coordinated move would make all of them better off. Following Martin
and Rogers (1995), we develop a simple two region model of monopolistic competi-
tion. The commercial relations between regions consist of intra-industry trade based
on love-of-variety on the part of consumers and mobility of physical capital. We make
two key assumptions. First, as in Martin and Rogers (1995), regions may differ in size.
Given the assumption that firms produce with internal increasing returns, and in the
absence of other differences between regions, this has the well-known implication that
the larger region attracts a more than proportionate share of firms (the ‘home market
effect’). Second, there are localized intra-industry spillovers (e.g. knowledge spillovers)
among monopolistic producers and also inter-industry spillovers from the modern sec-
tor to the other sector.2 Accordingly, local marginal production costs are lower, the
more numerous local firms are. Taken together, these two key assumptions imply that,
given a suitable set of parameters, the model has two stable equilibria which can unam-
biguously be welfare-ranked. One equilibrium has all firms concentrated in the larger
region, exploiting both the advantages of the large market and the advantages asso-
2 Localized external economies of scale have obtained strong empirical evidence. See the surveys by
Audretsch and Feldman (2004) and Rosenthal and Strange (2004) and the recent paper by Badinger
and Egger (2008), which finds strong empirical evidence in favor of intra-industry spillovers and also,
though less strong, inter-industry spillovers for OECD manufacturing. Indirect evidence of intra-
industry spillovers is provided by Devereux et al. (2007) who find that firms of a specific industry
respond to subsidies only in the region which already hosts a critical share of the respective industry.
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ciated with the external economies. However, quite intuitively, if the intra-industry
spillovers are strong enough there also exists a second, inefficient equilibrium where all
firms concentrate in the smaller region but are unable to coordinate on a shift to the
more efficient equilibrium.
Our subsidy game starts from such an inefficient equilibrium, where all the industry is
located in the smaller region (say region 2). Governments are assumed to dispose of
one instrument, direct capital payments, which are financed through non-distortionary
taxes, and which can be offered to the capital owners. Following a recent literature,
we assume that the subsidy game is in three stages (e.g. Baldwin and Krugman, 2004;
Borck and Pflüger, 2006): in the first stage, the core region (the government in region
2) sets its subsidy, in the second stage, the government in the periphery (region 1)
chooses its capital subsidy and the market allocation then unfolds in the third stage.
The welfare functions of the regional governments are utilitarian with possibly different
weights attached to workers and capital owners in their region.
Our main results are the following. If governments attach equal weight to capital
owners and workers, then region 2 will never defend the core. Rather, it will accept
that the more populous region 1 snatches the core by offering a capital subsidy which is
just high enough to induce all capital to relocate. Intuitively, the larger region has an
advantage in the competition game, because the agglomeration rent accruing to capital
owners is larger when all capital is located in the larger region. Although residents of
the smaller region benefit from a lower price index and higher wages when the core is
located in their region, given that subsidies to capital accrue to capital owners in both
regions, it becomes too costly for the government of the (smaller) core region to hold on
to the core once the (larger) periphery actively bids for firms. Joint welfare as well as
welfare in the two regions then increases. If, by contrast, governments assign a higher
weight to workers’ than to capital owners’ welfare, there is a set of parameters where
the smaller region defends the core, the inefficient lock-in persists, the periphery gains
and the core loses in comparison with the situation before the start of this subsidy
game. Intuitively, although allowing capital to relocate would allow capital owners to
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benefit from subsidies paid by the new core, this benefit would weigh less than the
loss incurred in the form of lower wages and higher prices when the core region lets its
industry go. Hence, in this case, the core will want to defend the core, even though
global efficiency would rise if all industry were located in the larger region.
Our paper is related to several strands of previous research, neither of which has come
up with the argument in favor of subsidy competition advanced here, however.
First, our paper is related to the literature on tax competition. The traditional liter-
ature in this field is based on models with perfectly competitive markets and stresses
that, as a result of fiscal externalities, taxes and government expenditures are bid down
by benevolent governments to sub-optimal levels. There are circumstances, however,
when tax competition may be favourable, notably when without such competition tax
rates are inefficiently high. In this spirit, Edwards and Keen (1996) show that tax
competition max help tame Leviathan governments, and Kehoe (1989) shows that
tax competition may alleviate excessive capital taxation in the absence of government
commitment. However, lock-in situations do not arise in this traditional literature.
Second, a more recent literature reconsiders tax competition in the presence of market
power on goods markets.3 Research in the tradition of the new economic geography
(typically) uses models of monopolistic competition and shows that the government
in the core region is able to maintain a higher tax on capital than the government in
the periphery.4 A result similar in spirit has been obtained by Haufler and Wooton
(1999). They show that in the competition to attract a foreign-owned monopolist, the
government of the larger region is able to achieve this at a lower cost than the small
region government. This result is based on the fact that the monopolist – similar to the
firms in the differentiated goods sector in models of the new economic geography – has
a locational preference for the larger market. Different market sizes are also studied by
Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) who analyse monopolistic competition with mobile
capital but without endogenous agglomeration, to show that, under certain conditions
3Important work in this area is by Janeba (2000). See also the surveys cited in footnote 1.
4See Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Borck and Pflüger (2006), Kind
et al. (2000) and Ludema and Wooton (2000). See also Janeba (1998).
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(notably when trade costs are low enough) tax competition is efficiency enhancing.
Even though our model has much in common with these studies, there are important
differences, the most important one being that an inefficient lock-in – our starting
point – has not been considered in this literature. The papers on tax competition
and economic geography analyze symmetric-identical regions which are endogenously
driven into a core-periphery constellation. Due to this fundamental symmetry, from a
welfare perspective it is immaterial which region ends up being the core – hence there
is no welfare improvement associated with a switch of the core.5 Haufler and Wooton
(1999) and Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005) allow for different market sizes, but
they do not consider local external economies. Hence, the tension between local intra-
industry spillovers and market size considerations, which gives rise to an inefficient
lock-in is not present in their models.
Finally, there is a literature which addresses the coordination failure that emerges
in models with decreasing average costs. In the context of city-industry equilibria
considered in urban economics, the sustainability of inefficient lock-ins is contested by
the idea of profit-seeking ‘land developers’. The idea, put forward by Henderson (1975),
holds that the existence of more efficient city sites can be exploited by forward-looking
developers, who, by this efficiency differential, are able to profitably organize ‘city
corporations’, and, hence to restore an overall efficient allocation. This idea has been
revived by Rauch (1993) who shows that discriminatory pricing of land over time on the
part of developers is key to the removal of such inefficiencies. Another mechanism to
overcome multiple equilibria and coordination failures arising under external economies
of scale has recently been worked out by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). They
analyze a model where production of final goods uses a continuum of tasks, each of
which has a zero weight, and which can possibly be performed in two locations. They
show that, by becoming external suppliers for these tasks, even ’small’ agents can
alleviate coordination problems.
5Note, however, that this does not imply that the a core-periphery constellation is necessarily the
welfare optimum. See e.g. Ottaviano and Thisse (2002) and Pflüger and Südekum (2007).
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Our analysis relates to these works insofar as we also address the coordination issue.
In a non-technical paper, (Duranton, 2008, p.40) has recently put forward the intuitive
notion that territorial competition can improve the spatial allocation of plants because
“the places for which the external effects are the strongest are expected to bid the most”.
We provide a formal analysis which is much in this spirit, but where the interaction of
external economies and market size is key.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
model and the locational equilibria. A welfare analysis is conducted for symmetric
and asymmetric region size. Section 3.3 analyzes the outcomes of subsidy competition
between asymmetrically sized regions. The last section concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Basic Set Up
The model builds on Martin and Rogers (1995). The world consists of two regions,
indexed by i = 1, 2, which are symmetric in preferences and technology. There are
two sectors. The modern sector (M), characterized by increasing returns, monopolis-
tic competition and iceberg trade costs, produces a composite of industrial varieties.
Spatial distance is modeled using iceberg trade costs. To consume one unit of a variety
produced abroad, τ > 1 units have to be shipped; the remainder melts away in transit.
The perfectly competitive traditional sector (A) produces a homogenous good under
constant returns to scale. The A-good is taken as the numéraire good and hence, its
price is normalized to one, pAi = 1. We assume that the traditional good is produced
in both regions and is traded without costs across regions.
There are two input factors, capital and labor. Each worker owns of one unit of labor
and each capitalist one unit of capital, which they both supply inelastically. The mass
of workers and the mass of capitalists are both normalised to unity. Region 1 hosts
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the share sl of workers and the share sk of capital owners. Labor is immobile across
regions and employed in both sectors. Capital is employed in the modern sector only,
and each firm requires one unit of capital. Capital can be freely moved across the two
regions, but capital owners are immobile. We assume perfect portfolio diversication:
each capitalist owns an equal share of the international portfolio which delivers the
return snr1 + (1 − sn)r2, where ri is the return to capital invested in region i and sn
is the share of capital (and, hence, firms) installed in region 1. The capital income of
region 1 is therefore given by sk(snr1 + (1− sn)r2).
3.2.2 Preferences and Demand
Households derive utility from consuming a range of differentiated modern goods and
the traditional good. Preferences are represented by a two tier utility function, where
the upper tier function is logarithmic quasi-linear and the lower tier utility function is
CES. The utility function of a type-h individual (capitalist or worker) in region i is6
Ui(Ai,Mi) = α lnMi + Ai (1)
A type-h individual in region i receives income yih. We assume 0 < α < yih, i =
1, 2, h = K,L, to assure that both types of goods are consumed by all individuals
in each region. Ai denotes consumption of the numéraire good and α the amount of
income spent on the composite good (see below). Consumption of the modern good
Mi consists of all differentiated varieties v:
Mi =
(∫ ni
0
mii(v)
σ−1
σ dv +
∫ ni+nj
ni
mji(v)
σ−1
σ dv
) σ
σ−1
, σ > 1, i 6= j, (2)
where mii denotes consumption of a variety produced domestically and mji denotes
consumption of a variety produced abroad. The constant elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties is denoted by σ. The budget constraint of a representative
6To simplify notation, we use the fact that – due to quasilinear utility – all individuals consume the
same amount of modern goods.
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household reads
∫ ni
0
pi(v)mii(v)dv +
∫ ni+nj
ni
τpj(v)mji(v)dv + Aih = yih, (3)
where pi and pj denote the producer prices of a respective variety. Solving the utility
maximization problem yields the following demand functions, mii(v), mji(v), M∗i and
A∗ih and indirect utility Vih:
M∗i = α/Pi, A
∗
ih = yih − α, h = K,L (4)
mii = αpi(v)
−σP σ−1i , mji = α(τpj(v))
−σP σ−1i ,
P1 ≡ [snp1−σ1 + (1− sn)(τp2)1−σ]
1
1−σ , (5)
Vih = yih − α lnPi, (6)
where P1 denotes the CES price index in region 1 which already takes symmetry of
producer prices into account. An analogous expression holds for the CES price index
of region 2.
3.2.3 Production
We will henceforth derive all expressions for region 1 only. The corresponding expres-
sions for region 2 are analogous.
Traditional sector
The A-good is produced using labor as the only input according to qA1 = (1 + µsn)LA1 ,
where LA1 is labor input and qA1 is output. The term µsn captures inter-industry
spillovers, with µ > 0. The larger the domestic share of firms, sn, the higher is the
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marginal productivity of labor and the more units of the A-good can be produced with
a given labor force. Due to perfect competition labor is paid its marginal product.
Hence, we get w1 = 1 + µsn.7
Modern sector
The representative firm in region 1 produces one variety using one unit of capital (the
fixed input requirement) and 1/(1 + γsn) units of labor according to the total cost
function
TC1 =
(
1 + µsn
1 + γsn
)
q1 + r1, (7)
where q1 is a firm’s output in region 1. Its fixed costs are given by r1 and its marginal
costs are determined by the variable input requirement and by the wage as previously
determined. Intra-industry spillovers γ have a positive effect on the productivity of
a firm. The proximity to other producers in the same industry generates knowledge
spillovers which lower firms’ variable costs. Inter-industry spillovers, on the other
hand, drive up wages in the region and hence, the firm’s variable costs. In line with
the empirical evidence we assume that spillovers are stronger within an industry than
between different industries, i.e. spillovers increase industry specific skills of a worker
more than general skills.8 The profit function of the representative firm in region 1 is
given by
Π1 =
(
p1 − 1 + µsn
1 + γsn
)
q1 − r1. (8)
Market clearing requires a firm’s supply q1 to be equal to aggregate demand, which
consists of domestic and export demand, including the indirect demand associated with
7Note that contrary to previous economic geography models which assume that the immobile factor
earns the same reward irrespective of whether employed in the concentrated or in the peripheral
region we allow for a higher wage rate in the region where industry is agglomerated.
8See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a survey of the evidence.
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the iceberg trade costs:
q1 = m11(sl + sk) + τm12((1− sl) + (1− sk)). (9)
Equation (9) uses the familiar result that mill pricing is optimal in the Dixit Stiglitz
model. Profit maximization yields optimal mill prices which are constant markups on
marginal costs:
p1 =
σ
σ − 1
(
1 + µsn
1 + γsn
)
. (10)
Using the zero pure profit condition and applying mill prices from (10) yields the break
even output q1 of a firm:
q1 = r1(σ − 1)
(
1 + γsn
1 + µsn
)
. (11)
Short run equilibrium
In the short run, the allocation of capital and hence the allocation of firms is exogenous.
Eqs. (10) and (11) then immediately imply ri = (piqi)/σ, i.e. the capital reward
captures operating profits. Using this result as well as the mill prices from (10) and
the market clearing condition (9), we find:
r1 =
α
σ
(
sl + sk
sn + (1− sn)φχ +
φ((1− sl) + (1− sk))
φsn + (1− sn)χ
)
, (12)
r2 =
α
σ
(
φ(sl + sk)χ
sn + (1− sn)φχ +
((1− sl) + (1− sk))χ
snφ+ (1− sn)χ
)
, (13)
where
χ ≡ (p2
p1
)1−σ =
(
1 + µ(1− sn)
1 + µsn
1 + γsn
1 + γ(1− sn)
)1−σ
and φ ≡ τ 1−σ is the level of trade freeness, with 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1.
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3.2.4 Long run equilibrium and welfare: the symmetric case
In the long run, capital is mobile and moves to the location where it earns the highest
return. We assume that this movement is governed by the ad-hoc adjustment equation:
s˙n = (r1 − r2)(1− sn)sn.
A long run equilibrium is defined as a situation where capital no longer moves across
regions. In this model, there are two types of locational long-run equilibria. Depending
on the relative strength of centripetal and centrifugal forces industry will be either
dispersed (symmetric interior equilibrium, where r1 = r2) or agglomerated in one
single region (a core-periphery equilibrium) at sn = 0 (with r1 < r2) or sn = 1 (with
r1 > r2).
The different locational equilibria which emerge for different levels of trade costs are
depicted in Figure 3.2 for the case where regions are equal sized. The parameters are
α = 0.3,σ = 4, µ = 0.5, sl = sk = 0.5,γ = 1.9
A symmetric equilibrium is stable for low trade freeness, e.g. φ = 0.17. Starting from
sn = 1/2, increasing region 1’s industry share lowers the capital reward gap (r1 − r2)
implying that firms will have an incentive to move back to region 2. A core-periphery
outcome is stable for high trade freeness (φ = 0.75) but unstable for low trade freeness.
For intermediate trade freeness (φ = 0.24), all three allocations, the symmetric interior
equilibrium and the two core-periphery equilibria are stable.
Locational forces
The market allocation is driven by different agglomeration and dispersion forces which
can be identified by making use of (12) and (13).10
9Unless otherwise noted, all figures will use the same basic parameters.
10A formal exposition of the forces of the model can be found in Appendix 3.5.3.
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Figure 3.1: Locational equilibria
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Figure 3.2: Bifurcation diagram
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Intra-industry spillovers are an agglomeration force. A higher local industry share
lowers the variable input requirement and raises firms’ operating profits. Thus, more
capital is attracted to that region.
The local competition effect (also termed crowding effect) and inter-industry spillovers
act in favor of a dispersed outcome. The competition effect describes the tendency of
firms to produce in regions with only few competitors. Starting from a symmetric allo-
cation of industry, increasing the share of industry in one region (for given production
costs) drives down operating profits in that region. This will in turn discourage cap-
ital owners to supply their capital there. The second dispersion force works through
the worker’s wage rate. A higher number of firms lowers variable costs but, due to
inter-industry spillovers, the wage paid to workers in the core exceeds the wage paid
in the periphery. Higher production costs in turn lower firms’ operating profits which
discourages a movement of capital into that region.
Symmetry Breaking
To assess the stability of the different long-run equilibria we derive the market break
point, φB, which is the threshold level of trade freeness above which the symmetric
equilibrium becomes unstable.
Figure 3.2 depicts the stability of long run equilibria for symmetric region size. The
model exhibits a subcritical pitchfork. As soon as φ exceeds the critical break point
φB, the only stable equilibrium is the core-periphery outcome. The expression for φB is
given in Appendix 3.5.1. The break point depends in intuitive ways on the parameters:
when agglomeration forces become stronger, φB falls, so that the range of trade freeness
levels at which the symmetric equilibrium is stable shrinks. This is the case when intra-
industry spillovers increase (higher γ), inter-industry spillovers decrease (lower µ) or σ
decreases, which means higher economies of scale at the firm level.
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Agglomeration rent and sustain point
Next, we assess the stability of the core-periphery equilibria and derive the level of
trade freeness φS (the ‘sustain point’), up to which a core-periphery equilibrium can
be sustained.
When all industry is agglomerated, say, in region 2, capital earns an agglomeration
rent, Ω2(φ, ·) ≡ (r2(φ, ·)− r1(φ, ·)) |sn=0:
Ω2(φ, ·) = α
σ
[
2−
(
1 + γ
1 + µ
)1−σ(
sk + sl
φ
+ [(1− sk) + (1− sl)]φ
)]
. (14)
which is the loss that a firm would incur if it were to relocate from region 2, the core,
to the periphery region 1, given that all other firms stay in the core.
The sustain point solves Ω2(φ, ·) = 0. At this level of trade freeness, the agglomeration
rent is zero so that full agglomeration is viable for φ > φS. The expression for φS
is presented in Appendix 3.5.2. Again, stronger agglomeration forces decrease the
sustain point, which means full agglomeration can be sustained for smaller levels of
trade freeness. This is the case when intra-industry spillovers increase, inter-industry
spillovers decrease, or σ decreases.
Moreover, the overlap between the sustain and market break point depicted in Figure
3.2 reflects the range of levels of trade freeness at which both types of equilibria, the
symmetric as well as the core-periphery outcome are stable.
Welfare Analysis
To study the welfare effects of a reallocation of industry, we first derive the indirect
utility functions of workers and capital owners in region i:
VKi = −α lnPi + snr1 + (1− sn)r2, VLi = −α lnPi + wi, (15)
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where w1 = (1 + µsn) and w2 = (1 + µ(1 − sn)). Regional welfare is assumed to be
the weighted sum of indirect utilities of capital owners and workers residing in the
respective region. We let the government attach a weight λ to workers’ welfare. Then
regional welfare is given by:
W1 = λslVL1 + (1− λ)skVK1 , W2 = λ(1− sl)VL2 + (1− λ)(1− sk)VK2 . (16)
For weak γ and low φ, residents of any region unambiguously lose as the share of indus-
try in their region declines, since to consumer prices rise and wage rates fall. Residents
of the agglomerating region experience a welfare increase since they save on transport
costs on imported varieties and workers earn a higher wage rate. By contrast, the ef-
fect of a reallocation of firms on regional welfare is ambiguous for strong intra-industry
spillovers and high φ. For instance, for high γ, at sn = 0 even residents of region 1 may
benefit from an agglomeration in region 2, since consumer prices are low due to strong
spillovers. If at the same time φ is sufficiently high, the benefit from lower producer
prices exceeds the cost of importing industrial goods. However, with an ongoing real-
location of industry towards region 1 the gains from intra-industry spillovers decline,
increasing consumer prices, thereby hurting households in both regions.
Next, to check whether the arising location pattern is socially desirable (i.e. whether
there is too much or too little agglomeration), we compare the social planner’s choice
of industry allocation to the market outcome. Since conflicting interests among resi-
dents of different regions make the Pareto criterion unapplicable, we apply a utilitarian
concept and assume the social welfare function to be the sum of household’s indirect
utilities W = W1+W2. We assume that the social planner takes market prices as given
and only decides over the allocation of industry.11 Figure 3.3 depicts the social welfare
function for different levels of trade freeness and symmetric region size.
While partial agglomeration is never optimal for the social planner, a symmetric allo-
11Pflüger and Südekum (2007) show that the resulting allocation is the same as when the planner
can implement first-best welfare, which also corrects for the price distortion in the industrial sector
stemming from imperfect competition.
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Figure 3.3: Social welfare: symmetric region size
cation is chosen at low φ and a core periphery equilibrium at high φ. We denote by φSB
the level of trade freeness at which the social planner is just indifferent between im-
plementing a symmetric allocation or a core periphery outcome. Formally φSB solves
W |sn= 12 = W |sn=1 = W |sn=0. Comparing φ
SB with φB allows us to detect whether
the market outcome is socially desirable. It turns out that the social break point lies
below the market breakpoint for our parameter restrictions,12 which implies that for
φSB < φ < φB the market exihibits under-agglomeration (see also Figure 3.2). Given
that our model includes external economies, this is not really surprising.
3.2.5 Long run equilibrium and welfare: the asymmetric case
So far we have assumed regions to be equally endowed with the immobile factor. In
this section, we generalise the model to allow for differences in regional workforces. In
particular, we consider region 1 to host more workers than region 2, so that sl ≥ 12 .
12The full expression for φSB is suppressed here but is available upon request.
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Region size effect
Recall that capital moves in search of the highest nominal reward where the capital
reward rates are given by (12) and (13). For simplicity we will assume that regions are
equally rich in capital, i.e. each region owns half of the world capital stock (sk = 1/2)
but they may differ in the number of workers. This gives rise to another agglomeration
force, which we term region size effect. This describes the tendency of firms to produce
in the larger market and to export to the smaller market.13 Formally, the market size
effect is derived by differentiating the capital reward gap with respect to the share of
immobile workers in region 1, sl, evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium in the absence
of inter-and intra-industry spillovers:
∂(r1 − r2)
∂sl
∣∣∣∣
sn=
1
2
,µ=γ=0
=
4α
σ
(
1− φ
1 + φ
)
≥ 0. (17)
Bifurcation diagram and agglomeration rent
Once we allow regions to differ, the symmetric equilibrium can no longer be stable.
The blue curve in the bifurcation diagram in Figure 3.4 identifies stable equilibria
for different levels of φ, assuming sl = 0.8. For low levels of trade freeness a stable
asymmetric interior equilibrium emerges, where the larger region (region 1) hosts more
than half of the total industry. However, for high φ, both the core in the large region
as well as the core in the smaller region constitute stable equilibria.
Both core-periphery equilibria, sn = 1 and sn = 0 are stable, since all firms, once
agglomerated in the region, earn a positive agglomeration rent. As Figure 3.5 shows,
however, for φ < 1, the agglomeration rent is clearly higher when all industry is in the
larger region.
Our model then allows for the possibility that the entire industry is concentrated in
the smaller region, despite the fact that firms could earn a higher agglomeration rent
13The region size effect is actually made up of two effects: the market size effect described above, and
the factor proportions effect: the larger region has larger relative supply of labour.
Inefficient Lock-in and Subsidy Competition 103
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Φ
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
sn
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Figure 3.5: Agglomeration rent for asymmetric region size
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if all industry were located in the larger region.14 This new feature of the asymmetric
model is in contrast to the ‘footloose capital’ model described in Baldwin et al. (2003)
and used by Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005)15 where the larger region always hosts
a larger share in industry irrespective of the underlying level of trade freeness.
Welfare
We stick to our definition of global welfare as the sum of regional welfare levels, where
W1 and W2 are given by (16). Figure 3.6 depicts the social welfare function for asym-
metric region size and different levels of trade freeness.
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Figure 3.6: Social welfare: asymmetric region size
Note that for low φ (e.g. φ = 0.05 in the Figure), partial agglomeration, with the larger
region hosting a larger share in industry, is socially desirable. For sufficiently high φ,
global welfare is maximized when all industry is agglomerated in the large region:
14The literature typically assumes that there exists some coordination failure or absence of rational
expectations (e.g. lack of information or costs that hinder firms to relocate) which makes firms
unable or unwilling to commit to relocate (see Baldwin et al. (2003) or Krugman (1991d)). Without
this assumption it becomes difficult to justify the existence of multiple equilibria. Krugman (1991b)
argues that rational expectations are hard to justify since they call for a degree of information and
sophistication that is unreasonable.
15In Ottaviano and van Ypersele (2005), for high trade costs there is a stable interior asymmetric
equilibrium, where the larger region hosts a larger industry share, whereas for low trade costs all
industry will be agglomerated in the larger region.
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Proposition 1 For φ > φSB, we have W (1) > W (0) iff sl > 12 .
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.4. ¥
The intuition for the result is that when the core is in the larger region, the majority
of households benefit from a lower cost-of-living index and higher wages.
However, as outlined above, our model allows for a stable core-periphery equilibrium
in the smaller region. It therefore allows for an inefficient but stable allocation of
industry. Figure 3.4 shows the welfare optimal allocation of industry as the red curves:
The figure also shows that whenever there is an equilibrium with full agglomeration,
this is also socially optimal.
3.3 Subsidy Competition
3.3.1 Basic Setup
We are interested in the outcome of subsidy competition in the presence of technolog-
ical spillovers. Assume that the level of trade freeness is sufficiently high such that
originally, industry is agglomerated in one region. Each regional government maxi-
mizes welfare of its residents by using subsidies to influence capital owners’ investment
decision. The core region, say region 2, as well as the periphery benefit from retaining
or attracting firms since hosting the industry core increases welfare of immobile factor
owners residing in the core through lower transport cost (‘cost-of-living effect’) and a
higher wage rate. In order to derive analytical expressions for the different subsidy lev-
els we model subsidies zi in their simplest form, namely as a direct lump-sum payment
to capital owners. Firms move according to the highest post-subsidy capital reward
rate, rsi = ri + zi. Laborers’ and capital owners’ endowment is taxed in a lump sum
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fashion to finance subsidy payments. The regional budget constraints are:
z1sn = T1(sk + sl), z2(1− sn) = T2((1− sk) + (1− sl)). (18)
For region 1, total subsidy payments are the subsidy times the share of firms sn, while
tax payments are lump-sum taxes paid by the sk capitalists and sl workers.
Government expenditure and tax revenue are zero once the region happens to become
the periphery, since there are no firms to subsidize. Inserting the price indices from
(5) as well as the post-subsidy capital reward rates, wage rates and tax payments into
the indirect utility functions, using (16) allows us to derive regional welfare both for
the case where region 1 hosts the industry core and for the case where region 1 is the
periphery (the expressions for region 2 being analogous):
WC1 (z1) = W1
∣∣∣∣
sn=1
= λsl(1 + µ) + (1− λ)sk
(
z1 +
2α
σ
)
−(λsl + (1− λ)sk)(α lnPC + z1
sl + sk
)
(19)
W P1 (z2) = W1
∣∣∣∣
sn=0
= λsl + (1− λ)sk
(
z2 +
2α
σ
)
−(λsl + (1− λ)sk)(α lnP P ) (20)
where PC ≡ (1+µ
1+γ
)
and P P ≡ φ 1(1−σ) (1+µ
1+γ
)
are the price indices for the core and
periphery case, respectively. Whereas welfare of a peripheral region is increasing in
the subsidy level offered in the core region, it decreases in its own subsidy level as
soon as it hosts the industry core. This is due to the ownership structure of capital
and the regional financing scheme. Since capital income is repatriated to the region of
origin and subsidies are financed via regional taxes, each capital owner residing in the
periphery benefits from a subsidy distributed in the core region. Welfare of the core
is falling in its own subsidy level, since it is entirely financed by residents of the core,
but part goes to capital owners residing in the periphery.
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We adopt the same game structure as Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and apply a
sequential move game. In the first stage the government of the core (Govt 2) sets its
subsidy level, the periphery (Govt 1) then chooses its subsidy in the second stage. In
the third stage firms choose their location of production dependent on the gross capital
reward rates. Production and consumption take place as described in the preceding
sections. We continue to assume that sk = 1/2 but allow for asymmetries in region
size in terms of the number of workers and in particular allow for the possibility that
the initial core region is smaller than the periphery. As before, we suppose that sl ≥ 12 ,
so that region 1 is larger, but region 2 is the core, so that the equilibrium without
subsidies is inefficient since the core is in the smaller region. Hence, in contrast to
the previous literature, we allow for a situation where the initial factors (e.g. market
size) which caused this agglomeration have vanished over time but where locational
hysteresis has led to a persisting inefficient agglomeration, where firms continue to
produce in the smaller region. Differences in region size are only allowed to the extent
to which welfare of the smaller core region, WC2 (z2) ≡ W2
∣∣
sn=0
still exceeds the welfare
level in the periphery case, W P2 (z1) ≡ W2
∣∣
sn=1
such that the outcome of the subsidy
competition game does not become trivial.16
Stage Two: Periphery’s Decision
In stage two Govt 1 (the periphery) decides whether to induce a relocation of the
industry core or to stay out of the competition and leave the allocation of industry
unchanged. However, due to the existence of agglomeration forces Govt 1 will not
achieve any movement of capital if it sets its subsidy too low. In order to induce
firms to relocate, the subsidy level has to be at least as high as the agglomeration
rent accruing to firms in the core plus the core’s subsidy rate, i.e. zmin1 (z2) = Ω2 + z2.
This would make a capital owner indifferent between staying in the core – realising the
agglomeration rent Ω2 – and being paid a subsidy of z2, or moving to the periphery
16Otherwise the benefits of hosting the industry core in the form of lower living costs and higher
wage rates would not suffice for the government of the core region to engage in a costly subsidy
competition.
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and being paid z1. Inserting Ω2 using (14) and sk = 1/2 yields
zmin1 (z2) =
α
σ
[
2− (
1+γ
1+µ
)1−σ(1 + 2sl − (2sl − 3)φ2)
2φ
]
+ z2. (21)
Any subsidy level below zmin1 (z2) will fail to induce a relocation of firms. Clearly,
whether Govt 1 decides to enforce a relocation by setting a subsidy level equal to zmin1
depends on the subsidy level set by the core government in the first stage. Govt 1
chooses its subsidy level according to the following decision rule:
z1 =
 zmin1 (z2) if WC1 (z1) > W P1 (z2),0 otherwise.
Intuitively, for Govt 1 to engage in the competition, welfare after having successfully
attracted all industry (WC1 (z1)) has to exceed the welfare level for the case where region
1 remains the periphery (W P1 (z2)). Using this decision rule, we are able to derive the
maximum subsidy level zmax1 that Govt 1 would be willing to incur. This subsidy level
solves W P1 (z2) = WC1 (zmax1 ). To enhance intutition we evaluate the resulting subsidy
levels at λ = 1/2 for the time being and turn later to the case of unequal welfare
weights. Using (19) and (20) yields
zmax1 (z2)
∣∣
λ=1/2
= 2µsl +
α(1 + 2sl)
1− σ lnφ− z2. (22)
The first term in (22) captures the potential ‘wage effect’ for region 1’s workers that will
occur if Govt 1 succeeds in attracting the industry core. The second term captures the
‘cost-of-living effect’ which enters through the price index prevailing in the respective
region.17 This term is positive since σ >1 and lnφ <0. Finally, the last term expresses
the ‘subsidy effect’ for each of region 1’s capital owners. The higher z2 set in the first
stage, the lower will be zmax1 , i.e. the lower will be the willingness of Govt 1 to attract
the core. It follows that as soon as zmin1 (z2) ≥ zmax1 (z2) Govt 1 will no longer be willing
17Due to symmetric spillovers both regions benefit from high intra-industry spillovers through lower
prices. Hence, any disparity in consumer prices between core and periphery stems from trade costs
only.
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to attract the core, since the necessary subsidy is so high that the gain from attracting
the core is lower than the cost.
Stage One: Core’s Decision
Turning to the first stage, Govt 2 acts as a Stackelberg leader, foreseeing the implica-
tions of its choice on the choice of Govt 1 in the following stage. Since Region 2 welfare
falls in its own subsidy, Govt 2 will want to set the lowest subsidy level consistent with
defending the core, if it wants to defend at all. This subsidy level, zd2 , is that at which
the periphery in the second stage will no longer be willing to snatch the core. Formally,
zd2 solves zmin1 (zd2) = zmax1 (zd2). Using (21) and (22), we get:
zd2
∣∣
λ=1/2
=
1
2
{
2µsl +
α(1 + 2sl)
1− σ lnφ−
α
σ
[
2− (
1+γ
1+µ
)1−σ(1 + 2sl − (2sl − 3)φ2)
2φ
]}
(23)
Therefore, Govt 2 will set its subsidy at zd2 if its welfare when it defends the core
exceeds the welfare it receives when becoming the periphery. Otherwise, it would set a
subsidy of zd2 − ε, where ε is a small positive number. The reason is that by raising its
subsidy, Govt 2 raises the subsidy which Govt 1 has to pay in order to attract industry.
This benefits region 2’s capital owners via the repatriation externality. Hence, we have
the following decision rule:
z∗2 =
 zd2 if WC2 (zd2) ≥ W P2 (zmin1 (z2)),zd2 − ε otherwise.
3.3.2 Equilibrium
Having derived the decision rules of the respective players and the according subsidy
levels, this section identifies the outcomes of the game.
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Equilibrium 1: Relocation of industry
Whether Govt 2 decides to defend the industry core depends on how much Govt 2
values workers’ relative to capitalists’ welfare in region 2. We start with the case where
workers and capitalists’ welfare is equally weighted.
Proposition 2. For equal welfare weights, λ = 1/2, Govt 2 will never defend the core
for any sl ≥ 12 . The equilibrium subsidy levels are given by z∗2 = z2d−ε, z∗1 = zmin1 (z2d−ε)
with some small ε > 0.
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.4. ¥
By setting z2 = zd2−ε, Govt 2 ensures that region 1 snatches the core offering zmin1 (zd2−
ε), thereby restoring an efficient allocation of industry. At the same time, since z2 raises
zmin1 , Govt 2 realizes the highest possible repatriation externality by setting z2 = zd2−ε,
which will benefit region 2’s capitalists via the repatriation of capital income. This
result is rather intuitive, in the sense that the larger region has a ‘natural advantage’
in the subsidy game: when the core region is small, the agglomeration rent is small
too. This implies that the periphery government has to offer capital owners a relatively
small subsidy to induce a relocation. It also implies that the periphery government
will be more willing to snatch the core, since the payoff to doing so increases with
sl. Hence, defending the core will be more costly for the core government. In fact, it
becomes so costly that for a symmetric welfare function, the core will only be defended
if it is located in the larger region. In other words, subsidy competition restores an
efficient allocation of industry. The next result states that welfare is then higher if it
would be without subsidies and the core located in the smaller region.
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Proposition 3. For zd2 > 0,
(i) overall welfare is higher in the equilibrium with than without subsidies,
W (zmin1 (z
d
2 − ε), zd2 − ε) > W (0, 0),
(ii) region 1’s residents experience a welfare gain after having successfully attracted all
industry compared to the initial regional welfare level:
WC1 (z
min
1 (z
d
2 − ε)) > W P1 (0).
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.4. ¥
What cannot be unambiguously determined is whether the new periphery region (region
2) will be worse or better off after the relocation of industry compared to the initial
welfare. On the one hand, a relocation of industry induced by a positive subsidy level
set by Govt 1 imposes a positive externality on capital owners’ income in the new
periphery. Half of the subsidy payment promised to industrial firms by Govt 1 accrues
to capital owners of region 2. On the other hand, region 2 loses all industry thereby
suffering from a lower wage rate and a higher cost-of-living index. Overall welfare
however, will be higher after the relocation of industry towards an efficient industry
allocation. This is an important result, since it shows that fiscal competition can help
redress an inefficiency stemming from increasing returns to scale.
Equilibrium 2: Persistent inefficient industry allocation
In this subsection, we look at the case where the welfare function assigns a higher
weight to workers than to capitalists. We may think of a government which leans
towards representing worker interests, for distributional or political reasons.
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Once we allow for λ > 1/2, region 2’s welfare differential WC2 (zd2)−W P2 (zmin1 (zd2 − ε))
is no longer unambiguously negative for sl > 1/2. This opens up the possibility that
the core region will defend the core even if it is smaller and efficiency would require
locating all industry in the larger region. Intuitively, for λ = 1
2
and sl > 12 , we have
just shown that the benefit capitalists incur through the repatriation of subsidies when
the core moves to region 1 more than outweighs the loss to workers and capitalists
through lower wages and a higher price index. When λ > 1
2
, then, the core government
weighs the loss to workers from falling wages and rising consumer prices after industry
relocation more heavily than the gain to capitalists from the subsidies paid by the
foreign government. In particular, we can show the following:
Proposition 4. There exists a region size s˜l = sl(γ) such that region 2 defends the
core if and only if sl < s˜l. Further, s˜l satisfies
(i)s˜l =
1
2
for λ =
1
2
(24)
(ii)
ds˜l
dγ
> 0 for λ >
1
2
. (25)
Proof. See appendix 3.5.4. ¥
Figure 3.7 plots s˜l for λ = 0.8 in order illustrate the effect of region size and localization
economies on core’s decision. For all sl, γ-combinations above s˜l, the core government
will not defend the core and industry will relocate towards the larger region 1; for
all sl, γ-combinations on and below s˜l, the core government defends the core and the
allocation of industry remains inefficient. Most importantly, note that there are sl, γ-
combinations for which Govt 2 decides to defend the industry core against region 1
despite region 1 being larger in terms of workers (the shaded region in Figure 3.7).
Hence, the disadvantage from becoming the periphery which predominantly affects
workers via reduced real wage income exceeds the benefit of a relocation (the subsidy
effect) for governments acting in workers’ interests. Figure 3.7 also shows s˜l for λ = 12 ,
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which is horizontal at sl = 12 : in this case, the core defends if and only if it is the larger
region.
Intuitively, the figure shows that an inefficient industry allocation can persist only if
the difference in region sizes is small and if spillovers are relatively large. On the one
hand, for given γ, a larger sl implies that it will be more and more difficult for the
(smaller) core to keep the industry from leaving. Larger spillovers imply that the core
will be more willing to hang on to the core. On the one hand, the costs of retaining
the core are reduced, since the agglomeration rent increases and Govt 2 therefore has
to pay higher subsidies to snatch the core. On the other hand, this means that if Govt
2 defends, capital owners do not benefit from the higher subsidy paid by region 1. But
this second effect is dominated by the first (see the Proof of Proposition 4), so that the
core government will be more willing to defend the core when spillovers increase.
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Figure 3.7: Govt 2’s Decision (zd2 > 0)
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Proposition 5. If Govt 2 defends the core by setting z2 = zd2 , compared to a situation
without subsidies,
(i) aggregate welfare falls,
(ii) region 2 welfare decreases for zd2 > 0, and
(iii) region 1 welfare increases.
Proof. See appendix 3.5.4. ¥
This is intuitive, since the allocation of industry is not changed by subsidies. The only
effect relevant for welfare is the payment of subsidies. Since these are paid by region 2
residents but part of the subsidy accrues to residents of region 1, subsidies redistribute
from region 2 to region 1. Overall welfare falls since the subsidy redistributes from
workers to capitalists, and this reduces welfare for λ > 1
2
.
3.4 Conclusion
The paper studies subsidy competition among asymmetric regions in a model with
mobile capital and agglomeration forces. We start from a situation where industry
is agglomerated in the smaller region for historic reasons, and ask whether subsidy
competition can lure industry to the larger region. When governments maximize a
weighted welfare function, we find the answer is yes when the welfare weights of workers
and capital owners are equal. In this instance, the smaller region does not prevent the
larger region from paying subsidies which lures all capital to that region. However,
when workers’ welfare is weighted more heavily, the smaller region might pay subsidies
to capital owners that are just large enough to prevent them from shifting their capital
to the other region. In this case, if the size difference between the regions is not too
large, an inefficient industry location prevails. Our paper thus provides a formalization
of the intuitive argument that, when external economies are prevalent, jurisdictional
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competition can improve the spatial allocation of economic activity (e.g. Duranton,
2008). Unless territorial welfare functions are skewed towards immobile workers and
size differences between regions are small, this notion is shown to be correct.
Inefficient Lock-in and Subsidy Competition 116
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Break point
Solving
d(r1 − r2)
dsn
|sn= 12 = 0, (A.1)
using (12) and (13) gives the ‘break point’
φB =
4 + 6µ− 4µσ + γ(4σ + µ− 2)− 2√2√(γ − µ)(σ − 1)(4 + µ(4 + γ − 2σ) + 2γσ)
(2 + γ)(2 + µ)
.(A.2)
3.5.2 Sustain point
Solving (14) gives the sustain point
φS =
( 1+γ
1+µ
)σ
(
1 + µ−
√
(1 + µ)2 − (1 + γ)2(1+µ
1+γ
)2σ
)
1 + γ
. (A.3)
Differentiating φS gives:
∂φS
∂γ
= − (1 + µ)(σ − 1)
(1 + γ)
√
(1 + µ)2 − (1 + γ)2(1+µ
1+γ
)2σ
· φS < 0 (A.4)
∂φS
∂µ
=
σ − 1√
(1 + µ)2 − (1 + γ)2(1+µ
1+γ
)2σ
· φS > 0 (A.5)
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3.5.3 Locational Forces
The locational forces are obtained by evaluating the different forces at sn = 12 for the
symmetric region case, i.e. sl = sk = 12 .
Intra-Industry Spillovers
To isolate the intra-industry spillover force we differentiate the capital reward gap with
respect to sn, holding fixed the market crowding effect (the direct effect of the industry
share on ri) and inter-industry spillovers.
d(r1 − r2)
dsn
∣∣∣∣
sn=
1
2
,µ=0
=
∂(r1 − r2)
∂χγ
∂χγ
∂sn
= −32αγ(1− σ)
(2 + γ)σ
φ
(1 + φ)2
> 0. (A.6)
This expression is positive for our parameter specifications and captures the agglom-
erative intra-industry spillover force.
Inter-Industry Spillovers
Holding fixed the market crowding effect and intra-industry spillovers yields the de-
glomerative inter-industry spillover force
d(r1 − r2)
dsn
∣∣∣∣
sn=
1
2
,γ=0
=
∂(r1 − r2)
∂χµ
∂χµ
∂sn
=
32αµ(1− σ)
(2 + µ)σ
φ
(1 + φ)2
< 0. (A.7)
Market Crowding Effect
The second dispersion force denoted as the market crowding effect works through the
direct effect of sn on r1 in (12). Holding fixed inter-and intra-industry spillovers yields
∂(r1 − r2)
∂sn
∣∣∣∣
sn=
1
2
,µ=γ=0
= −8α
σ
(−1 + φ)2
(1 + φ)2
≤ 0. (A.8)
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which is unambiguously non-positive.
3.5.4 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
We show that irrespective of the welfare weight λ, an industry allocation where all
firms are located in the larger region is preferred by the social planner to an allocation
with all firms in the smaller region. Comparing the sum of regional welfare for the case
where the core is located in the larger region with the sum of regional welfare for the
case where the small region hosts the core yields
W
∣∣
sn=1
−W ∣∣
sn=0
=
(2sl − 1)[µ(σ − 1)− α lnφ]λ
σ − 1 (A.9)
which is unambiguously positive for sl > 12 . ¥
Proof of Proposition 2.
Plugging in the respective subsidy levels zd2 and zmin1 from (23) and (21) into region 2’s
welfare function, respectively yields
WC2 (z
d
2)−W P2 (zmin1 (z2))
∣∣
λ=1/2
= −(2sl − 1)
2
[
µ− α
σ − 1 lnφ
]
, (A.10)
which is negative for sl > 12 . It follows that Govt 2 sets z2 = z
d
2 − ε implying that
WC1 (z
min
1 (z
d
2 − ε)) > W P1 (z2). ¥
Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) From Proposition 1, we know that without subsidies, welfare is higher if the core is
in the larger region. Evaluating the effect of subsidies on welfare in the case where the
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core is in region 1 gives:
(1− λ)zmin1 −
(1− λ)sk + λsl
sk + sl
zmin1 . (A.11)
For λ = 1
2
, this is zero. The same holds for the welfare effect of subsidies if the core
is in region 2. Hence, welfare with subsidies is still highest if the core is in the larger
region.
(ii) From the proof above we know that WC1 (zmin1 (zd2 − ε)) > W P1 (z2) holds. Since
∂WP1
∂z2
> 0 implies W P1 (z2) > W P1 (0) for zd2 > 0 it follows that WC1 (zmin1 (zd2 − ε)) >
W P1 (0), i.e. Govt 1 is better off after successfully snatching the core compared to the
baseline welfare level. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4.
The locus s˜l = sl(γ) is implicitly defined by
∆(sl, γ, ·) ≡ WC2 (zd2 , sl, γ, ·)−W P2 (zmin1 (zd2 − ²), sl, γ, ·) = 0.
Part(i) follows immediately from setting λ = 1
2
in (A.10). To prove (ii), differentiatia-
tion of ∆ gives the slope:
ds˜l
dγ
= − d∆/dγ
d∆/dsl
, (A.12)
where
d∆
dγ
=
α(2λ− 1)(σ − 1)φ(1 + µ)σ−1 (λ (1− 2sl) 2 − 1)
(
2sl+1
φ2
− 2sl + 3
)
2(1 + γ)σσ (2sl − 3) (λ (2sl − 1) + 1) > 0 (A.13)
for sl, λ > 12 .
The expression for d∆/dsl is rather messy and therefore omitted. However, we can
show numerically that it is negative for the parameters used in the paper. Intuitively,
when region 2 becomes smaller, it will be less willing to defend. Formally, we can show
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that differentiating ds˜l
dγ
and evaluating at λ = 1
2
gives
d(ds˜l
dγ
)
dλ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1/2
=
α(σ − 1)2 (4 (sl − 1) sl − 1) (1 + µ)σ−1φ
σ+1
1−σ
(
(2sl + 1)φ
2
σ−1 + (3− 2sl)φ 2σσ−1
)
σ(1 + γ)σ (2sl − 3) (2sl + 1) (α log(φ) + µ(1− σ)) > 0
(A.14)
Hence, ds˜l
dγ
> 0 for λ, sl > 12 . ¥
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) Since the industry allocation is not affected, we need to consider only the effect of
subsidies on welfare. This is given by:
Z = (1− λ)z2 − (1− λ)(1− sk) + λ(1− sl)
1− sk + 1− sl z2 =
(1− 2λ)(1− sl)
1− sk + 1− sl z2.
This expression is negative for λ > 1
2
, so subsidies decrease welfare.
(ii) and (iii). From ∂W
C
2 (z2)
∂z2
< 0 and ∂W
P
1 (z2)
∂z2
> 0 it follows that WC2 (zd2) < WC2 (0) and
W P1 (z2) > W
P
1 (0) for zd2 > 0. Residents of region 2 will unambiguously experience
a welfare decline whereas households in region 1 experience an unambiguous welfare
gain. ¥
Chapter 4
The winner gives it all:
Unions, tax competition and
offshoring
Unions, tax competition and offshoring 122
4.1 Introduction
In January 2008, Nokia’s Executive Vice president Veli Sundbäck announced the closure
of its handset factory in Bochum in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and the relocation
of Nokia’s manufacturing activity to Cluj (Romania) as a response to changes in market
conditions and an increased requirement for cost effectiveness. However, as Nokia
had received investment subsidies from the state of NRW for its production site in
Bochum and will be exempt from the real estate tax in Romania, the decision to
relocate its production facility to a low-labour-cost country reignited an old debate on
the distribution of state subsidies. As a matter of fact, the latest case of production
delocation is just another example of what has been common practice long before the
enlargement of the European Union: Governments exploiting firms’ responsiveness to
subsidies and engaging in subsidy races.1 Accordingly, Germany may have lost the
latest race for a large manufacturer, but has come off as the winner in the past at the
cost of subsidy payments when bidding for a BMW plant in 2001 against Kolin (Czech
Republic) or averting Volkswagen’s threats to relocate towards Hungary in 1996.
Against this background, the present paper assesses the outcome and welfare impli-
cations of a subsidy race between countries with different degrees of labor market
distortions. Our analysis builds on a model in which industrial activity is inefficiently
locked-in in a unionized core country. What we have in mind is that a certain re-
gion historically emerged as an industrial center which sparked the emergence of trade
unions, capturing some of the location rents earned in such an agglomeration. Our
most important result is that tax competition among a leading unionized industry core
and a challenging emerging country is efficiency enhancing as it leads to relocation of
industry towards the country with a non-distorted labor market. A government of an
industrial core whose objective it is to maximize residents’ welfare will find it optimal
1As more than three quarters of subsidies to industry in the OECD are investment subsidies (see
Fuest and Huber, 2000, Table 1) there is hardly any doubt that local governments use subsidies as
an instrument to influence the location decision of capital. Biesebroeck (2008) gives an overview of
bidding wars between the Canadian and the US government for the automotive industry. See also
Greenstone and Moretti (2003).
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to let its competitor attract mobile capital so as to benefit from increased efficiency
and the competing location’s tax regime.
Local labor markets are typically thought of as important determinants of subsidy poli-
cies, disregarding alternative employment opportunities of local workers and the fact
that consumers across the country as well as shareholders of locally owned companies
may benefit hugely from real capital moving to low-wage or low-tax regions. Our at
first sight somewhat surprising result suggests that what we observe in everyday polit-
ical discussions and decisions may, in some respects, be in contrast to what would be
optimal policy once general equilibrium effects are taken into account.
Moreover, disentangling the welfare effects of industry relocation to factor groups re-
veals that capitalists are the clear winners of the subsidy race as they benefit from
lower consumer prices and the repatriation of subsidy income. Workers of the non-
unionized competitive industry in the winning country benefit from their government’s
action only if union wages have been way above the competitive wage rate such that
the benefit from lower consumer prices compensates the financing costs of attracting an
industry cluster. The opposite holds for non-unionized workers in the former industrial
core country. Surprisingly, they suffer, together with former unionized workers, from
a delocation of industry and in particular when union wages were high. Since union
wages depend on the same parameter as consumers’ love for variety a loss of industry
will be more severe if the valuation for the industry good is high as this will have a
strong impact on the country’s consumer price index.
Our modelling approach has various advantages. Firstly, the monopolistic competition
framework allows us to be consistent with empirical findings by Stewart (1990), Abowd
and Lemieux (1993) and Nickell and Wadhwani (1994) who give evidence for unions’
wage setting behavior to depend on firms’ market power next to their own bargaining
power. Secondly, the model which follows recent work by Borck et al. (2009) is able
to reflect the stylized fact that economic activity is not evenly distributed across space
but tends to cluster according to certain agglomeration mechanisms as outlined by
Marshall (1890), creating location rents for each individual firm. These location rents
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can to a certain extent be extracted, e.g. by governments or unions without changing
the spatial allocation of firms instantaneously.
Our work draws on different strands of the literature. Recent years have seen an
increasing interest in the interaction of agglomeration economies and local government
tax setting behaviour (Kind et al. (2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000), Baldwin and
Krugman (2004), Borck and Pflüger (2006)) with one major insight being that the
presence of agglomeration economies reduces the mobility of capital and creates taxable
location rents. These models, however, do not incorporate labor market frictions as an
additional factor in the competition for mobile capital. Picard and Toulemonde (2006)
examine the role of trade unions on the allocation of firms across two regions. They
describe how the existence of union wages reinforce the home market effect supporting
the concentration of firms in one location.
A parallel strand in the literature has focused on the deterring effects of unionization
on foreign direct investment (Leahy and Montagna (2000); Naylor and Santoni (2003);
Lommerud et al. (2003)).2 These papers, however, consider only trade unions and firms
while ignoring government tax policies. A notable exception is recent work by Haufler
and Mittermaier (2008) who show that a unionized country with additional location
disadvantages (such as a smaller market) may end up attracting mobile foreign capital,
whereby taxes have a strategic effect on the union’s behavior. Our model however
differs conceptually as it explicitly accounts for agglomeration tendencies which are
empirically well established3 and explain the co-existence of industrialized core and
lagging regions as empirically outlined in Redding and Venables (2004). Moreover, our
paper, by contrast, examines the role unions plays for tax competition without their
behavior being controllable (directly or indirectly so) by governments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general
setup of the model. Section 3 illustrates the impact of tax competition on the allocation
2These contributions are part of a more general literature that analyzes the interaction between
unionization, imperfect competition in goods markets, and economic integration. See e.g. Brander
and Spencer (1988), Huizinga (1993), Driffill and van der Ploeg (1995), and Naylor (1999).
3For an overview of the empirical literature on agglomeration economies see Rosenthal and Strange
(2004).
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of industrial firms. Section 4 demonstrates the welfare effects on each single factor
group. Section 5 discusses the outcomes of the game for an alternative government
objective. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 The basic model
The theoretical model follows the model proposed by Borck et al. (2009). We consider
two countries i ∈ {h, f} (h and f being mnemonic for ‘home’ and ‘foreign’) where one
of the two production factors, labor (L), is immobile, whereas the other, capital (K),
is mobile across countries such that it can be employed in one region while its owners
(who do not move) spend its return in the other region. Countries are symmetric
in technology, preferences and size, but are allowed to differ in labor market rigidity
as measured by a parameter of union power. There are two sectors, an ‘A’ sector
with perfect competition, and an industrial ‘M ’ sector displaying differentiated goods,
increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. Trade in the competitive
good is costless, whereas the increasing returns sector faces per unit ‘iceberg’ transport
costs τ à la Samuelson (1954) which means that for each unit to arrive at location j,
τ > 1 units have to be shipped from location i. The A sector produces a homogeneous
traditional good which we choose to be the numéraire using labor only. Units are scaled
such that one unit of labor produces one unit of output, so that the competitive wage
also equals one.
4.2.1 Preferences
There are two types of households in each country, inelastically supplying their factor
endowment, labor and capital, respectively. In country i, there is a total of Ki+Li
households, whose utility stems from consumption of the traditional as well as the
differentiated, industrial varieties. Those preferences are reflected by a two-tier utility
function, whereby the upper tier is quasi-linear and the lower tier is of the C.E.S. type.
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The upper tier utility function of a household is
Ui(Mi, Ai) = α lnMi + Ai − α[lnα− 1], (1)
where the last term is a constant that disappears when indirect utility is derived, Ai
denotes consumption of the traditional good and Mi stands for differentiated industrial
varieties v according to the lower-tier function
Mi =
(∫ ni
0
mii(v)
σ−1
σ dv +
∫ N
ni
mji(v)
σ−1
σ dv
) σ
σ−1
, σ > 1, N = ni + nj. (2)
Here σ denotes the constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties and
ni the mass of varieties produced in i. mii and mji denote the quantity consumed
by a household in country i of a variety produced in i and j, respectively. Assuming
0 < α < yis, (i = h, f ; s = K,L) it is ensured that both goods will be consumed.
Utility maximization yields the following demand functions:
Mi =
α
Pi
, Ais = yis − α, s = K,L
mii = αpi(v)
−σP σ−1i , mji = α(τpj(v))
−σP σ−1i ,
(3)
where
Pi ≡
(
nip
1−σ
i + nj(τpj(v))
−σ) 11−σ (4)
denotes the perfect C.E.S. price index4 where we take into account that firms within
one country are identical and charge identical producer prices.5 Indirect utility is
Vis = yis − α lnPi, s = K,L (5)
where income is either labor (‘L’) income or capital (‘K’) income.
4This is the expenditure needed to purchase a unit-level of welfare.
5However, producer prices across regions are no longer equal once we allow for labor market frictions.
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4.2.2 Industrial production
The perfectly competitive A sector has already been described above. Every firm in the
industrial sector produces one variety6 with a fixed input, namely one unit of capital,
and labor. Moreover, a higher concentration of industry in the country lowers the labor
input requirement, according to the following specification: For each unit of output,
γi ≡ 1/(1 + θni) units of labor are needed as a variable input, where θ > 1 measures
the local knowledge spill-over occurring between workers of the M sector. This way
of modelling spill-overs is obviously a short-cut for considering the various channels
through which industry concentration may benefit each and every single firm. It can
be rationalized in the present setting by knowledge exchange or thick labor markets.7
Using this specification, the firms’ profit function in i reads
pii = (pi − wiγi)qi − ri, (6)
where pi denotes the consumer price, wi is the wage rate, and ri is the capital reward
rate. Equilibrium in the goods market requires total (world) demand for a domestic
industrial good to equal supply of this variety. The market clearing condition reads
qi = mii(Li +Ki) + τmij(Lj +Kj) (7)
This latter term shows that part of demand is indirect due to iceberg trade costs which
are fully borne by consumers. Straightforward profit maximization gives us the firm’s
mill price
pi =
σ
σ − 1wiγi, (8)
whereby the same price, multiplied by τ , is charged to customers abroad. Now, since
capital supply is fixed, so is the number of firms which will bid for capital; hence, its
compensation adjusts so as to ensure zero profits in equilibrium. Using this zero-profit
6Note that this is not an assumption, but a result. For details, refer to Baldwin et al. (2003).
7For a thorough analysis on the micro-foundations of agglomeration economies, see Duranton and
Puga (2004).
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condition and (8), we obtain the output level which allows a firm to break even
qi =
ri(σ − 1)
wiγi
. (9)
Labor demand of an industrial firm reads
lMi = γiqi. (10)
4.2.3 Mobile factor’s reward
In the short run the allocation of capital and hence the location ofM firms is exogenous.
To derive capital’s reward note that, due to the fact that one unit of capital is needed
to run a firm, its reward is bid up to the point where it equals operating profit. To
ease notation, we will henceforth use the share notation where sn ≡ nh/N denotes
region h’s share of the world’s industry, λ ≡ Lh/L is region h’s share of world labor
and κ ≡ Kh/K denotes the share of world capital region h owns. With (8) and (9),
it follows immediately that the capital reward rate ri reflects operating profit, i.e.
ri = (1/σ)piqi. Using this, the demand functions (3) and market clearing (7) and
normalizing N = L = K = 1, yields
rh =
α
σ
(
κ+ λ
sn + φχ (1− sn) +
((1− κ) + (1− λ))φ
φsn + χ (1− sn)
)
,
rf =
α
σ
(
φχ(κ+ λ)
sn + φχ (1− sn) +
((1− κ) + (1− λ))χ
φsn + χ (1− sn)
)
;
(11)
where 0 < φ ≡ τ 1−σ ≤ 1 stands for the level of trade freeness and χ ≡ (pf
ph
)1−σ =
(
wfγf
whγh
)1−σ.
In the long run capital is mobile and seeks for the highest nominal return. Local
technological spillovers on the sectoral level support a locational equilibrium where
all industrial activity is clustered in one region since, all else equal an increase in the
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number of firms in h increases operating profit in h and hence the capital reward gap
(rh − rf ) which induces a further capital inflow into h. On the other hand, firms in
h will face intense local competition as sn increases which deters other firms to enter
the market. However, for ongoing trade integration φ firms compete with other firms
irrespective of their location which entails that the opportunity cost of agglomerating
in one country and serving the foreign market from abroad become low. Consequently,
for a sufficiently high level of trade freeness firms will be agglomerated in one region as
they benefit from the spatial proximity to other firms through local industry spill-over
effects. The critical level of trade freeness at which the benefit of agglomeration begins
to exceed the cost of serving from one location is typically denoted as the break point
level of trade freeness, φB and derived solving ∂rh−rf
∂sn
∣∣
sn=1/2
= 0 for φ.8
For the purpose of our later analysis which assesses the outcome of a tax competi-
tion game between an industrialized country hosting an industry cluster (‘core’) and
a lagging region (‘periphery’), we describe a locational equilibrium where the level of
trade freeness is sufficiently high (φ > φB) such that all industry is agglomerated in
one region, say h.9 This could be due to historical reasons, just as the story goes in
Krugman (1991e)’s seminal paper. For instance, one could think of a highly industri-
alized country in Western Europe versus an emerging market in Eastern Europe. As
said in the introduction, we think that historically determined agglomeration patterns
then may have sparked labor’s organization, giving rise to asymmetric unionization.
Firms in the industrial core earn an agglomeration rent (Ω) which is defined as the
loss a single firm would incur if it relocated to the periphery, given that all other firms
stay in the core. In other words, capital is tied to the core and capital owners will have
no incentive to relocate their capital unit as long as they earn positive location rents
8A formal expression of the break point is available upon request. For a more detailed model exposition
see Borck et al. (2009).
9Tax competition within agglomeration models where trade costs are so high that no agglomeration
occurs yield results that are closer in nature to the ‘basic tax competition model’ (see Baldwin et al.
(2003)). For an analysis of such interior cases in a New Trade Theory model, refer to Egger and
Seidel (2007) who show that a country with a stronger labor market distortion will find it optimal
to choose a lower Nash tax rate in competition for mobile capital.
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which can be expressed as
Ω ≡ rh − rf
∣∣
sn=1
=
α
σ
(
2− 1
φ
(
wf (1 + θ)
wh
)1−σ
(1 + φ2)
)
. (12)
Obviously, the agglomeration rent is increasing in θ the intensity of local industry
spill-overs, the level of trade integration φ and foreign’s wage rate wf , whereas it is
decreasing in core’s wage, wh.
4.2.4 Union wage setting
As noted earlier the emergence of an industrial cluster may have sparked labor’s or-
ganization, giving rise to asymmetric unionization. We find it therefore natural to
choose the industrialized core to be the unionized country whereas periphery’s labor
market is perfectly competitive. Hence, whereas the immobile factor’s reward in the
periphery is equal to the competitive wage rate, we allow firm-specific unions (which
are conceptually identical to sector-specific unions in this model) in the core to set the
nominal10 reward for unionized workers using a decentralized wage setting approach for
two reasons: Nationwide unions are hardly observed in reality and, more importantly,
the feature of our model that unions, much like competing firms, try each to get the
highest rent possible without internalizing consequences for the overall price level, tax
policies and industry location, is one that makes it plausible as a stylized description
of many OECD countries’ union behavior.
Workers employed in unionized firms will enjoy higher nominal wages than those work-
ing in the non-unionized sector of the economy. Consequently, as firms set their prices
according to a fixed mark-up rule (8), consumer prices will, of course, be higher un-
der unionization, which implies that A sector employees and capital owners will lose
from it, as will foreign country’s residents who buy imported differentiated goods from
core’s industry. The non-unionized traditional A industry serves as a ‘buffer’ sector
10Obviously, we do not use a monetary model here. We use the term ‘nominal’ as opposed to ‘real’ in
the sense that the latter means taking the price index into account.
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for those who do not find employment in the industrial M sector, so there will be no
unemployment.
We employ a monopoly union approach,11 where the union maximizes the nominal
wage bill of its members over and above the competitive one, (wh − 1)lMi . The firm
then exerts its ‘right to manage’, i.e. it chooses optimal output given the wage rate.
From here on, wh denotes the union-sector wage in h (whereas the competitive wages
in core and periphery are equal to 1, see above). Using (7), (10) and the demand
functions from (3), we rewrite union’s objective function,
(wh − 1) γ qh = (wh − 1)γh
(
σ
σ − 1 γhwh
)−σ
αψ, (13)
where ψ ≡ [P σ−1h (κ+ λ) +P σ−1f ((1− κ) + (1− λ)].12 The left hand side of (13) reveals
how each union equally weighs the factors ‘wage rate above competitive wage rate’ and
‘employment’ so as to maximize the excess wage bill. The iso-elasticity of both labor
demand (that stems from the iso-elasticity of product demand and constant per unit
labor input requirement) and the firm’s part of the Nash bargaining lead to the wage
that maximizes (13)
wh = 1 +
1
σ − 1 (14)
which is simply a fixed mark-up on the competitive wage. Intuitively, the union wage
rate falls in the elasticity of substitution which measures a firm’s mark-up in the mo-
nopolistically competitive industry.13
11This is a special case of Nash bargaining between the representative union and the firm where all
the bargaining power is with the union. We are aware that this is only one out of many ways to
model industrial relations; however, it seems to be the most widely used one due to its tractability.
For an exhaustive overview of collective bargaining and some empirical evidence, we refer to Cahuc
and Zylberberg (2004).
12Note that each union neglects the effects on the economy’s consumer price index.
13It is worth noting that we get an only quantitatively different result with the more general Nash
bargaining approach. The union’s outside option is zero, and the firm’s outside option is to produce
nothing, having already sunk the fixed cost which is the same whether an agreement is reached or
not and hence cancels from the Nash maximand (This point is parallel to Picard and Toulemonde
(2006). They emphasize that this assumption is implicitly made in many models where fixed costs
are set to zero). Adding weights of β and 1 − β to the union’s and firm’s objectives in the Nash
product, respectively, and maximizing yields wh = 1 + β/(σ − 1). Since this does not provide us
with additional insights, we do not pursue this further.
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A natural question that arises within a core-periphery equilibrium and unions’ mark-up
wages in the core is whether, in the absence of government intervention, this allocation
of capital remains stable. This is a straightforward problem to tackle, which leads us
to
Proposition 1 Agglomeration rents earned in the core can partially be reaped by trade
unions, up to a wage level of wb = (1 + θ)
(
2φ
1+φ2
) 1
σ−1 . Beyond this point, the core-
periphery equilibrium becomes unstable as the rents in f are higher.
For the proof, we simply set rh equal to rf and solve the equation for wh, evaluating
the expression at sn = 1. This is the ‘break wage rate’ above which each and every
unit of capital is better off in country f than in the core h. The first derivatives
are straightforward: wb rises in local technological spill-over (θ) and falls with market
integration (φ). Figure 4.1 illustrates the stability of the core-periphery equilibrium
under asymmetric unionization.14
Figure 4.1: Stability of core-periphery equilibria under asymmetric unionization
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Figure 4.1 reveals that as long as the union wage rate set in the core does not exceed the
break wage rate wb, capital will be tied to the region where it earns an agglomeration
14Parameter values σ = 4;α = 0.5; θ = 0.3;φ = 0.6.
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rent. Of course, with the presence of unions in the agglomerated core part of the
location rent which, in the absence of labor market distortion fully accrued to capital
owners are now redirected to unionized workers.
4.3 Tax competition
Governments maximize residents’ welfare and deploy lump-sum taxes on factor endow-
ment, using the revenues for a direct subsidy to capital employed within their borders.15
In accordance with the models in this literature (see Baldwin and Krugman (2004),
Borck and Pflüger (2006)), we assume that the core is a Stackelberg leader in that it
gets to set its tax rate first. In our framework, this assumption can be rationalized in
the following way: The country that disposes of the unionized industries knows that it
may face competition from a challenger and will essentially play an ‘entry-deterrence’
game.
Letting zi denote a subsidy to capital employed in i and ri + zi the return to capital
including subsidies, we end up with the government budget constraints
snzh = Th(κ+ λ); (1− sn)zf = Tf ((1− κ) + (1− λ)), (15)
with Ti denoting the tax rate. To best disentangle the effects of asymmetric union-
ization on the location of capital we assume that countries are of equal size (κ = λ =
0.5).16 Governments are utilitarian and maximize the sum of residents’ indirect utility,
where welfare of unionized M and non-unionized A workers as well as capitalists, in h
reads
V Mh = L
M
h (wh − α lnPh − Th), (16)
V Ah = (L− LMh )(1− α lnPh − Th), (17)
15Tax competition here is modelled in a very simple way: Given that the owners of both factors are
immobile, they are simply taxed on their endowment, i.e. residence-based taxes are employed.
16The interested reader is referred to Borck et al. (2009) who consider inefficiencies arising through
asymmetrically sized countries.
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V Kh = Kh(yK − α lnPh − Th), (18)
where yK denotes capitalist’s income and LMh = lMh nh is the core’s industrial sector’s
labor demand. Observe that since the world is a lumpy place in this model, both
parties will effectively compare two situations: being the core (henceforth indicated
by the superscript ‘c’) or the periphery (indicated by ‘p’). At this point, the simple
structure of the model gives us a lot of mileage when it comes to optimal policy analysis
as we get a closed-form welfare function. Taking the example of country h being the
core,17 welfare is derived adding up (16)-(18) evaluated at sn = 1
WF ch =
1
2
(
1− zh + 2α
σ
)
+ LMch (wh − 1)− α lnP ch, (19)
where LMch ≡ 2ασ (σ−1)wh . Country f ’s welfare in this case is
WF pf =
1
2
(2α
σ
+ zh + 1
)− α lnP pf . (20)
If, by contrast, all industry locates in f , the welfare terms are
WF ph =
1
2
(2α
σ
+ zf + 1
)− α lnP ph (21)
WF cf =
1
2
(2α
σ
− zf + 1
)− α lnP cf (22)
The simplified price indices are obtained using (8) and (14) in (see (4))
P ch =
σ
σ−1whγ, P
p
h =
σ
σ−1φ
1/(1−σ)γ,
P cf =
σ
σ−1γ, P
p
f =
σ
σ−1φ
1/(1−σ)whγ.
(23)
where γ ≡ 1/(1 + θ). Note that part of core’s union wage rate is borne by consumers
abroad (‘wage cost exporting’).
Moreover, given our assumption that the labor market distortion occurs only in h, we
17Note that rh|sn=1 = rf |sn=0 = 2α/σ.
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can show that global welfare WF glob = WFh+WFf could be enhanced if the industry
core shifted towards the non-unionized periphery:
Proposition 2 For high levels of trade freeness and wf < wh < wb the core-periphery
equilibrium sn = 1 is stable but globally inefficient,
WF glob|sn=1 < WF glob|sn=0.
Proof : See Appendix 4.7.1. ¥
The obvious question then is whether core will defend its industry cluster and prevent
the shift of industry towards an efficient allocation, using a generous tax regime to
compensate capital for high union wages and at the same time ensuring higher nominal
wages for its industrial workers. Hosting the industry core is attractive since local
production avoids consumer-borne trade costs for one’s residents (‘cost-of-living effect’).
Moreover, whereas the benefit of higher nominal wages accrues to unionized workers
in the core only, part of the resulting higher consumer prices is borne by consumers
abroad (‘wage cost exporting’). However, the latter effect enhances welfare in the core
only up to a certain union wage level after which consumer prices become so high that
less workers will be employed in the unionized sector as less of the industrial good is
demanded. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2 which depicts core’s welfare as a function
of union wages in the absence of subsidies18
18Parameter values: σ = 4;α = 0.3; θ = 0.3;φ = 0.6.
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Figure 4.2: Core’s welfare function for different union wages
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4.3.1 Second Stage: Periphery’s government
Solving the game via backward induction, we start with the government of the periph-
ery at stage two of the tax game. As all firms are alike, this is a straightforward exercise:
The government of the periphery, government f , has a maximum subsidy/minimum
tax it is willing to offer. This can be found at the point where its overall welfare level
is the same no matter if it hosts the industry or not, WF cf = WF
p
f . Solving this for
the subsidy, we obtain ‘zmaxf ’:
zmaxf = −zh + 2α
(
lnwh − lnφ
σ − 1
)
(24)
The first term denotes the foregone repatriation of subsidy income from c for periphery’s
capitalists once p attracts the industry. The second term captures the benefits of
industry relocation towards the non-unionized country. Residents in the periphery
benefit from lower consumer prices since wages are competitive and transport costs
are absent for them once industry locates in the periphery. On the other hand, the
government of the periphery knows that it has to offer each firm at least what core’s
government offers, in addition to the agglomeration rent Ω. We call this subsidy level
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‘zminf ’ which is obtained solving Ω + (zh − zf ) = 0 for zh using (12):
zminf = zh +
α
σ
(
2− 1
φ
(
1 + θ
wh
)1−σ
(1 + φ2)
)
. (25)
Now, as long as zmaxf is greater than zminf , periphery can profitably attract the capital
from the core. Note that these terms depend only on core’s tax policy (zh) and exoge-
nous parameters (as the monopoly unions’ wage, wh, only depends on the parameter
σ). The next step is to examine government h’s behavior.
4.3.2 First Stage: Core’s government
The core’s government is aware of the influence its policy exerts on the ability and
willingness of the periphery to attract capital. To determine core’s optimal behavior,
we first determine the policy at which periphery’s government will not be able to
profitably attract the mobile capital. In a next step we check whether core’s government
will actually want to hold on to the industrial core.
From inspection of (24) and (25), it can easily be seen how we can work out the
‘knife-edge’ level of subsidy, say zdh, at which the core can make it unprofitable for the
periphery to attract the industry which will be the case whenever zminf is at least as
large as zmaxf . We set (24) equal to (25) and solve for zh:
zdh =
α
2σ
(
1
φ
wσ−1h (1 + θ)
1−σ(1 + φ2) + 2σ lnwh − 2σ lnφ
σ − 1 − 2
)
. (26)
This means that core’s offer has to be at least zdh to make sure that the periphery’s
government will not be a threat to the pre-existing allocation.19
It is however not immediately obvious what core’s government opts for: Production in
its part of the world leads to a lower price index for all of its consumers (‘cost-of-living
effect’). Moreover, industrial workers in the core earn higher wages than they otherwise
19Obviously, every better offer will do the trick, but will never be optimal since the subsidies do not
alleviate any distortion. Rather, they amount to a transfer to the other country which will be kept
as tiny as possible.
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would - whereby part of this excess wage bill is paid, via higher prices, by foreigners
(‘wage cost exporting effect’). On the other hand, allowing the industry to delocate
to f means h’s capitalists would benefit from the repatriation of subsidy income and
also that its consumers would be able to buy goods produced in a low-wage region.
So, in the case where core holds on to its industry, it will set zh = zdh. In the case
where it does not, it will set the subsidy level marginally smaller, zh = zdh − ², where ²
is some small but positive number. To see this latter point, note that this guarantees
the highest possible subsidy transfer from the periphery (remember, zminf = zh + Ω).
Core’s optimal policy can therefore be summarized by
z∗h =
 zdh if WF ch(zdh) ≥ WF
p
h (z
min
f (zh)),
zdh − ² otherwise.
This gives us also f ’s optimal policy when it attracts all industry: As the second
mover, it takes the given z∗h. So we plug zdh for zh into (25), which is optimal by a
similar argument to the one above: It is the cheapest way to attract the industry. On
the contrary, in case of no industry delocation it is simple to conclude that the subsidy
to capital and hence the tax on L and K will be zero as being the periphery implies
not hosting any industry.
Now that we derived each countries’ optimal policies in the two cases, we proceed to
the equilibrium outcome of the game. The reduced-form equations can be obtained by
plugging the optimal policies for each case into the region’s respective welfare functions
(19)-(22) using (25) and (26). It is then a straightforward exercise to compare welfare
levels. Core’s government will simply compare the difference between WF ch(z∗h) and
WF ph (z
∗
f ). If it is positive, then the country as a whole is better off holding on to its
industry; if it is negative, the opposite holds true. Using (19) and (21) the welfare
differential can be written as
WF ch −WF ph = LMch (wh − 1)−
z∗h
2
− z
∗
f
2
− α ln
(
P ch
P ph
)
. (27)
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The excess wage bill in the first term reflects the benefits of keeping all industry whereas
the second and third term reflect the financing cost and the foregone subsidy payment
of doing so, respectively. The last term’s sign is ambiguous as both P ch and P
p
h will
exceed one. Hence, depending on the level of trade freeness and the union wage the
last term will be positive or negative. Note that both governments take into account
all general equilibrium effects. Specifically, all tax and wage effects as well as trade
cost and price effects are taken into account. We can now state
Proposition 3 A welfare-maximizing government in the unionized core will find it in
its best interest to let the industrial core move to the periphery i.e.,
WF ch(z
d
h)−WF ph (zminf ) < 0.
Proof: See Appendix 4.7.2. ¥
This result is striking at first sight. After all, the core acts as a Stackelberg leader
and maximizes welfare within its border. So one might have expected it to hold on
to its industry via a generous tax regime since the costs of higher union wages are
partly borne by consumers abroad while the benefits of higher wage income accrue
solely to workers within the country. Upon closer inspection, however, our result is
quite intuitive: By letting its capital relocate to f , while still owning it, country h gets
rid of the labor market distortion20 and, at the same time, makes sure capital owners
get a favorable tax regime abroad, leading to repatriated subsidies.
This makes a nice case why governments may, in bidding for mobile factors, make
favorable offers: They may have in mind the preferential regimes their countrymens’
businesses will get abroad. Furthermore, the presence of a challenging emerging market,
i.e. tax competition leads to increased global welfare via restoring an efficient allocation
of industry.
20Trade costs will, at a certain point, counteract the ‘lower-wage’ effect on prices. However, high
trade costs undermine stability of the core-periphery equilibrium in the first place, which is why we
concentrated on lower levels of τ from the outset.
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4.4 Winners and losers of the subsidy race
The above analysis showed that unionized core benefits from inducing a relocation of
firms towards the periphery country f . It chooses a subsidy level at which the periphery
can profitably attract all industry. Hence, both countries are clearly winners of the
game and benefit from delocating industry towards a country with a non-distorted
labor market. This section identifies the winners and the losers of the subsidy race
within the different income groups. We begin with country h’s and f ’s capital owners.
Proposition 4 Capitalists in both locations are the clear winners of the subsidy race.
Capitalists in h win due to the repatriation of capital income whereas capitalists in f
benefit from a lower cost-of-living index.
Proof: See Appendix 4.7.3. ¥
For core’s capital owners, the benefits from repatriating subsidies exceed the cost of
incurring transport costs for imported varieties. Capitalists in f benefit from a lower
cost-of-living index while the financing cost for subsidies are shared between capitalists
and workers.
The impact on workers in the new core country is however ambiguous. To begin with
workers of the new core the indirect utility (Vf, w) differential of workers in f before
and after reads
V pf, w − V cf, w = Lf
(
α(lnP cf − lnP pf ) + zminf
)
. (28)
The difference in price indices is negative since P cf < P
p
f , indicating that workers are
better off with firms producing in their country. The last term, however, indicates that
workers might be better off in a periphery when financing costs are high. Figure 4.3
illustrates the welfare differential in (28).21
21Parameter values: φ = 0.6; α = 0.3; θ = 1..
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Figure 4.3: Foreign workers’ welfare differential
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Figure 4.3 reveals that workers in f will only benefit from an industry relocation for
low σ. Put differently, workers in f win only if they have severely suffered from wage
cost exporting, i.e. for high union wages (low σ) such that it becomes worthwhile to
incur the financing costs of attracting firms.
Intuitively, union members as a whole lose as industry shifts towards f . Their real
income unambiguously falls on two counts, the decline of the nominal wage and the
increase of the price index. The difference of before and after welfare of union workers
denoted as V cu and V pu , respectively is derived using (16) and (23) for the core and
periphery case
V cu − V pu =
2α
σ
(
σ − 1
σ
)(
1 + α[(σ − 1) ln(σ − 1
σ
)− lnφ]
)
. (29)
Figure 4.4 depicts union workers’ welfare differential in (29) for different σ which con-
firms that union workers particularly suffer from subsidy competition for low σ, i.e.
high union wages.22
22Parameter values: φ = 0.6; α = 0.3.
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Figure 4.4: Welfare of h’s union workers before and after industry relocation
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Turning to non-union workers in h, their welfare differential is obtained after inserting
the respective price indices into h’s non-union workers’ indirect utilities using (17) for
both cases
V cnon − V pnon = −α(λ− LMch )(lnwh −
1
1− σ lnφ) (30)
From inspection of (30) it is not ex ante clear whether non-union workers unambigu-
ously benefit from industry relocation towards a country with no labor market distor-
tion. More precisely, non-union workers benefit from industry delocation as they no
longer bear high consumer prices resulting from asymmetric unionization (this effect
is captured in ‘lnwh’) whereas they suffer from losing all industry as they have to
bear transport costs for imported varieties which is reflected through ‘lnφ’. To learn
whether the overall effect is positive or negative Figure 4.5 displays non-union workers’
before and after welfare differential at different levels of σ evaluated at different degrees
of trade freeness.
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Figure 4.5: Welfare of h’s non-union workers (before and after industry relocation)
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Surprisingly, non-union workers were better off for low σ, i.e. under (high) union wages
and experience higher welfare from industry relocation only for higher σ (low union
wages). This seems to be counterintuitive at first sight as we would expect non-union
workers to gain (like workers in f) especially for low σ, i.e. for high union wages. To
understand the result, first note that non-union workers face a trade off between higher
consumer prices due to union wages and higher consumer prices because of shipping
costs. However, recall that a low elasticity of substitution σ implies high union wages
but at the same time indicates a high love for variety. Consequently, consumers in h
suffer from industry delocation especially if their valuation for the industrial good is
high as this leads to a strong increase in the cost-of-living index Ph which depresses
households’ purchasing power in h. Formally, this effect reads
∂P ph
∂σ
=
φ
1
1−σ (σ lnφ+ 1− σ)
(1 + θ)(σ − 1)3 < 0,
∂2P ph
∂σ∂φ
=
φ
σ
1−σ (σ2 − 1− σ lnφ)
(1 + θ)(σ − 1)4 > 0. (31)
which reflects that an increasing elasticity of substitution (a declining ‘love for variety’
and lower union wages) attenuates the loss arising from a high peripheral cost-of-living
index. This effect is amplified by decreasing levels of trade freeness.
Unions, tax competition and offshoring 144
4.5 Discussion
Obviously, our strong main result arises out of two specific assumptions: Firstly, gov-
ernments are true welfare-maximizers and weigh workers’ and capital owners’ utility
equally. Then, the most efficient solution prevails, which is offshoring production to
a location where the labor market is not distorted.23 A straightforward extension
here is to assume a government that only cares about workers, which could be due to
its preferences or the fact that capital ownership is concentrated in very few hands,
whereas the by far biggest share of households are labor households. In this case, the
core will not find it optimal to get rid of its industry up to a certain union wage, but
will rather accept the distortion which is partially borne by periphery’s residents. We
briefly illustrate the case of a government that does not care about capital owners:
Such a government’s objective function has as its arguments only A- and M -sector
workers’ utility. Apart from that, we proceed in perfect analogy to the analysis above,
i.e., we compare price indices and welfare levels with all industrial activity in h and
f , respectively, and work out the critical tax/subsidy levels zˆmaxh , zˆdh under this alter-
native scenario. Finally, inserting the optimal policies under the revised scenario into
the government objective function and conducting government h’s welfare comparison,
like before leads to the welfare differential
˜WFh
c − ˜WFhp = LMch (wh − 1)−
zh
2
− α ln
(
P ch
P ph
)
. (32)
Inserting the new subsidy levels zˆdh and the corresponding price indices finally yields
˜WFh
c − ˜WFhp = 2α− 1
wh
2α(σ − 1)
σ
− α
σ
(
1 +
(1 + φ2)
2φ
(
1 + θ
wh
)1−σ)
− α lnwh. (33)
As one would expect, it is rising in the agglomeration force (θ) and in trade freeness
(φ). Since technological spillovers as well as the level of trade integration increase the
agglomeration rent, it also decreases the cost of financing a subsidy level necessary to
defend the core. These familiar effects notwithstanding, core’s optimal decision in this
23The tax game here has, as is true of many of the models in this literature, an auction-like character
- hence the globally efficient outcome.
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alternative ‘leftist’ scenario is no longer as clear cut as it was in Section 3. To see this
Figure 4.6 illustrates the welfare difference as a function of the union wage rate wh.24
Figure 4.6: Home’s welfare difference for different union wages
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For moderate union wages a ‘leftist’ government that represents workers’ interests will
set a subsidy level low enough to prevent a relocation of industry towards an efficient
outcome. This may not seem too surprising as unionized workers benefit from the
distortion, but remember that non-union workers and home capitalists equally enter
the government’s welfare calculus. Even though the model is highly stylized, we think
the model and its predictions have intuitive appeal: Due to the quasi-linearity of the
utility function, the M -sector can be thought of as one specific industry producing
differentiated goods, whereas the competitive sector represents the (‘big’) rest of the
economy. If such a sector suffers from a labor market distortion, it may not be ex ante
clear that a government will find it in its best interest to compensate mobile factors
for high wages. Rather, it may well be welfare-enhancing to use tax instruments
or other government action to get industries offshored to low-wage countries, which
benefits consumers with low consumer prices and shareholders with higher dividends.
Thinking of particular industries such as consumer electronics, it may well be that
industrialized countries’ governments have understood that it can be in their best
24Parameter values: σ = 4;α = 0.5; θ = 0.3;φ = 0.6.
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interest to allow production and assembling to be shifted to places with lower labor
costs. Then, downward pressure on taxes benefits them as national shareholders gain
from them. Thinking of the car industry, on the contrary, one typically has in mind
that jurisdictions do a lot to hold on to it, which may show the importance of local
interest groups as decisions on industry- or even firm-specific tax breaks or subsidies
will not only, in general, be based on national welfare-maximizing behavior, but also
on the interests of local politicians.
4.6 Conclusion
In a simple model of tax competition between countries with asymmetric union power
and agglomeration tendencies, we have shown that the government of the agglomerated
and unionized country may not have an incentive to try to hold on to its industry.
Instead of realizing the benefits from higher wage income while exporting part of the
wage burden to foreign consumers via higher prices, it rather allows the competing
country to attract industry and benefit from the other country’s generous tax regime
as well as low production costs, leading to low consumer prices. Tax competition is
welfare enhancing as it leads to a relocation of industry towards a country with a
non-distorted labor market. In contrast to the previous literature which focused on
the agglomeration-holding country’s ability to hold on to the core, we show why its
willingness to do so may be curtailed. The finding has intuitive appeal when one
thinks of the fact that welfare is, after all, driven by consumption, which in this case
is increased by two facts: Lower prices because of the circumvented labor market
distortion, and higher income because of capitalists’ repatriated income. We highlight
the way in which winners and losers are generated in tax competition and leave it for
future work to look into this in more depth empirically. In terms of theory, it seems
promising to examine the role of special interest groups and their organization when
it comes to influencing governments in their choice of policy variables in the presence
of international tax competition.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Global welfare is derived adding up the indirect utility functions of A sector workers,
unionized and non-unionized M workers as well as capital owners across countries.
Taking the difference of global welfare evaluated at sn = 1 and global welfare at sn = 0
gives, after inserting wh = σσ−1 ,
WF glob
∣∣
sn=0
−WF glob∣∣
sn=1
= −1− σ
2
σ − 1 ln
(
σ − 1
σ
)
. (A.1)
one can easily see that the expression above is non-negative for σ > 1. ¥
4.7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Setting zh = zdh and zf = zminf (zh) in equation (27), as well as inserting the respective
price indices from (23) reduces to
WF ch(zh)−WF ph (zf ) =
2α(σ − 1)
whσ
(wh − 1)− 2α lnwh. (A.2)
Note that the first term is simply union’s objective which is the excess wage bill of its
members whereas the second term denotes the potential benefit of a relocation, namely
getting rid of the distortion. This equals, after substituting wh = σσ−1 ,
WF ch(zh)−WF ph (zf ) =
2α(σ − 1)
σ2
− 2α ln
(
σ
σ − 1
)
. (A.3)
This term is smaller than zero for any α > 0, σ > 1, indicating that the government in
h will always be better off when the core is in f . The equilibrium subsidy levels are
given by z∗h = zdh − ² and z∗f = zminf (z∗h), for some small ². ¥
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4.7.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The indirect utility differential of capitalists in h reads
V ch, cap − V ph, cap = Kh
(
α(lnP ph − lnP ch)− zminf
)
(A.4)
Inserting the respective price indices, (23), and the union wage yields
V ch, cap − V ph, cap =
α
4σ2
(1 + θ)1−σ(σ − 1)1−σσσ(1 + φ2)
φ
+
α[2σ(ln(σ − 1)− ln σ)− 1]
2σ
.
(A.5)
This expression will be infinitely negative for σ → 1 and approaches zero for σ → ∞.
Hence, capitalists in h gain from firms’ relocation towards the union-unionized country.
The welfare differential of capital owners in f reads simply
V cf, cap − V pf, cap = Kf
(
α(lnP pf − lnP cf )
)
. (A.6)
After inserting the respective price indices and wh simplifies to
V cf, cap − V pf, cap =
α
2
(
lnσ − ln(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1 lnφ
)
, (A.7)
which is unambiguously positive for any α > 0, σ > 1 and 0 < φ < 1. ¥
Chapter 5
The merits and pitfalls of
co-agglomeration:
Vertical linkages and regional
competition
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5.1 Introduction
Inspired by the success of economic clusters such as Silicon Valley, California or Sophia
Antipolis, France the focus of regional policies has gradually shifted away from equity
considerations to objectives enhancing the competitiveness of lagging regions. In its
latest report on national cluster strategies the OECD points to countries like Ger-
many, Finland, Norway and Italy that formerly engaged predominantly in preserving
employment in declining industries and only recently launched regional policy pro-
grams supporting particulary high-technology industries (OECD (2007)).1 To justify
the distribution of funds to selected firms of a specific industry, policy makers com-
monly emphasize the interrelated nature of firm location decisions. More precisely, it
is argued that the attraction and formation of a key industry cluster is essential for the
subsequent attraction of establishments from related industries. This cluster strategy
has significantly shaped the funds allocation process e.g. in the UK, where funds are
distributed exclusively to those firms which demonstrate credibly substantial linkages
between research institutions and industry (OECD (2007)).
The interdependent nature of firm location decisions has equally encouraged the devel-
opment of the industrial park in Cluj-Napoca, Romania and the actions taken by local
Romanian officials concerning the attraction of inward FDI. By means of state subsi-
dies it successfully persuaded Nokia to delocate its production facility from Germany to
Romania in 2008. Whether the official’s strategy to induce a self-supporting process of
firm location will be successful still remains to be seen. In any case, the latest incident
of publicly funded FDI attraction has triggered a lively debate on the desirability of
such industry specific policies between politicians and researchers. Whereas supporters
highlight positive first round and second round employment effects, economists preva-
lently cast doubt on the efficiency of industry specific industrial policy programs. So do
Leslie and Kargon (1996), who present anecdotal evidence on the non-transferability of
economic clusters and the failure of applying the concept of existing clusters to other
locations.
1For instance, the InnoRegio program designated to the Eastern Länder in Germany is to facilitate
the transformation process from traditional manufacturing to research oriented sectors.
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We develop a simple true vertical linkage model à la Venables (1996) where firm agglom-
eration occurs through production linkages between upstream and downstream firms.2
Depending on the level of economic integration, final and intermediate good suppliers
locate evenly across regions or agglomerate in one of the two locations. The inter-
related production structure entails that a region which hosts all upstream industry
attracts more than half the share of final goods producers which benefits core and hurts
peripheral residents on two counts as trade in both types of goods is costly. Residents
incur lower consumer prices as final goods producers incur lower transport costs when
purchasing intermediate varieties. Additionally, core residents save directly on trans-
port costs when purchasing the industrial final good. Starting from an agglomerated
equilibrium we explore the effectiveness and desirability of selective financial assistance
in a setting where local authorities compete for firms of a certain key industry.
We find that the amount of subsidy payments required to enforce an industry delo-
cation from a core to a peripheral region exceeds the maximum amount of resources
that a government of a peripheral region is willing to invest to increase its residents’
welfare. An industry cluster will remain in the location where it emerged prior to any
government intervention. At the end of the game a subsidy is distributed to owners
of these firms ensuring that the neighboring jurisdiction is not tempted to snatch the
industry cluster. Except for owners of the subsidized industry cluster, residents of the
agglomeration are worse off than before as they incur the costs of financing subsidy
payments. Our findings therefore particularly highlight the pitfalls associated with
the competition for a key industry and suggest to rethink current cluster strategies
which selectively distribute funds to industries which are assumed to be the drivers of
industrial agglomeration.
The recent empirical contribution by Ellison et al. (2007) who explore the sources
2The literature on production linkages between firms can be divided into two types of input-output
models. Krugman and Venables (1995) apply the idea of ‘horizontal linkages’ in the spirit of Ethier
(1982) who assumes final goods to enter private consumption and at the same time enter final good
production as intermediate goods. Contrary to this modelling type, Venables (1996) assumes a
‘vertical linkage’ structure where upstream and downstream firms form two distinct industries which
are interrelated through production linkages.
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of agglomeration formulated by Marshall (1890), i.e. the importance of knowledge
spillovers, labor market pooling effects and cost linkages for firm agglomeration, re-
veal the decisive nature of input-output linkages for the co-agglomeration of economic
activity in space. Similarly, Duranton and Overman (2008) find evidence for the rele-
vance of input-output linkages at the regional level and Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000)
empirically show that central locations have attracted industries which are dependent
on intermediate inputs. However, despite the rich empirical evidence on the impor-
tance of production linkages for firm agglomeration and the reassessment of regional
policy goals as reported by the OECD, the number of studies that apply vertical link-
age models to questions related to regional cluster policies and subsidy competition is
small. Notable exceptions are Forslid and Midelfart (2005) who look at optimal indus-
trial cluster policy to upstream or downstream firms in a model where agglomeration
occurs through cost linkages ignoring however the pressures arising from competing
governments. Similarly, Wildasin (1993) assesses the question of how changes of the
own tax policy affect wages and welfare of the neighboring jurisdiction. The author
considers a model of two jurisdictions that are interrelated through interindustry trade
but abstract from co-agglomeration tendencies. Most closely related to our paper is the
work by Kind et al. (2000) who analyze tax competition in a model with input-output
linkages. Nevertheless, our model set up is slightly different as their two-sector model
builds on the assumption that production linkages occur within the same sector (‘hor-
izontal linkages’). The model ranges in the family of true ‘vertical linkages’ models
as it displays two distinct industrial sectors, a final and intermediate goods industry
next to a traditional sector and accounts for the empirically observed co-agglomeration
patterns. Furthermore, the assumption of vertical linkages has also implications for
the tax competition game. In contrast to the horizontal linkage model developed by
Kind et al. (2000), holding the industry cluster in the current model becomes more
attractive with intense production linkages as strong input-output linkages raise the
share of downstream firms in the core which benefits core residents via low consumer
prices.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model and the equilibrium analysis
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in Section 2 and 3. The subsidy competition game where local governments who
maximize their residents’ welfare intend to attract a key industry by means of sector
specific subsidies is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
5.2 The Model
5.2.1 Basic Set Up
The world consists of two regions i ∈ {1, 2} with symmetric technology. Each region
is inhabited by Li + Ki + Hi households with identical preferences. There are three
sectors. The perfectly competitive numéraire sector produces a homogenous good A
under constant returns to scale. It is produced in both regions using immobile la-
bor as the only input and is traded without costs across regions. The two industrial
sectors, M and X produce under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and are sub-
ject to iceberg trade costs τ ≥ 1.3 The downstream sector (M) produces a final
industrial good using one unit of sector specific capital K and a composite of indus-
trial varieties which are purchased from firms of the upstream sector X. Each firm
of the upstream industry produces one intermediate variety using one unit of capital
H which is specific to the upstream sector and labor.4 Hence, whereas demand for
M -goods stems from households residing in both locations, intermediate inputs are
purchased by downstream firms only. Sector specific capital K and H can move freely
across regions but capital owners are assumed to be immobile which implies that the
reward of capital is repatriated to the region of residence. We denote sk ≡ K1/K as
the share of world capital owned by downstream capital owners residing in region 1
with K = K1 + K2 = 1. Analogously, sm ≡ m1/m denotes the share of downstream
capital employed in region 1 (or more precisely, the mass of downstream varieties pro-
duced in region 1). With full employment of downstream capital the total mass of
downstream firms m is determined by the total mass of downstream capital owners in
3For simplicity we assume that both sectors incur the same level of transport costs.
4Upstream specific capital are e.g. patents allowing to produce a particular X variety.
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the economy m = m1 +m2 = K = 1. The share of capital owners who supply capital
to the upstream firms are denoted as sh ≡ H1/H with H = H1+H2 = 1. Analogously,
sn ≡ n1/n denotes the share of capital employed in region 1 (the mass of varieties
produced in region 1) with n = n1 + n2 = H = 1. The share of workers in region 1 is
denoted as sl ≡ L1/L, with L = L1 + L2 = 1. We assume regions to be equal in their
overall market size i.e. sh = sk = sl.
5.2.2 Preferences and Demand
The representative household inelastically supplies one unit of its factor endowment
and derives utility from consuming a range of differentiated industrial M -varieties and
the traditional sector’s A-good. Household’s preferences are represented by a two
tier utility function, where the upper tier function is quasi-linear which eliminates
the income effect on the M -good. The lower tier utility function is of the CES form
displaying a household’s love for industrial varieties. The upper tier utility function
reads
Ui(Ai,Mi) = α lnMi + Ai − α[lnα− 1] (1)
We assume 0 < α < yif , f ∈ {H,K,L} to assure that both types of goods are
consumed. α[lnα − 1] is a constant which will cancel out when deriving the indirect
utility function. Aif denotes consumption of the numéraire good and α the amount of
income spent on the composite good Mi which consists of all differentiated varieties v
of the industrial good
Mi =
(∫ mi
0
Dii(v)
σ−1
σ dv +
∫ mi+mj
mi
Dji(v)
σ−1
σ dv
) σ
σ−1
, σ > 1, i 6= j. (2)
Dii denotes consumption of a downstream variety produced domestically and Dji de-
notes consumption of a downstream variety produced abroad. The constant elasticity
of substitution between any two varieties is denoted by σ. The budget constraint of a
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representative household reads
∫ mi
0
pMi(v)Dii(v)dv +
∫ mi+mj
mi
τpMj(v)Dji(v)dv + Ai = yif , f ∈ {H,K,L} (3)
where pMi and pMj denote the producer prices of a respective variety and τ ≥ 1 iceberg
trade costs. yif , f ∈ {H,K,L} denotes income of the respective household. Solving
the two stage budgeting problem yields the following demand functions, Dii(v), Dji(v),
Mi and Ai and indirect utility Vif
M∗i = α/Pi, A
∗
if = yif − α, (4)
Dii = αpMi(v)
−σP σ−1i , Dji = αpMj(v)
−σP σ−1i ,
Pi ≡ [mip1−σMi +mjp1−σMj ]
1
1−σ , (5)
Vif = yif − α lnPi, f ∈ {H,K,L} (6)
where Pi denotes consumers’ cost-of-living index in region i which takes symmetry of
producer prices already into account.
5.2.3 Production
Traditional Sector
The A-good is traded at zero costs among regions and is produced using labor only
according to qAi = LAi , where LAi denotes labor input and qAi denotes output. Due to
perfect competition labor is paid its marginal product. Free trade ensures that wage
rates are equalized across regions. Hence, with pAi = 1 and from pAi qAi = wLAi and
qAi = L
A
i it follows w = 1 for both regions.
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Final goods production (downstream industry)
A firm of the M -sector produces a variety using sector specific capital K a composite
intermediate good X with price Pxi entering as a CES aggregate and labor. More
precisely, output of an upstream firm only enters production of a final good variety,
i.e. the M -good serves as a final consumption good whereas the X-good is used as an
intermediate input only. A representative downstream firm in region i has to employ
one unit of capital K as the fixed input requirement which costs Ri before starting to
produce a final good variety. Production of the variety itself follows a Cobb-Douglas
technology where aM units of the intermediate input per unit of output is employed.
Hence, a typical downstream firms in region i produces qMi units of output with total
costs TCMi given by
TCMi = aMP
η
xiqMi +Ri, 0 < η < 1 (7)
The parameter η denotes the share of expenditures which are devoted to the purchase
of the composite X-good with producer price Pxi = [nip1−ρxi + njp
1−ρ
xj ]
1
1−ρ .5 It also
indicates the intensity of vertical linkages between upstream and downstream firms.
The profit function of a downstream firm reads
piMi = (pMi − aMP ηxi)qMi −Ri, (8)
and the profit maximizing final goods producer price is a constant mark up over
marginal costs pMi = σσ−1aMP
η
xi. Choosing units aM =
σ−1
σ
then yields
pMi = P
η
xi, (9)
i.e. the price of the final industrial good depends on the cost of purchasing the whole
available range of intermediate inputs. Note that the per unit producer price is identical
on the two markets. This is due to the familiar result that mill pricing in the Dixit
5Pxi is derived solving the lower expenditure minimization problem
∫ nw
0
pxi(s)xi(s)ds s.t. Xi =
[
∫ nw
0
xi(s)
ρ−1
ρ ]
ρ
ρ−1 .
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Stiglitz monopolistic competition framework is optimal for firms.6 Trade costs are
fully borne by consumers implying that part of the demand is indirect due to transport
losses.
Using the zero pure profit condition and applying mill prices from (9) yields output
qMi that allows a downstream firm to break even
qMi =
Riσ
P ηxi
. (10)
Finally, the condition for market clearing in the final goods sector reads
qMi = Diiµ1 + τDijµ2. (11)
Would-be entrepreneurs bid for downstream capital K until operating profit equals
the capital reward rate for this sector, Ri = pMiqMiσ .
7 Inserting households’ demand
function using (4) into (11) and applying the share notation yields the reward for
downstream capital K in each location
R1 =
α
σ
(
µ1
sm + φ(1− sm)χ +
φµ2
φsm + (1− sm)χ
)
(12)
R2 =
α
σ
(
χµ2
φsm + (1− sm)χ +
χφµ1
sm + φ(1− sm)χ
)
, (13)
where φ ≡ τ 1−σ is the level of trade freeness with φ ∈ [0, 1]. χ ≡ (pM2
pM1
)1−σ
=
(
Px2
Px1
)η(1−σ)
is the ratio of producer price indices for intermediate varieties.
6This is due to the constant markup, or more precisely due to the constant elasticity of substitution
(see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)).
7Operating profits in the Dixit Stiglitz monopolistic competition framework are equal to a constant
share of firm’s sales.
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Intermediate goods production (upstream industry)
The representative firm of the upstream sector produces one variety using one unit of
sector specific capital H and ax units of labor according to the total cost function
TCxi = axqxi + ri (14)
where ri denotes capital H’s reward rate, qxi firm’s output in region i and ax the unit
input requirement of labor. With the profit function of the representative firm in region
i, pixi =
(
pxi− ax
)
qxi− ri, the profit maximizing price of an upstream firms is given by
pxi =
( ρ
ρ− 1
)
ax (15)
where ρ is the elasticity of demand perceived by upstream firms whose demand stems
from M -good producers. In equilibrium firms make zero profits and equilibrium firm
size is equal to
qxi =
ri(ρ− 1)
ax
(16)
which by choosing units ax = ρ−1ρ is simply qxi = riρ. For simplicity we will assume that
the perceived elasticity of demand of downstream firms equals the perceived elasticity
of demand of upstream, σ = ρ, i.e. upstream and downstream firms neglect to the
same amount the effect of their pricing behavior on the overall sectoral price index Pxi
and PMi, respectively. Total demand of the downstream sector producing in region i
for the upstream composite good X is derived using Shepard’s Lemma on (7)
∂TCMi
∂Pxi
= ηaMqMiP
η−1
xi =
ηV CMi
Pxi
(17)
with ηV CMi denoting expenditure on the composite good X of a single M firm pro-
ducing in i with variable costs
V CMi = aMP
η
xiqMi. (18)
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Let xii(s) denote the quantity of an intermediate variety s produced in i and demanded
by M firms in i. xii(s) is derived applying Shepard’s Lemma on (18) which yields
xii(s) =
∂V CMi
∂pxi(s)
=
∂V CMi
∂Pxi
∂Pxi
∂pxi(s)
=
p−ρxi ηV CMi
P 1−ρxi
. (19)
The market clearing condition for an upstream firm reads
qxi = xiimi + τxijmj. (20)
In a goods market equilibrium supply of an intermediate variety must be equal to
downstream firms’ demand for the variety. Note that we assume the intermediate good
to be exposed to the same level of trade costs as the final good. Analogously to the M
sector, reward to owners of capital H is equal to operating profit of an intermediate
good producer, ri = pxiqxiρ . After inserting market demand for the intermediate variety
using (19) and the producer price using (15) then yields
r1 =
η(σ − 1)
σ
(
R1sm
sn + φ(1− sn)(px2px1 )1−ρ
+
φR2(1− sm)
φsn + (1− sn)(px2px1 )1−ρ
)
(21)
r2 =
η(σ − 1)
ρ
(
R2(1− sm)
φsn + (1− sn) +
φR1sm
sn + φ(1− sn)
)
, (22)
where we use the share notation and ρ = σ. As producer prices for upstream varieties
are equal across regions we can write (px2
px1
)1−ρ = 1.
5.3 Locational equilibria
In the short run both types of capital are immobile. Consequently, the share of down-
stream industry sm as well as the share of upstream industry in region 1, sn, are both
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exogenous and capital owners K and H earn rewards equal to (12), (13) and (21), (22),
respectively. In the long run capital owners of both industries seek for the highest nom-
inal reward which is measured in terms of the numéraire. The location of upstream
and downstream capital is determined by its respective capital reward differential. In
the following, we verbally describe the locational forces of the final goods industry and
the intermediate goods sector and leave a formal analysis to Appendix 5.6.
As firms of the final goods industry face immobile household demand in each region
they will want to locate where market demand is highest which minimizes transport
costs (‘demand linkage effect’). On the other hand, firms of the final goods sector use
intermediate varieties in the production of the M good. Consequently they will want
to locate close to upstream firms which minimizes the cost of purchasing intermediate
goods (‘cost linkage effect’). Firms of the upstream industry face no cost linkages but
locate where demand for intermediate varieties is highest. Both industries are subject
to the local competition effect in their sector which acts as a dispersion force. The
equilibrium location of upstream and downstream firms will be determined by the
interplay of these agglomerative and dispersive forces. To derive the equilibrium share
of final good firms in region 1 we exploit the no-delocation condition R1−R2 = 0 which
characterizes a locational equilibrium in this sector. Using (12) and (13) and solving
for sm, yields
sm =Min[1,Max(0, sˆm)], with sˆm =
1
2
[
2 +
φ
χ− φ +
1
χφ− 1
]
(23)
where we assume symmetric market size and impose µ1 = µ2 = 32 . Equation (23)
reveals that the share of downstream firms depends on the level of trade freeness φ and
on the ratio of cost indices χ for purchasing intermediate X-varieties which themselves
depend on the share of upstream firms, sn. The equilibrium of upstream firms can be
described by the following proposition.
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Proposition 1 X-industry exhibits only two stable spatial equilibria. Firms of the X-
sector are either symmetrically dispersed (sn = 1/2) across regions or agglomerated in
one of the region. A partial equilibrium is never a stable equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 5.7. ¥
Proposition 1 states that upstream firms locate either symmetrically across locations
or agglomerate in one region. The critical level of trade freeness (commonly denoted as
the ‘break point’ level of trade freeness) at which the allocation of upstream industry
changes from a symmetric distribution to a full agglomeration equilibrium is obtained
solving ∂(r1−r2)
∂sn
∣∣
sn=
1
2
= 0 for φ.8
φB = 1 + 2η − 2
√
η(1 + η),
∂φB
∂η
= 2− (1 + 2η)√
η(1 + η)
< 0. (24)
The second expression unveils that agglomeration of intermediate goods suppliers oc-
curs at lower levels of trade freeness as production linkages get more intense.
Clearly, under autarky (φ → 0), downstream and upstream industry will be evenly
distributed across regions, sm = sn = 12 .
9 For cases where trade costs are positive,
the vertical production structure has some interesting implications for the allocation of
downstream and upstream firms. This can be easily seen after differentiating sm using
(23) with respect to sn and evaluating the expression at the symmetric equilibrium
∂sˆm
∂sn
∣∣∣∣
sn=1/2
=
4ηφ
1− φ2 > 0. (25)
Bearing in mind that sn = 1/2 implies sm = 1/2 implies that as soon as the region
holds all upstream firms it also enjoys more than half the share of downstream firms,
sm|sn=1 > 1/2, as long as trade is not completely free. This effect is amplified with
8See Appendix 5.8 for a detailed derivation of φB .
9For upstream industry, insert the equilibrium share of downstream firms, sm and downstream capital
reward rates R1 and R2 into (21) and (22) and evaluate (r1 − r2) at φ = 0. Solving r1 − r2
∣∣
φ=0
for
sn yields sn = 12 .
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higher input-output linkages and freer trade. Figure 5.1 illustrates upstream capital’s
reward gap for different sn and the corresponding share of downstream firms in a
scissors diagram (Figure 5.2)10
Figure 5.1: Upstream industry (X)
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Figure 5.2: Downstream industry (M)
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The stability of the agglomerated equilibrium for upstream firms is best explained with
a thought experiment commonly used in this literature (e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003)).
Starting from the symmetric allocation at sn = 12 in Figure 5.1 and increasing the
share of upstream firms in region 1 marginally widens the capital reward gap r1 − r2
which makes region 1 relatively more profitable to upstream capitalists. Consequently,
region 1 will experience an inflow of upstream firms as along as the capital reward gap
remains positive. The adjustment process will come to an end after all upstream firms
have set up their production facility in region 1. Figure 5.2 illustrates the location
of downstream firms in a scissors diagram for parameter values at which upstream
firms concentrate in one region. In this case, downstream industry are asymmetrically
distributed across regions (1/2 < sm < 1) and not fully agglomerated as firms in this
industry face demand from (immobile) households residing in each region.
Agglomeration rent
According to Proposition 1 and (25), economic activity of both industries will be un-
evenly distributed across regions if the level of trade integration is sufficiently high, i.e.
10Parameter values: α = 0.3;σ = 4;φ = 0.4; η = 0.3
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if φ exceeds φB. In that case, cost and demand linkages ensure that one region will
holds all intermediate suppliers and according to (25) a larger fraction of final goods
producers. As already described in the introduction, our paper intends to consider a
scenario where local authorities pursue a cluster strategy which focuses on a partic-
ular key industry. It seems therefore most natural to let upstream firms which are
decisive for the clustering of economic activity to represent a key industry and firms
belonging to the downstream sector to characterize those industries that are affected
by the location decisions of firms belonging to the key industry. Then, if intermediate
goods suppliers are agglomerated in one region, say region 1, upstream capitalists earn
an agglomeration rent Ω, which is defined as the loss that a single X firm incurs if it
relocates towards the peripheral region given that all other X firms stay in the core.
Formally, the agglomeration rent prevailing in region 1 is given by
Ω ≡ r1 − r2
∣∣
sn=1
=
3αη(σ − 1)(1− φ)[scm(1 + φ)− 1]
φσ2
(26)
where scm ≡Min[1,Max(0, sˆcm)] with
sˆcm ≡ sˆm|sn=1 =
1
2
(
2 +
φ
P η(1−σ) − φ +
1
φP η(1−σ) − 1
)
, (27)
and P ≡ Px2|sn=1 = Px1|sn=0 = φ
1
1−σ > 1.
Accordingly, we can write spm ≡Min[1,Max(0, sˆpm)] with
sˆpm ≡ sˆm|sn=0 =
1
2
(
2 +
φ
P−η(1−σ) − φ +
1
φP−η(1−σ) − 1
)
(28)
as the share of region 1’s downstream firms for the case where all upstream industry
is agglomerated in region 2.
To summarize, the section showed that the model exhibits only two possible stable
allocations of economic activity. Whether each location holds an equal share of each
industry depends on the level of trade integration as well as on the intensity of vertical
production linkages which both affect the relative strength of agglomerative and disper-
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sive forces. Moreover, equation (25) unveiled that the location of downstream industry
is linked to the location decision of intermediate goods suppliers. A concentration of
upstream firms in one location entails an uneven distribution of final goods produc-
ers across locations where the agglomerated location will attract more than half the
share of final goods producers. This benefits core and hurts peripheral residents on two
counts as trade in both types of goods is costly. Residents incur lower consumer prices
as final goods producers incur lower transport costs when purchasing intermediate va-
rieties. Additionally, core residents save on direct transport costs when purchasing the
industrial final good.
5.4 Competition for a key industry
The true vertical linkage nature of the model allows us to consider a cluster policy
which is targeted at one specific sector as described in the introduction.11 Each region
his run by a local government which decides on the distribution of funds. It maxi-
mizes regional welfare Wi which consists of the unweighted sum of indirect utilities of
households residing within a jurisdiction’s boundaries. Moreover, we consider a sce-
nario where local authorities compete for an industrial cluster, and presume that the
two regions initially differ in their level of economic activity. Whereas both regions are
active in the traditional sector, region 1, the core, is assumed to host all upstream firms
and consequently also a larger share in downstream industry. We denote region 2 the
periphery with sn = 0 and (1− scm) < 12 . We apply a three stage sequential move game
in the spirit of Baldwin and Krugman (2004), where the core region acts as a Stackel-
berg leader and chooses her subsidy level z1 in the first stage. The periphery decides
whether to attract upstream industry in the second stage. The equilibrium allocation
of economic activity unfolds in the third stage where production and consumption
take place as described in the preceding sections. Subsidy payments to upstream cap-
ital owners are financed through a lump sum tax on each factor owner’s endowment.
11E.g. Germany’s BioRegio program focuses exclusively on the biotech sector and was launched to
catch up with successes of UK and US biotech firms (OECD (2007)).
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Government’s budget constraint in region 1 and region 2 then reads
z1sn = µ1T1, z2(1− sn) = µ2T2, (29)
where zi, i ∈ {1, 2} is the subsidy payment prevailing in region i and offered to upstream
capitalists. Indirect utility of each households now reads
Vif = sf [−α lnPi + y∗f − Ti], f ∈ {H,K,L}, i ∈ {1, 2} (30)
where Pi is given in (5) and Ti denotes the per capita residency based lump sum
tax. Workers’ income in both regions is simply the wage rate which is equal to one.
Derivation of capital owners’ income is equally straightforward. Irrespective of the equi-
librium allocation of downstream capital (either an interior equilibrium where capital
rates equalize or a corner equilibrium where downstream capital follows the location
of upstream firms) income of downstream capital owners is the same, i.e. y∗K ≡ 3ασ ,
i ∈ {1, 2}.12 Similarly, upstream capitalists earn an income equal to y∗H ≡ 3αη(σ−1)σ +zi,
i ∈ {1, 2}. Noting that µ1 ≡ sk+ sh+ sl and µ2 ≡ (1− sk)+ (1− sh)+ (1− sl) regional
welfare in the two economic states, sn = 0 and sn = 1 can be expressed as
WC1 = −αµ1 lnPC1 + shy∗H + sky∗K + sl − z1, (31)
W P1 = −αµ1 lnP P1 + shy∗H + sky∗K + sl, (32)
WC2 = −αµ2 lnPC2 + (1− sh)y∗H + (1− sk)y∗K + (1− sl)− z2, (33)
W P2 = −αµ2 lnP P2 + (1− sh)y∗H + (1− sk)y∗K + (1− sl), (34)
where WC2 ≡ W1|sn=0, W P2 ≡ W1|sn=1 and PC2 ≡ P2|sn=0.13
12For the proof, we simply insert the equilibrium number of downstream firms, sm using (23) into Ri
using (12)-(13). The same equilibrium capital reward rate is obtained after evaluating R1 at sm = 1
or R2 at sm = 0, respectively.
13A detailed derivation of the cost-of-living indices is conducted in Appendix 5.9.
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5.4.1 Stage 2 - Periphery’s decision
We begin with periphery’s choice of z2. Upstream capital owners earn an (after subsi-
dies) agglomeration rent, Ωˆ ≡ (z1− z2) +Ω, where Ω is denoted in (26). If periphery’s
regional policy program is to attract the target industry it must offer a subsidy payment
which is high enough to make each upstream capitalist indifferent between employing
her capital in region 1 or 2 given that the rest of upstream capital remains in region 1.
Formally, this critical subsidy level is derived setting Ωˆ = 0 and solving for z2 which
yields z2 = z1+Ω. Hence, to induce a delocation of upstream firms periphery must pay
a subsidy high enough to compensate upstream capitalists for the agglomeration rent
prevailing in the core plus the subsidy payment which is offered by the core government.
Proposition 2. Tighter production linkages increase periphery’s cost of attracting the
cluster (‘Rent-increasing effect of linkages’)
∂z2
∂η
=
∂Ω
∂η
= γ
[
scm(1 + φ) + η(1 + φ)
∂scm
∂η
]
≥ 0 (35)
with γ ≡ 3α(σ−1)(1−φ)
φσ2
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix 5.10.1. ¥
Consequently, stronger interindustry linkages stabilize an existing agglomeration which
makes it more costly for a challenging periphery to snatch the industry core.
Aside from the subsidy level that periphery has to offer at least in order to persuade
upstream capitalists to invest in the region, we need to know how much periphery is
actually willing to pay for the industry cluster. Intuitively, periphery will increase her
subsidy offer as long as residents’ welfare after successfully attracting the industry core
is higher than welfare without the cluster. Note that periphery’s upstream capitalists
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benefit from a subsidy paid by the foreign government due to the repatriation of capital
income and the residency based financing scheme. Inserting capital owners’ income yH ,
and yK into (33),(34) and solving WC2 = W P2 for z2 yields the threshold level of z2 at
which periphery is no longer willing to attract the agglomeration.
z2 = −(1− sh)
sh
z1 − αµ2
sh
ln
(
PC2
P P2
)
(36)
z2 will be lower the higher the foregone subsidy payment z1 that periphery’s upstream
capitalists have to incur in case her government decides to attract the cluster. It will
be higher the larger the potential gain from saving on transport costs on imported
final goods since a side effect of attracting the agglomeration is a relocation of down-
stream firms towards the new core.14 The latter effect will be amplified with rising
interindustry linkages which is summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Stronger linkages increase the attractiveness of hosting the industry
cluster for the periphery (‘Cost-of-living effect’).
∂z2
∂η
= −αµ2
sh
[
∂PC2
∂η
(PC2 )
−1 − ∂P
P
2
∂η
(P P2 )
−1
]
≥ 0 (37)
Proof. See Appendix 5.10.2. ¥
Proposition 3 is not confined to the periphery but applies equally to residents in the
core region. To confirm that the industry cluster becomes more attractive with stronger
vertical production linkages for core residents we derive the threshold level of core’s
willingness to retain the agglomeration analogously to z2 by solving WC1 = W P1 for
z1. By symmetry of the model, core’s willingness to hold on to the cluster increases
with an increase in vertical production linkages, ∂z1
∂η
≥ 0. This result emphasizes a
14Appendix 5.9 shows that ln
(PC2
PP2
)
< 0.
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notable difference to the model employed in Kind et al. (2000). In a model with
horizontal production linkages as outlined in Kind et al. (2000), industrial varieties are
used for private consumption but also enter as intermediate inputs in the production
of the industrial good. Consequently, the share which industrial varieties take on in
the production of the final industrial good (in our model denoted as η) next to labor
also determines the degree to which varieties enter private consumption. It follows
that a larger intensity of production linkages lowers the share of industrial varieties
in household’s consumption basket. As a result, hosting an industrial cluster becomes
less attractive to a region with increasing input-output linkages as the output of this
sector then denotes only a small share in private consumption.
Hence, whereas the attractiveness of holding an agglomeration declines with stronger
production linkages in Kind et al. (2000) it increases in our model for both, the core
and the periphery. Stronger production linkages affect consumer prices of final good
varieties since downstream firms are reliant on intermediate goods varieties. Holding
the industrial core is therefore associated with lower consumer prices for residents of
the core as they benefit from savings in direct transport costs of the final good since the
core holds a larger share of final goods industry. Secondly, final goods producers save
on transport costs when purchasing intermediate varieties and will therefore charge
lower consumer prices.
5.4.2 Stage 1 - Core’s decision
At the first stage of the subsidy game the government of the core region foresees the
implications of her choice on the periphery’s choice in the second stage. Core decides
according to the decision rule
z1 =
 zˆ1 if WC1 (zˆ1) ≥ W P1 (z2),zˆ1 − δ otherwise.
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where δ is some small but positive number. If core decides to retain the agglomeration
she has to set a subsidy level at which inducing a relocation of upstream firms becomes
too costly for the periphery. Solving z2 = z2 for z1 yields the level of subsidy payment
at which core ensures that the industry cluster stays in the region
zˆ1 = −µ2α ln
(
PC2
P P2
)
− shΩ (38)
The subsidy level necessary to prevent a delocation will be higher if periphery faces
a large potential benefit from attracting the core. A large agglomeration rent reduces
core’s cost of preventing a delocation. If core is not interested in holding on to the
industry cluster it simply offers a subsidy level marginally below zˆ1. This ensures that
periphery can profitably attract all industry while core’s upstream capitalists benefit
from high subsidy payments financed by residents of the periphery. As only capital is
mobile while its owners reside in the region of residence, repatriation of capital income
benefits region 1’s upstream capitalists.
Inspection of the critical subsidy levels z2 and z2 unveiled two opposing effects of higher
input-output linkages which influences core’s choice of subsidy payment in (38). On
the one hand, stronger linkages stabilize the agglomeration rent Ω which lowers core’s
cost of retaining all industry. On the other hand, stronger linkages also promise higher
benefits from holding the core which increases periphery’s threshold level up to which
she will make an offer to upstream capitalists. Figure 5.3 depicts zˆ1 evaluated at φ = φB
for parameter values α = 0.3; σ = 4;µ2 = 3/2; sh = 1/2.
Figure 5.3 illustrates that slightly altering the underlying model by assuming vertical
instead of horizontal linkages affects the interpretation and direction of subsidy levels.
Contrary to earlier work by Kind et al. (2000) where the taxing capacity increases
monotonically with increasing production linkages, the subsidy cost (taxing capacity)
of retaining the core in the current model increase (decreases) for weak production link-
ages and only decrease (increase) when vertical linkages between both sectors become
sufficiently strong.
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Figure 5.3: Core’s subsidy necessary to defend industry core
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The equilibrium outcome of the game is summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium outcome) Core retains all industry and sets z1 = zˆ1 which
increases periphery’s cost of attracting upstream firms to the level where z2 = z2.
WC1 (zˆ1)−W P1 (z2) ≥ 0. (39)
Proof. See Appendix 5.10.3. ¥
Proposition 4 states that a welfare maximizing government of a periphery abstains from
offering funds to upstream capitalists as the underlying financing costs would make her
residents, particularly worker households and downstream capital owners who do not
belong to the subsidy recipients, worse off. To trigger a delocation of the key industry
periphery would have to offer a subsidy level which exceeds her threshold level z2 as
soon as core chooses to set zˆ1. Moreover, although upstream firms will not relocate,
maintaining the industry cluster becomes less attractive if subsidies accrue to capital
owners abroad. Global welfare remains unaffected as subsidies are distributed in a
lump-sum fashion. Compared to the welfare level prior to the subsidy competition
game, core residents experience an overall welfare decline whereas periphery residents
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benefit from subsidy payments financed by core residents.15 Welfare of core’s upstream
capital owners increases whereas core’s workers and downstream capitalists are worse
off compared to a situation without any subsidies.
The outcome of the subsidy game highlights an often postulated concern that regional
policy programs targeted at one specific industry do not affect the allocation of industry
as intended and are associated with high financing costs for the core region. These are
mainly borne by non-recipients whereas capitalists of the subsidized industry benefit
from the distribution of subsidy payments irrespective of the region of residence.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper recognizes the recent shift in several national industrial policy strategies as
outlined in the latest OECD report on regional policies (OECD (2007)). We consider
a cluster strategy where public funds are distributed to firms of an industry of which
local authorities believe that it fosters an ongoing agglomeration process attracting
further establishments of related industries. Welfare maximizing governments compete
for firms of this core industry as attracting the core industry is associated with higher
regional welfare. The underlying model differs from earlier work by Kind et al. (2000)
who similarly deal with questions of interjurisdictional competition in the presence of
agglomeration economies. We employ a vertical linkage model with final and inter-
mediate goods producers and account for the stylized fact that cost linkages are an
important source of agglomeration. Altering the assumptions on the production struc-
ture of the model in this way has implications for the tax competition game. More
precisely, the taxing capacity of a region hosting an industrial agglomeration no longer
monotonically increases with increasing cost linkages but depends on the level of initial
input-output linkages. The equilibrium outcome of the subsidy game reveals that a
welfare maximizing periphery will abstain from attracting an industrial core as the fi-
15The exact amount to which core residents lose compared to a situation without subsides is (1 −
sh)z
∗
h, i.e. the amount that accrues to foreign subsidy recipients which is financed by domestic core
residents.
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nancing costs exceed the benefits of attracting a core industry. Whereas the allocation
of economic activity remains unchanged, core residents suffer from financing subsidy
payments that are necessary to prevent a relocation of industry. Except for capital
owners of the subsidized industry, residents of the industrial core will suffer from the
distribution of sector specific subsidies.
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Appendix
5.6 Locational forces of the model
5.6.1 Final goods sector
Cost-linkage effect
Given symmetric region size downstream firms will agglomerate indirectly due to cost
linkages. Indirect because the concentration of M -firms depends on the number of
upstream firms in a region. Selling in the region with a high number of upstream firms
lowers the cost of purchasing intermediates. Formally,
∂(R1 −R2)
∂sn
∣∣∣∣
sm=sn=1/2
=
∂(R1 −R2)
∂χ
∂χ
∂sn
=
48αη(1− φ)φ
σ(1 + φ)3
≥ 0. (A.1)
Downstream local competition effect
On the other hand the local competition effect deters firms to produce in a region with
many competitors.
∂(R1 −R2)
∂sm
∣∣∣∣
sm=sn1/2
= −12α(φ− 1)
2
σ(1 + φ)2
< 0. (A.2)
5.6.2 Intermediate goods sector
Demand linkage effect
Demand linkages in the upstream industry support the agglomeration of suppliers in
one region. The intensity of demand linkages depends on the share of intermediates de-
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noted as η that enter the variable cost of a downstream firm. Inspecting the expression
for sm reveals that it depends on the share of upstream industry as well as exogenous
parameters. Holding the market competition constant we insert the expression for Ri,
i ∈ {1, 2} and sm into the upstream capital reward differential and differentiate with
respect to sn. This yields the isolated demand linkage effect
∂(r1 − r2)
∂sn
∣∣∣∣
sn=1/2
=
48αη2(σ − 1)φ
(1 + φ)2σ2
≥ 0 (A.3)
The demand linkage effect is positive but decreasing in the level of trade freeness as
location becomes less important with ongoing economic integration. The second order
derivative reads
∂2(r1 − r2)
∂sn∂φ
∣∣∣∣
sn=1/2
=
96αη2(σ − 1)(φ− 2)
(1 + φ)4σ2
< 0 (A.4)
Upstream local competition effect
The local competition effect for upstream firms is derived similarly to above. Holding
the demand linkage effect constant it can be expressed as
∂(r1 − r2)
∂sn
∣∣∣∣
sn=1/2
= −12αη(φ− 1)
2(1 + φ(2− 4η + φ))(σ − 1)
(1 + φ)4σ2
≤ 0. (A.5)
5.7 Proof of Proposition 1
As ∂2(r1− r2)/∂s2n = 0 and ∂3(r1− r2)/∂s3n > 0 at the symmetric equilibrium sn = 1/2
and φ = φB with
∂3(r1 − r2)
∂s3n
=
96αη3(1 + 2η)(σ − 1)
(1 + η)σ2
the formal conditions for a subcritical pitchfork diagram are fulfilled which implies
that partial equilibria such as 0 < sn < 1/2 and 1/2 < sn < 1 are unstable equilibria
(Grandmont (2008), pp.33.). ¥
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5.8 Derivation of φB
To derive the level of trade freeness at which the slope of the capital reward gap curve
is just zero, i.e. where agglomeration and dispersion force do just offset each other, we
insert the expression for R1 and R2 using (12) and (13) as well as sm using (23) into
(21) and (22) and partially differentiate (r1− r2) with respect to the share of upstream
firms sn and evaluate at the symmetric equilibrium. This yields
∂(r1 − r2)
∂sn
∣∣∣∣
sn=1/2
=
12αη(σ − 1)[φ(2 + 4η − φ)− 1]
(1 + φ)2σ2
(A.6)
Note that this expression is simply the sum of the market crowding and the demand
linkage effect derived above. Solving (A.6) for φ yields the break point expressed in
(24).
5.9 Cost-of-living indices
The producer price indices for region 1 and 2 read
Px1 =
[
sn + φ(1− sn)
] 1
1−σ Px2 =
[
(1− sn) + φsn
] 1
1−σ (A.7)
Noting that PCxi = 1 and P = P Pxi = φ
1
1−σ , the cost-of-living-indices for final goods for
both possible states (core and periphery) read
PC1 = [s
c
m + (1− scm)φP η(1−σ)]
1
1−σ , P P1 = [s
p
mP
η(1−σ) + (1− spm)φ]
1
1−σ , (A.8)
PC2 = [(1− spm) + spmφP η(1−σ)]
1
1−σ , P P2 = [(1− scm)P η(1−σ) + scmφ]
1
1−σ . (A.9)
To prove that ln
(PC2
PP2
)
< 0 we use the fact that scm = 1 − spm (for equal overall market
size). Consequently, PC1 = PC2 and P P1 = P P2 . To show that PC1 < P P1 it must be true
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that
scm + (1− scm)φP η(1−σ) > (1− scm)P η(1−σ) + scmφ (A.10)
which after some rearrangements and inserting P = φ
1
1−σ can be written as
scm − (1− scm)φη
This expression is positive since scm > (1−scm) due to (25) and φη < 1 for our parameter
specifications.
5.10 Proofs
5.10.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Partially differentiating scm with respect to η yields
∂scm
∂η
=
1
2
P
η(1−σ)
x2 (1− σ)φ lnPx2
(
− 1
(P
η(1−σ)
x2 − φ)2
− 1
(φP
η(1−σ)
x2 − 1)2
)
> 0 (A.11)
which is positive since σ > 1. ¥
5.10.2 Proof of Proposition 3
To prove that ∂P
C
2
∂η
is non-negative it must be true that ∂P
C
2
∂η
≤ 0 and ∂PP2
∂η
≥ 0. We
begin with the first expression
∂PC2
∂η
=
1
1− σ (P
C
2 )
σ
(
∂scm
∂η
(1− φ1+η) + (1− scm)φ1+η lnφ
)
(A.12)
Increasing vertical production linkages will have no effect on the consumer price index
for the case where scm = 1. In this case it follows
∂scm
∂η
= 0 and ∂P
C
2
∂η
= 0. For the
case of an interior stable equilibrium of downstream industry,1
2
< scm < 1 we insert the
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expression for ∂s
c
m
∂η
from (A.11) which yields
∂PC2
∂η
=
1
1− σ
(
φ1+η(φ2 − 1)
2(φ− φη)2 (P
C
2 )
σ lnφ
)
(A.13)
This expression is unambiguously negative since 0 < φ, η < 1 and σ > 1. The benefit
from a lower cost-of-living index therefore increases with stronger production linkages.
It remains to be shown that ∂P
P
2
∂η
≥ 0.
∂P P2
∂η
=
1
1− σ (P
P
2 )
σ
(
(1− scm)φη lnφ−
∂scm
∂η
(φη − φ)
)
≥ 0 (A.14)
This expression is non-negative for σ > 1 since ∂s
c
m
∂η
≥ 0 and (φη − φ) > 0. ¥
5.10.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Inserting zˆ1 and z2(zˆ1 − δ) into W P1 (z1) and W P1 (z2) yields
WC1 (zˆ1)−W P1 (z2) = shδ − µ1α ln
(
PC1
P P1
)
+ µ2α ln
(
PC2
P P2
)
= shδ > 0,
(A.15)
since PC1 = PC2 and P P1 = P P2 and µ1 = µ2. ¥
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